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The Political Origins of the "Behavioral Revolution" in Political Science, 1937-1951

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A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science.

Chapel Hill
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ABSTRACT
BRUCE BYERS
The Political Origins of the "Behavioral Revolution" in Political Science, 1937-1951
(Under the direction of Professor Michael Lienesch)

Critical histories of political science have stressed the importance of liberalism, scientism, and realism to the rise of behavioralism in political science. These histories have thus stressed the absence of objectivity in empirical inquiry in political science. More sympathetic histories, however, have stressed the importance of behavioralists' rejection of legalistic and historicist approaches to political analysis. These characterizations identify behavioralism as the resumption of a lost Aristotelian orientation to political analysis and the presence of objectivity, broadly considered. By focusing on the period from 1937 to 1951 and on the strongest proponents of behavioralism in the Social Science Research Council, this study questions both of these historical descriptions of behavioralism in political science. I contend that behavioralism was developed by individuals actively engaged in the research and training of administrators during the late New Deal and during World War II. I further contend that it proceeded from an administrative perspective suspicious of broad definitions of democracy. These contentions are supported by examining the proponents of a hierarchical conception of labor within the administrative perspective, and their rejection of a participatory conception of labor among a nascent group of reform oriented public intellectuals. The former emphasized formal political participation as a sufficient form of democratic practice. The latter emphasized the importance of more substantive conceptions of democratic practice, including the possibility for an "industrial democracy" and its subsequent democratization of administrative practices. I conclude that behavioralism was a form of knowledge developed by and for those embedded in a conservative administrative paradigm.

Preface

What impressed me most about the reformers I examined here was their understanding of the ideas surrounding "work" and "labor"-- of the ways in which the history, practices, beliefs and structures associated with these terms define our lives. For these theorists the concept and practice of work had given the concept of democracy its soul in the 19th century, and they hoped attention to its structure and meaning would help guide political and social reform in the unstable world of the 20th century. The seemingly romantic (and perhaps rather male) orientation of this perspective was not lost on me. I nonetheless remain quite sympathic to their claims: they claimed that if American citizens did not create the structures for broad and substantive forms of participation in society, something precious would be lost — in an unregulated economy, meaningful participation in the workplace would be impossible, and without that participation, communal life would be rather empty. I contend that their observations regarding the increased presence of a barren "pressure group politics" remains a compelling platform for better understanding of the present. Even in the so-called boom economy of the 1990s in the United States, there is hypercompetition for "good" jobs, pathological levels of competition to gain credentials for them, and simultaneous discussion about the need for a "communitarian" ethos. The critical difference between contemporary discussions of community (such as those put forth by Amitai Etzioni) and those of the late New Deal "utopian" reformers, however, was the reformers' sense that the concept of true community could not be separated from the performance of meaningful work. More to the point, these "utopians" saw a new breed of social scientists in the late 1930s, and thought they were apologizing for the presence of these fragmented and fragmenting pressure groups -- the new scientists were using "benign" terms like "status groups" and "interest groups." The new breed of social scientists were calling these groups "modern" and "normal." The reformers thought differently.

My own ability to work at uncovering the past was enabled by a cherished community of co-workers, friends, and family. The initial departure from my work as a craftsman was first aided by my dear aunt, Helen Hollander. With the aid of her family and the political milieu of the 1970s, I was helped to look beyond that world. The Honors Program at the University of Washington, overseen by Michael McCann and Dan Lev also provided a marvelous environment for exploring issues, testing ideas, and coming to terms with the presence of a world beyond the merely technical. At the University of North Carolina, Stephen Leonard, Leon Fink and Gary Marks were unselfish with their time and insights into the concept of labor, labor politics, and the role of intellectuals in the political

community. The help provided by Craig Calhoun throughout my graduate work has been multifaceted and exemplary.

This project has had a kind of life, and Professor Michael Lienesch has been at the very heart of it. In seminars, in office hours, and in the very character of his relationships with others he demonstrates the importance of listening carefully to ideas and to the texts, the people, and the periods people wish to examine. It is sad, indeed, that it is now much harder to get to his office. It is also with regret that I left my immediate contact with his family. Nicholas, Elizabeth, Ann and Marion were constant sources of warmth, support and guidance throughout my time in Chapel Hill. My greatest sorrow is that I learned only a small fraction of what they knew about the serious business of living.

I have been fortunate to receive the aid of other friends -- too numerous to mention. Most important has been the support of Andrew Pickard. In addition to his friendship throughout the years, Andy provided critical support for me at a moment in graduate school in which I was flagging. In some fundamental way, I have also benefitted deeply from the help of the entire Ahrens family, Eric Brantley, Salam Calhoun, Glenn Hayslett, Kerry Hogan, Julie Jacobs, Mark Leeper, Mark Marcoplos, Rita McClarty, and George Stephens.

Most important has been the aid given me by my family. My brother Brian has had a heart of gold throughout this process. My brother Gary has been an incredible exemplar for achieving competence and seeing tasks to completion, as in his own work. Finally, there has been the immeasurable help of my parents. I am saddened that my father was not able to see me reach the end of graduate school. In some sense, my work has been an attempt to understand the economic and ideological forces he faced in attempting to create an island of grace in a world which could use a little more. His goal, in many ways attained, was to form his own winery. Whatever the world of medicine might say, his untimely end was very much the result of the tension between an American dream and a harsher American reality he faced. A costly lesson, this has been a constant reminder to me to be acutely and critically aware of the world which shapes us. Mostly, I simply miss him. Throughout the years, my mother has provided me with astonishing levels of every conceivable form of support. Without it, completion of my own dream would not have been possible. It is to her that I dedicate this work.

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List of Abbreviations

AFL	American Federation of Labor
APSA	American Political Science Association
APSR	American Political Science Review
BOB	Bureau of the Budget
CEA	Council of Economic Advisors
CED	Committee for Economic Development
CIO	Congress of Industrial Organizations
COC	U.S. Chamber of Commerce
COE	Committee on Experts (SSRC)
CPB	Committee on Political Behavior (SSRC)
CWS	Committee on War Studies (SSRC)
FEA	Full Employment Act of 1945
JOP	Journal of Politics
NAM	National Association of Manufacturers
NDMB	National Defense Mediation Board
NIRA	National Industrial Recovery Act
NLRA	National Labor Relations Act
NLRB	National Labor Relations Board
NPB	National Planning Board
NRPB	National Resources Planning Board
NR	*The New Republic*
OPA	Office of Price Administration
PAR	Public Administration Review
PAC	Public Administration Committee (SSRC)
POQ	Public Opinion Quarterly
RAC	Rockefeller Archive Center (SSRC Collection)
SSRC	Social Sciences Research Council
TVA	Tennessee Valley Authority
UMW	United Mine Workers
WLB	War Labor Board

Introduction

The high drama of power politics on the international screen lulls us into forgetting that there is no international power politics that does not begin in power politics at home.

Robert Lynd
1945

Finally, I should like to comment briefly on the notion that the behavioral tendency in social science is somehow anti-democratic... The only possible grounds I am able to discern for this fear is one which applies to any increase in man's ability to control his natural or social environment.

Evron M. Kirkpatrick
1962

Another array of problems that my notes give ample testimony to. . . well, a difficult question that still persists is how do you deal with the so-called activists? And let me hasten to say that it's not activity that creates the problem. It's the nature of the aspirations and the projected actions that some of the so-called activists have in mind...What do you say? The tendency... is to be nice, to be polite, to say something disarming, something that won't offend anyone, at the same time try to fend off the likelihood of anything happening.

Pendleton Herring
1978

A. The Argument

This study places changes in the profession of political science within the context of American politics between 1937 and 1951. The story begins with the rise of the CIO as a new and significant entrant to the American political landscape. The story ends with the simultaneous publication of the report of the American Political Science Association (APSA) 1951 Committee on Responsible Parties and the 1951 report of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) Committee on Political Behavior (CPB). My primary

goal is to determine the political (as opposed to the scientific or philosophical) origins of the post-war concept of "behavioralism" in political science. My findings can be stated simply: the "behavioral revolution" was not merely a by product of social scientists' administrative or methodological training received in World War II governmental agencies, a reaction to cold war ideology, or the increased use of social psychological methodologies within the profession. Rather, it was deeply involved with a reaction to reform ideas of the late New Deal and supportive of more conservative ideas arising throughout the period under examination.

By the end of the 1940s, reform ideas such as centralized economic planning were no longer being seriously considered in policy making bodies.[1] It is clear, however, that remnants of those ideas colored plans to create a stable and democratic post war order, and this was something prominent political scientists were clearly directing their energies towards. In the early 1940s, reformers were calling for increased participation in government agencies and increased governmental power to regulate corporate power. Following suit, a number of political scientists proposed reformation of the profession and were involved in direct political action to support those reforms. These reformers' discussions included a science suspicious of its *laissez-faire* roots, the need to recognize the contributions of labor groups and minority parties, and the active support of centralized planning. The unacceptable character of these reform proposals, however, can be seen in the writings of a number of figures whose fame and centrality to contemporary political science practice is without question: Gabriel Almond, David Easton, Pendleton Herring, V. O. Key, Harold Lasswell, Earl Latham, Herbert Simon, and David Truman. It is more difficult to claim the same level of fame for reform oriented social scientists such as Peter Bachrach, Max Lerner, Benjamin Lippincot or Robert Lynd and George Soule. As Lerner guessed, however, the history would not be written by the reformers. This work attempts to recapture a sense of the need for a "behavioral" science -- to sketch the outline of the tension that existed between reformers seeking labor and consumer participation in governance, and those claiming that governance required the coordination

of those groups through buffering agents such as neutral administrators and fragmented parties.

The late 1930s and early 1940s calls for reform included co-managed workplaces and a co-administered price control system; a *cooperative* and *participatory* stance towards the depression. In the mid and late 1940s, however, alternatives arose which focused on the use of middle management and economic specialists to manage the workplace and run the polity using scientific insights unavailable to citizen participants; an *administrative* and *hierarchical* stance towards New Deal dilemmas.[2] The cooperative approach and the administrative approach were both thought to produce abundance, democracy and social stability, but clearly represented different paths to it.[3] Rather than let society proceed unplanned and directed by capitalists, reformist writers in the late 1930s and 1940s discussed the need for a critical and non-bourgeois political science, with focus on the expansion of group participation. Throughout, however, the creators of the behavioral movement in political science wanted a critical political science that remained suspicious of popular input, and worked with *already* organized groups. Given reformers' support for increasingly universal and direct participation, I have labeled them "activists" and "democratic collectivists." Since the more administratively placed writers claimed their ability to democratize capitalism with less drastic reform, I have labeled them "democratic capitalists."[4] The collectivists supported a centralized planning board and price administration office open to consumer and labor input. Democratic capitalists sought similar bodies, but indicated they were to be staffed by, as noted, scientifically trained specialists. Collectivists sought a stronger party system attentive to labor input. Democratic capitalists sought a loose party structure able to bargain with existing interests. Idealists like Max Lerner and E.E. Schattschneider had realist counterparts like the University of Chicago's Avery Leiserson and the SSRC's Pendleton Herring.

I contend that behavioralism was produced by a situation yielding a three stage argument peculiar to political scientists of the late New Deal era: the utopian "isms" producing "the

world revolution of our time" could be boiled down to differing strategies for the distribution of goods, status, and security; the distribution of these entities could be achieved by coordinating the desires of organized groups; and only scientifically trained administrative elites could continually find the mean between these groups. In a sense, then, international phenomena were viewed through the lens of domestic group politics, and domestic group politics were viewed through the lens of international politics. Those who were distressed by the rise of fascism and communism looked with concern at the rise of the CIO, and vice versa. It is difficult to determine which came first. It is clear, however, that democratic capitalists were concerned that the kind of participation sought by reformers would generate class tensions. At the very worst, the United States would follow the road of European countries into fascism or communism.

The *idea* of "behavioralism," I contend, was a paradigm for those who saw the possibility for "administered" (rather than socialist or fascist) coordination between increasingly conflictual groups. Organized interests in tension with one another could be reigned in with a vocabulary and perspective utterly antithetical to conflict. Any conflict could be reduced to a process, and could be parsed into more manageable units. Thus divided, consensus could be approached. It was therefore attendant upon those who sought to coordinate intergroup interaction to develop a body of knowledge antithetic to utopian "isms." With its focus on organized groups, it was portrayed as a system with better representative characteristics than the ham-handed "isms" producing world conflict. More importantly, they saw this approach as the only feasible solution facing New Deal planners— hence their claim to be realists. While activism was to be used to increase participation and realize reform, behavioralism was the basis for the administration of interests and stabilization of conflict. Activism, I contend, required recognizing a conflict of interest between the public interest and the needs of capitalists. Behavioralism, in its conceptualization as an administrative perspective, required acceptance of a basic unity of interest between capitalism and the public interest.

B. Contemporary Perspectives on the origin of Behavioralism

Histories surrounding the behavioral movement in political science are too numerous to address in detail, though a number of suggestive examples highlight the need for a fundamental reexamination of the period -- a reexamination which looks at the links between "revolutionaries" and their New Deal context.

In the decades since the revolution, one of the key assertions of behavioralism's founders has been the movement's apolitical origins in the rejection of a legalistic research tradition: their emphases on direct observation and falsifiable hypotheses were based on the rejection of methodologies stressing textual exegesis and historicist analysis. John Wahlke summarized this point, for example, in his 1978 presidential address. "How it began in protest against formalistic, historicist and juristic conceptions of political science's subject matter... needs no retelling here." The rejection of formalism, historicism, and legalism was not only an adequate summary of behavioralism's origins, but behavioralists contended that their work actually recaptured a lost western tradition. They were part of, Eulau notes, "a new generation that all too readily seemed to forget its roots in classical political theory... the techniques of behavioral analysis are in the tradition of the classical political theorists.".

A growing amount of literature has, of course, drawn these assertions into question by highlighting the liberal and realist outline of the profession's orientation.[5] But Gabriel Almond has countered that these have been left and right wing attempts to violate a longstanding tradition which rejects political advocacy. The profession, according to Almond, should remember its centrist foundation. In "beginning with the Greeks and continuing up to the creative scholars of our own generation, [we see] the historically correct version of our disciplinary heritage." In response to Theodore Lowi's recent charge that Herbert Simon's work was the product of a "web" of capitalist power relations, Simon claimed that only "behavioral methodology" would reveal the presence of political bias within the profession. The reason, one would have to assume, is that behavioral methodologies have proven their unique (and centrist) ability to objectively

assess the validity of any claim.[6] In any event, one is easily left with the question: does "centrism" adequately describe the formation of the behavioral movement? If so, how was this center defined?

One problem with a reexamination of the period begins with political scientists' own history of it. Analyses of the New Deal, for example, have either treated it as a monolithic entity, or been highly critical of its radical and experimental components. One clear theme is the "consensus" assertion that groups involved in New Deal politics were focused solely on material gain. In *The End of Liberalism* Theodore Lowi claimed the New Deal institutionalized a banal (and presumably pecuniary) interdependence between interest groups and government. The result has paralyzed the possibilities for government planning and held planners in a state of "permanent receivership" to interest groups.[7] Grant McConnel identified the New Deal's embrace of collective bargaining as a change in labor's tactics to attain mere job security. In the transformation from the AFL to the CIO, "the issue was the same; only the means of resolution was novel..."[8] Seymour Martin Lipset identified the "iron law of oligarchy" as the fundamental reason CIO leaders were "not concerned with the lack of democracy" while Henry Kariel claimed nascent CIO unions "invariably obeyed Michel's iron law..." and helped generate the "decline of pluralism." Similarly W.C. McWilliams claimed that "access to goods... account[ed] for the tendency of the unions to sacrifice every other good to the attainment of economic gain..." A number of other political histories repeat similar themes.[9]

Recent discussion of New Deal political thought clearly suggests, however, that the late New Deal contained a deeper reform orientation. Far from the liberal interpretation of the late New Deal, activist labor leaders, public intellectuals, and left leaning Democrats in the NLRB and on Senator Robert Wagner's staff were seeking much deeper reforms than they have been given credit for. This is not only evident in the recent work of historians such as Alan Brinkley, Christopher Tomlins, Melvyn Dubofsky, Alan Fraser and Stephen Gerstle, but among political scientists as well.[10] Mark Barenburg suggests, for example,

that the political theory of groups embodied in the Wagner Act outlines a formula for social transformation far more radical than McConnel's interpretation suggests. Joel Rogers identifies the presence of a "divide and conquer" strategy towards labor in the post-war era, noting the presence of a collectivist alternative feared by capitalists. A collectivism similar to the one Rogers speculates in theory is, in fact, considered by activists in the late New Deal.[11]

As discussed in greater detail below, the characteristics of deep reforms were outlined in periodicals such as the *New Republic*, *The Nation*, *Survey Graphic*, the *Annals of the American Academy* and the *Virginia Quarterly Review* between 1937 and 1946. *New Republic* activists tried, for example, to define labor groups in a way which cut across notions of specific "interests" such as farm, industry, and craft labor. In addition, the prevalence of unionization was to be high enough to fundamentally re-orient the function of government in a way which educated workers of the critical social role of their actions. The arguments of *New Republic* activists were not based on a simplistic belief that the mere increase in union density would make labor perspectives more prevalent in society. It was, rather, based on the theory that a fundamental shift would occur in the character and function of government, industry, labor, consumption, and social inquiry. Wilson Carey McWilliams described this as a utopian fraternal vision in which "what was valued in the worker was his status as a victim," but there is more structure to their argument than the concept of fraternity would suggest.[12]

The history of the behavioral movement has been approached by a number of writers, but with a paucity of details and no specific focus on the period under examination here. John Gunnell has, for example, examined the discussions of political theory which were "internal" to the profession, and thus noted that behavioralism was fundamentally connected to the 1920s concept of "scientism." Gunnell therefore concludes that with respect to political theory, the period embodied more of a reformation than a revolution. G. David Garson has also examined the "internal" debates of the profession, attempting

to account for the rise and fall of group theories of politics. In his focus on groups, Garson identifies a fundamental link between the history of administrative theory and the rise of the "golden age" of behavioral group theory in the 1950s. Indeed, Garson astutely identifies theorists' post-war discussion of groups as comparatively cynical and elitist relative to pre-war attempts to achieve functional representation. By focusing only on the tradition of "group theories," however, Garson implies that the work of those figures was limited to a narrow area of research within political science. By implication it suggests that "group theorists" were neither involved in the political actions of that period, nor establishing the outlines of acceptable practices for years to come.[13]

The work of David Ricci and Raymond Seidelman is equally telling. Identifying the "tragic" embrace of science, Ricci summarizes the behavioral era as one of a number of periods in which faith in science was unable to comprehend the depth of its social crises. Seidelman, conversely, identifies the work of V.O. Key (a critical figure within the SSRC Committee on Political Behavior) as firmly embedded in a "tradition" of political realism. Both authors were attempting to find broader trends within the profession, and were not concerned with defining behavioralism per se. Nonetheless, by identifying overarching "traditions" within the discipline, both Seidelman and Ricci write a history which is nearly as general as behavioralists' assertions that they have carried on the "classic traditions" in their work.

When placed in the more concrete world of late New Deal, wartime and post-war political dilemmas, the character of behavioralists' work need not be approached on such general terms. The fundamental significance of V.O. Key's work (selected as archetypal behavioralism by SSRC members), was not, for example, that he was perfecting an older methodology of scientism or joining his realist or liberal brethren. In the writing of *Southern Politics in State and Nation,* Key was looking at the practices of the single party South in ways which revealed arenas for "feasible" reforms in keeping with the administrative focus of the Social Science Research Council. Indeed, the initial formation

of the post-war SSRC Committee on Political Behavior was to find a body of knowledge which built upon the experience of the SSRC's more prominent Public Administration Committee. That committee had not only held monthly meetings among prominent Washington administrators during the war (49 of them between 1940 and 1945), but was overseen by the first chairman of the Committee on Political Behavior: Pendleton Herring. The SSRC's Policy and Planning Committee stated in 1945 that:

> "the Council's role in [political science] should be redefined in the light of the work of the Committees on Government and Public Administration, and of experience with the functioning of various types of committees, ha[s] led to formulation of a proposal for an exploratory committee on research in political behavior... [using] experiments designed to identify the common problems encountered by all types of government administrators and to analyze their varying responses."[14]

With the committee's vision so clear, one is left wondering just what their "experiences" were, and how are they to be characterized in the broader history of the period. What has been omitted is an examination of the behavioral movement which views it as a product of calls for a reform oriented, depression ending, business regulating "planning state" during the late New Deal, wartime and postwar periods. As long as disciplinary histories focus on "internal" dialogues, or broader "traditions" of scientism, liberalism, or realism that were unconnected to their political environment, the behavioral revolution will be misdescribed by friend and foe alike. The approach taken here is to outline the range of ideas surrounding "planning" and "administration" that were closely linked to the proponents of behavioralism.

C. Methodology and Dissertation Structure

Behavioralism may have been part of some broader trend in social thought, but the search for a more detailed account of the idea has required focus on its strongest proponents in the period, the Social Science Research Council. There was, in fact, a New England Committee on Political Behavior which was, for a time, more active than the SSRC's in 1948. But the SSRC eventually subsumed the work of this group into its own 1949

Committee on Political Behavior (CPB), involving them in the first major report of the Committee in 1951. The later impact of this committee on the profession is difficult to estimate. In the first 20 years of its work, however, the committee took credit for direct funding of 22 books and 31 articles, with indirect funding of 397 books and articles.[15]

In this work I focused on three sets of writers either in or close to the political science profession. The first included the members of the CPB, the second were prominent political scientists working in administrative agencies during the war, and the third included writers critical of the first and second group. While the literature search for the first two groups was done using the participants of the CPB and 120 political scientists listed as government administrators in the 1944 *American Political Science Review*, the scope of this work was necessarily truncated. The volume of the material made it necessary to focus on the CPB and wartime agency workers clearly in contact with them in the SSRC's Public Administration Committee. Working backward from the CPB participants Pendleton Herring, Avery Leiserson, V.O. Key, and David Truman, I restricted inquiry to the work of figures such as Charles Merriam, Leonard White, Harold Lasswell, Arthur Holcombe, and C. Hermann Pritchett. For the sake of simplicity, I occasionally refer to these writers as the "proto-behavioralists."

For each of those writers, I attempted to identify any political involvement, the writer's advisors, the writer's institutional affiliations, the influence of works cited by the author, and interpret those elements within the broader context of New Deal dilemmas. Much of the biographical information came from Oral Histories taken by Oral History Project of the American Political Science Association. Influential figures discussed there were added to the list of CPB and agency figures to be examined. For each of the writers on the truncated list, a literature search of the *Periodicals Review* as well as a search of the *Periodicals Content Index* was run. Documents relevant to the discussion of New Deal, wartime, and Fair Deal politics were read to help determine the writers' political positions and institutional affiliations.

In reviewing the writings of the behavioralists, it became clear that they were implicitly and explicitly writing in response to reformist writers, some of whom were writing in *The Nation* and *The New Republic*. The reformist writers in these periodicals, then, made up the third group to be examined. For these writers, a second set of searches was run using the *Periodicals Review* and the *Periodicals Content Index*. In addition, references to these figures within the APSA oral histories were also examined. Thus, a coherent set of texts were generated for interpretation of the behavioral movement.

For better or worse, interpretation of these documents has proceeded from the assumption that the concept of work and the institutions surrounding labor were undergoing a critical transformation. The contribution of experiences with other groups (farm, single issue etc.) is acknowledged and quite evident in even a cursory examination of the period's politics. Nonetheless, it seems clear that institutions and perspectives were being shaped and questioned through the frustration with AFL conservatism, the dramatic rise of the CIO, and the CIO's endorsement by New Deal visionaries and intellectuals. This assumption is not only justified by recent academic assertions about the centrality of labor politics to the

New Deal and wartime politics,[16] but the supposedly objective writings of the proto behavioralists contained conservative (and quite contested) interpretations of trade and industrial unionism. Moreover, this focus has been fruitful: there was not only deep suspicion surrounding reformers' motives, but the administrators' conception of their own roles seemed connected to a changing definition of labor. Administration, for SSRC theorists, required exposing the fallacies of those who sought broad participation and workplace control. More to the point, administration was the antithesis of industrial democracy, let alone labor's affect on activist legislatures and party government.

Chapter One examines the centrality of labor to reformer's definition of the public interest. In the *New Republic, Survey Graphic, Nation* and *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* these reformers identified a conflict of interest between capitalism and democracy, and contended that substantive democracy could only be achieved through the increased participation of labor in both the workplace and in governance. Absent that, capitalist mismanagement and trends towards fascism would continue. Just as critical were the writings of a handful of political scientists speculating on how the discipline might similarly reorient its concerns.

Chapters Two and Three examine the unity of interest thesis among the protobehavioralists supportive of democratic capitalism. Chapter Two highlights their reliance on "moderation" as a response to class conflict. More to the point, it highlights their continual reference to the presence of an "equilibrium" between groups with moderated demands, and groups moderated by a middle class orientation. Chapter Three examines their concept of administration. Therein it is noted that the "true" administrator is not deluded by utopian speculation, but keeps examines "social trends" that will make true coordination of interests possible. In both chapters the presence of a highly pejorative stance towards labor and popular participation informs their "realist" support of administrative coordination.

Chapter Four examines the wartime attempts of *New Republic* writers to define their "affirmative state," and define the administrative approach as a negative "pressure group state." I contend that the response to reformers' "conflict of interest" thesis was sought in guarantees of full employment for labor, consumer protection through an intrinsically democratic (albeit administered) "price system." Conversely, I claim that the distrust of labor groups and popular participation survived the war and was embraced by political scientists.

Chapters Five and Six narrow the examination of behavioralism to the writings of Pendleton Herring and David Truman. Chapter Five examines Herring's rejection of political activism as a definition of "objectivity," and his subsequent embrace of "interest adjustment" as *the* paradigm to be followed by political scientists. To that end it is noted that he recommended division of the discipline into professional scientists and lay scientists — the former being the only true producers of knowledge, and the latter to be restricted to the consumption of their knowledge and repetition of it in the classroom. It is also noted that strident objections to this assertion had begun in the 1940s.[17] The most notable of these was the highly publicized work of the APSA's Committee on Responsible Parties. Chapter Six examines the classic work of David Truman, who extends, deepens, and puts a scientific shell around the idea of interest adjustment. Portraying the "group process" as a social process revealed by progress in revelations social psychology, Truman masked the proximal origins of the administrative perspective in New Deal, wartime and post-war politics. The appropriate title of his book on *The Governmental Process* should not be overlooked. It was a book which defended an administrative perspective on political participation. Had the *New Republic* writers put forth their alternative stressing substantive participation in the workplace, it might well have been entitled *The Democratic Process*. More importantly, Truman's *Governmental Process* may be seen as a history of groups in the United States that *always* had consensus over basic American values — groups had an essentially untrammeled belief in the unity of interest between democracy and capitalism. Contending that American politics had

been a system seeking equilibrium, Truman claimed that political scientists were free to wash their hands of pedestrian beliefs in utopias. Instead, political scientists could busy themselves with the detailed description of the democratic polity, and the correction of its minor trespasses.

1. Brinkley, Alan 1994. *The End of Reform* (New York: Basic Books).; Lichtenstein, Nelson 1989. "From Corporatism to Collective Bargaining: Organized Labor and the Eclispse of Social Democracy in the Postwar Era" in *The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order* edited by Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle (Princeton: Princeton University Press) Pp. 122-52.; Skocpol, Theda and Edwin Amenta 1988. "Redefining the New Deal: World War II and the Development of Social Provision in the United States" in *The Politics of Social Policy in the United States* edited by Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff and Theda Skocpol. (Princeton: Princeton University Press) Pp. 123-148.

2. See note one. See also Harris, Howell John 1982. *The Right to Manage: industrial relations policies of American business in the 1940s* (Madison: Univeristy of Wisconsin Press) Pp. 105-58.

3. Alan Brinkley 1989. "The New Deal and the Idea of the State" in op. cit., *The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order* Pp. 85-121.; Brinkley 1994, op. cit.

4. Both terms were used during the period: the former by New School activist Max Lerner, and the latter by Harvard political economist Seymour Harris, as well as more public figures like Thurman Arnold. See Lerner, Max 1939. *It's Later Than You Think: The Need for a Militant Democracy* (New York: Viking Press).; Arnold, Thurman *The Future of Democratic Capitalism.*(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press).

5. Crick, Bernard 1959. *The American Science of Politics: Its Origins and Conditions* (Berkeley: University of California Press).; Seidelman, Raymond and Edward J. Harpham 1984. *Disenchanted Realists:Political Science and the American Crisis, 1884-1984* (Albany: State University of New York Press).; Ricci, David 1984. *The Tragedy of Political Science: Politics, Scholarship and Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press).; Gunnell, John 1993. *The Descent of Political Theory: The Genealagy of an American Vocation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).; James Farr, John S. Dryzek and Stephen T. Leonard eds. 1995. *Political Science in History: Research Programs and Political Traditions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

6. Eulau, Heinz 1970. "Political Science" *A Reader's Guide to the Social Sciences* edited by Bert F. Hoselitz (New York: The Free Press) Pp. 172-3. Almond, Gabriel 1990. "Separate Tables: Schools and Sects in Political Science" *A Discipline Divided: Schools and Sects in Political Science* (Newbury Park: Sage Publications) p. 24 and p. 29.; Simon, Herbert 1993. "The State of American Political Science: Professor Lowi's View of Our Discipline" *PS* Vol. 26 No. 1, p. 49.

7. Lowi, Theodore 1979. *The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States* (New York: Norton and Co.) Pp. 31-50 and 279-94. Lowi almost completely

7. Lowi, Theodore 1979. *The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States* (New York: Norton and Co.) Pp. 31-50 and 279-94. Lowi almost completely ignores the New Deal's fears of fascism, communism, and depression. He does note that it was a "means of combating the injustices of a brutal world." (p. 42) Rather than analyze the period further, he focuses on the resulting "ritualistic" consensus over the use of government. The second edition's endorsement by Arthur Schlesinger calls the work itself a "countervailing power." The reference is an ironic one. The term is from a 1950s work of John Kenneth Galbraith's book of the same name, in which Galbraith argued that the New Deal was merely the evolutionary development of countervailing powers to correct economic concentration. Implicit and explicit in Galbraith's argument was that the New Deal was not a capitalist crisis. The question was also asked by David Truman's colleague in group theory, Earl Latham, who assembled a series of essays contemplating whether or not the New Deal was "evolution or revolution." The irony is in the fact that Lowi's own work both rests on and ignores that discussion... his book, a countervailing power about a world Lowi claims was not concerned with countervailing powers.

8. McConnel, Grant 1970 [1966]. *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York: Vintage) p. 305 and chapter nine in general.

9. Seymour Martin Lipset et. al., discuss the presence of "true" union democracy in the International Typographical Union as a deviant case from other unions in Lipset, Seymour Martin, Martin Trow and James Coleman 1977. *Union Democracy: The Inside Politics of the International Typographical Union* (New York: Free Press) Pp. 3-16. The quote is on page 7.; Kariel, Henry S. 1967 (1961) *The Decline of American Pluralism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press) 16p. 49-67. The quote is on page 51.; More recently, Steven Fraser has consciously and-ironically borrowed from the behavioral era's "system's theory" to reconstruct the dominant outlines of the "New Deal Order." Though the bias fruitfully "diminishes the importance of particular political actors - presidents, senators and others" and "elevates, by contrast, the importance of economic events and social trends..." the generalizations he hopes to make casts a shadow over much of importance. He contends, for example, that the "relationship between the 'second New Deal' and the 'new unionism' was organic... designed by its chief architects to encourage and stimulate mass consumption" and goes on to note that the CIO helped to create a worker that was "existentially mobile, more oriented to consumption than production." Similarly, Nelson Lichtenstein has discussed the conservative stance of labor leaders relative to union members during World War II. See also McWilliams, Wilson Carey 1973. *The Idea of Fraternity in America* (Berkeley: University of California Press) p. 542.; Political histories are discussed in Fraser, Steven and Gary Gerstle 1989 "Introduction" in *The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order* op. cit., p. x.; Also, Fraser, Steven "The Labor Question" in ibid., p. 68.; Lichtenstein, Nelson 1982. *Labor's War at Home: The CIO and World War II* (New York: Cambridge University Press). The most thorough treatment of the period is in Brinkley, Alan 1994 *The End of Reform* op. cit., Pp. 3-30, wherein he argues the presence of a far more complex array of cultural, economic and political phenomena.

10. Brinkley, Alan 1989 and 1994 op. cit.; Dubofsky, Melvyn 1994. *The State and Labor in Modern America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press).; Fraser and Gerstle 1989. op. cit.; 1985. *The State and the Unions: Labor Relations, Law, and the Organized Labor Movement in America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).; 1992. "The New Deal, Collective Bargaining, and the Triumph of Industrial Pluralism" in *The New Deal: Conflicting Interpretations and Shifting Perspectives* (New York: Garland), Pp. 305-332.

11. Mark Barenberg, 1993. "The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation" *Harvard Law Review* Vol. 106 No. 7. Pp. 1379-1496.; Joel Rogers, 1990. "Divide and Conquer: Further Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Law" *Wisconsin Law Review* No. 1., Pp. 1-143. Rogers provocative argument is astonishingly similar to the ideas of the collectivists discussed in chapter 1. The two worlds described by the activist parallel rational choice models of "cooperative" and "uncooperative equilibrium" between political actors. The "utopian" world sought by the activists was similar to the notion of cooperative equilibrium.

12. McWilliams, 1973. *The Idea of Fraternity in America* op. cit., Pp. 537-569.

13. Garson, G. David 1978. *Group Theories of Politics* (New York: Russel Sage) Pp. 47-76 and throughout.

14. In addition came recommendations that their work emulate Chester Barnard's 1938 *Function of the Executive* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press). See SSRC Policy and Planning Committee, "Policy and Planning Minutes" Outline of proposal for a new Committee on Political Behavior., July 28-29 1945, Rockefeller Archives Center (hereinafter RAC) Accession 1 Series 1 Box 190, Folder 1124.

15. Public Administration Committee "Minutes of the Committee" 1940-1944 RAC-SSRC Accession I Series I Subseries 23 Box 253 Folder 1488; Bryce Woods "Committee on Political Behavior 1949-1963, Committee on Government Process 1964-1972: A Report on the Activities of the Committee" August, 1973, RAC-SSRC Collection, Accession I Series I Subseries 19 Box 189 Folder 19.; "Report to the Carnegie Corporation of New York From the Social Science Research Council on the Grant of $7,000 Towards the Cost of Exploratory Activities with Respect to the Study of Political Behavior" Committee on Political Behavior RAC-SSRC Collection, Accession 2, Series I, Subseries 76, Box 470, Folder 5834.; "Policy and Planning Minutes" Outline of proposal for a new Committee on Political Behavior., July 28-29 1945, RAC-SSRC Collection, Accession 1, Series 1, Box 190, Folder 1124.

16. Fraser and Gerstle 1989, op. cit.; Harris 1982, op. cit.; Lichtenstein 1981, op. cit.;

17. This was long before the "revolution" swept through the 1950s and 1960s.

Chapter 1
Democratic Collectivism and the Conflict of Interest Thesis

> The change in the American labor movement cannot be reduced to a single term. There is a new base for organization - the industrial union base. There is a new leadership. There is a new temper and militancy, both in leadership and in the rank-and-file membership. There is a new readiness for political action and a consciousness of its importance. Together these sum up to what I have called a change of phase in American labor... The perspective today is... *labor consciousness.*
>
> *Max Lerner*
> 1938

Political scientists who associate the 1930s and 1940s with the rise of interest groups tend to forget the important role that many political actors saw these groups playing in sidestepping a choice between fascism and communism. Left leaning activists like Max Lerner and George Soule identified unregulated capitalism as the source of pressure towards communism and fascism: unregulated capitalism generated depressions and labor conflicts that required finding an alternative developmental path.

Reformers writing in the *New Republic*, *Annals* and other publications thought that integration of increasingly polarized economic classes could be achieved by granting labor groups broad organizational rights and formal representation in government. They reasoned that substantive labor participation would produce two entities: a balance to monopoly concentrations, and a sense of community coming from the re-invigorated structure of democratic participation. The latter highlighted the sense of "collectivism." — Under low levels of unionization, it was rational for labor groups to fight for their small monopolies, and logical for "minimum government" to simply police the boundaries between specific interests. Without this community, a milieu of competing groups would

reinforce attitudes and forms of knowledge specific to an unecessarily conflictual stance between groups. Conversely, high unionization rates both within and between industries would result in an alternative scenario. Overly successful battles for wage increase and workplace control would reveal, via inflation and the effects of poor use of capital, the need for responsible wage demands and competent workplace management. More importantly, a deeper "collective" sensibility might exist between classes.

As of 1937, however, many of the details were speculative. Activists were calling for specific reforms, but they were also struggling against what they saw as a dominant laissez-faire view of politics. This struggle included the need to acknowledge two points: a conflict of interest between capital and labor, and the need for a "Copernican shift" in the perception of institutions and "facts." With the conflict of interest properly understood, it would be possible to reintegrate economic classes within reformed institutions. The bulk of their writings, however, werespeculative — they discussed how a less conflictual integration of groups *might* exist outside laissez-faire assumptions, and what a supportive political science might also look like outside laissez-faire assumptions.

A. The Democratic Collectivists: Activists Seeking Enabled Cooperation

1.The Problematic Dominance of a Business Vision

Approaching 1937, an agenda was being established by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) which called for union protection and increasing participation in governance. Writers were taking notice of the fact that industrial union leaders were beginning to establish a strong presence in policy arenas previously dominated by business. Writing in the *Annals* one observer noted in 1936 that:

> "...there seems not the slightest doubt... that the groundwork has been laid for something resembling equality of consideration in government... [l]ook at labor union presidents sitting alongside corporation presidents, both engaged in the business of being public officials or advisors to public officials... Has it

> "worked"? No, not very well. There was no perfect harmony... but the *idea* [has been] established, and the idea is the thing."[1]

This new level of participation was critical given the balance it provided, but it left open the question as to just what the relationship should be between business and labor. Writing in the 1936 *Annals*, *New Republic* editor George Soule restated the need for labor unions to counterbalance business enterprise:

> "So long as we do not abolish capitalism entirely, the only feasible choice is between an economic order in which the powers of organized capital have liberty to practice whatever restrictions they can manage, uncontrolled by labor or the democratic state, and one in which these powers are checked and balanced by labor organized for economic or political action, or both."[2]

While balance was needed, NLRB economist David Saposs was careful to point out that "trade union collective bargaining was founded and still exists on the basic idea of conflict of interest between employer and employee..."[3] More to the point, collective bargaining with independent unions generated more than mere business efficiency. "The minutes of company union meetings indicate that shop matters are the chief, if not the sole, topic of discussion. Company unions do not, like industrial unions, also discuss important social and economic affairs affecting the general welfare of the workers and the Nation."[4]

The suspect character of company unions was also discussed by Dean of the Wisconsin Law School and New Deal activist Lloyd Garrison. Distinguishing between a natural and coercive form of representation, he contended that company unions suppressed healthy participation. Writing in the *Annals* he stated that:

> "[n]o one who has not sat in judgment on [NLRA Section 7A] cases can appreciate the extent to which, without any actual threats or intimidation, employees can be induced, for fear of losing favor or even losing their jobs, to

follow the obvious wishes of their foremen, superintendents, and plant officials in the matter of organization."[5]

In 1938, however, Lerner took the idea of a dominant business vision beyond discussion of a distinction between independent and company unions. Noting that "[t]he original democratic impulse... has been overlaid by a powerful plutocracy and [been] all but stifled in the climate of business success"[6] he went on to state that some saw "the new forces of labor as educated Romans must have discussed the barbarian hordes beyond the Danube and the Rhine..."[7] but maintained that labor unions had "valid social purposes."[8]

Other *New Republic* writers also tried to chip away at what they described as a free market vision of union recalcitrance. Editor Bruce Bliven described the presence of a "Cassandra racket" of conservative journalists like Walter Lippman, "unite[d]... in writing about the danger of calamity." These writers sought "federal incorporation of unions to increase their financial responsibility for losses inflicted upon an employer in the course of a strike. Most of them want sharp penalties against strikes during the life of a union contract..."[9] Writing in the *Virginia Quarterly Review*, CIO union leader Philip Murray conveyed the same sentiment. "This attempt to 'make labor responsible' has always amused me. All the more so, because... less than five per cent [of private corporations] give out financial statements..."[10]

For Lerner the conflict-of-interest thesis later extended to the broader idea that "[if you] [d]emocratize the corporation and the trade-union... you have laid the basis for genuinely democratizing the state."[11] Though Lerner's perspective seemed more concerned with union officials' tendencies to become "bureaucrats, vested interests... and the[ir]... fatal tendency toward constriction"[12] it was an attempt to counter an ethic of economic self interest. "Racketeering and grafting are diseases not of the labor movement but of commercialism itself, of the ethos of our entire economic world. Those diseases have

extended themselves to labor, as they have extended themselves to every other part of the social organism."[13]

Writers also discussed the problem of consumer society as a fundamental component of the business vision. Robert Lynd, whose work included research on consumers for Hoover's Committee on Social Trends and later worked on the 20th Century Fund proposals for collective bargaining policy[14] wrote in the *Political Science Quarterly* that the belief in the consumer as the "third estate" of democracy was mistaken on a score of different levels. Most notable was his identification of the mistaken assertion that:

> "the interests of business and of the consumer are identical. This assumption also appears in such more specific forms as the following: Business could not exist if it did not strive to serve the consumer; it is to the interest of business to rectify any abuses of the consumer involved in its current procedures, and it may be counted upon to do so..."[15]

Moreover, discussion of the role of the consumer society was the result of a *"Realpolitik* of business enterprise" which was "ready at every point to exploit [consumer] insecurities under the guise of proffered choices."[16]

Writing from a similar perspective, *New Republic* writer Herbert Fierst wrote that attempts to regulate capitalists by using consumer cooperatives had to be designed to work in concert with labor. Referring to the cooperative movement as naive in asserting that it was a "long sought middle way" he cautioned that:

> "[I]t must be made clear to would be labor coöperators that they are entering a movement that, on the whole, lacks an explicit realization of the State's function. Superficially, this may seem to be a trivial matter devoid of practical consequences, but in reality ha[s] had important effects upon the growth or decay of both the cooperative and the labor movement in Europe. It has, furthermore, proved that there is no "middle way."[17]

Soule, however, blended together discussion of a broader set of interests as those needing incorporation into coordination with labor. "Farmers have long been organized at the top for political pressure, but what we may look for now is more action by tenants, sharecroppers, farm laborers, coöperatives of producers and consumers. The consumers' interest among city people needs far better implementation[.]"[18]

2. The Evolution of True Cooperation: Joining Public and Private

More clearly than other writers publishing in the academic community, George Soule and Philip Murray outlined a vision for a world embracing private enterprise but rejecting pure self interest. In his 1937 discussion of "Labor's Decisive Victory," Soule outlined the idea of the unified interest of labor in differing economic spheres by linking it to a structured form of consumption. His concern was with identifying the negative impact of using brute force to extract extravagant wage gains. Though wage gains might be possible in isolated circumstances, they tended to create inflationary tendencies which could yield disastrous consequences. If workers realized this, he contended, it would increase their understanding of their social placement and role in society:

> "[L]abor in the end derives little benefit from organization to control wages unless prices can also be controlled in the interest of the masses of consumers. But the organization campaign of the CIO is relevant to this truth and its ultimate importance is derived therefrom... When only a comparatively few groups of skilled workers are organized in scattered local localities and industries, their natural tendency is to get what they can for themselves, even at the expense of workers in general. Consequently they pay little attention to the problem of prices, so long as they can boost their own incomes. But as organization of workers becomes widespread, and a genuine labor movement develops that is compelled to consider the interest of all, the emphasis tends to shift. A social force develops that has more incentive and more power to protect the worker not only as producer but also as consumer and as citizen. Such power can be exercised both politically, through governmental control over industry, and economically, through encouragement to consumer's movements. The trade union's real significance is not so much that it safeguards the immediate welfare of its own members... [but] that it supplies the nucleus for a real labor movement. And a labor movement is what the CIO is now by way of giving us."[19]

As noted above, contemporary theorists have made strikingly similar claims with respect to the relation between levels of unionization and governmental relations oriented towards a communitarian labor focus rather than an individualist capitalist one.[20] Similarly, Soule referred to a seemingly abstract power that "can be exercised politically... and economically" and discounted the significance of "immediate welfare." Writing in the 1936 *Annals*, he summarized that "[t]he broader the front on which labor bargains, the more beneficial is the social result."[21]

Discussion of CIO unionization by Philip Murray followed a similar orientation. Murray claimed that with its increasing strength, the CIO had to understand its broader social role and that wildcat strikes during the war were serving mere short-term gains. Murray stated in 1940 that:

> "When labor organizes, it is sharing with other social and economic groups the need for collective action. Only under primitive conditions in a frontier economy does the individual control his own destiny. Even then, collective action within the family and among neighbors is essential to comfort and security... [and over time, F]armers, tradesmen, employers, consumers, investors, taxpayers, bankers, lawyers, doctors, wage earners all discover among themselves common objectives which can be achieved only through common action."

Also suggestive of the presence of an evolving "social force" was Murray's contention that "unions are taking an interest in politics and good government. Many of their leaders have been elected to public office. Few are the steel towns now without the wage-earner representation on the council or school board... the local unions urge well-rounded programs of social legislation and do much to spread understanding of their objectives..."[22] In short, the social theory of both Soule and Murray identifies a development of cooperation based on the shared understandings of their mutual roles in the economy.

While Murray and Soule stand alone as the clearest discussants of a cooperative vision, they do not stand alone overall. Writing in the *APSR*, University of Chicago political scientist Marshal Dimock suggested that labor be viewed as an evolving, respected member in war production decision making. He noted that "in a democracy, labor unions are social, educative, and political as well as economic in their function."[23] Identifying a developmental trend, Dimock noted that:

> "labor produces executive ability just as management produces it... labor in this country is now passing from the organizing to the administering period. If and when collective bargaining is accepted understandingly by the main body of the nation's business leaders, organized labor will tend to lose its fighting characteristics. Realizing that it has arrived, it will willingly assume responsibilities toward the social order which it now looks upon with suspicion, seeing in them curbs to its liberty and influence."[24]

Suggesting a turn towards Soule's cooperative condition, Dimock argued that "labor will bear any necessary sacrifices, but all segments of the population must share equally. Labor will restrict its liberties for the sake of survival, but it wants assurance that those it trusts will be at the helm."[25]

Included in Lerner's 1939 pragmatic appeal for a political bond between unions and the distressed moderates of the middle class was a discussion similar to Soule's and Murray's.[26] He contended that in unplanned capitalism labor "seeks to maximize wages and minimize hours, thus adding restrictions to production just as the owners do." Conversely, guarantees to workers would yield their benign deference to authority and thus the ability for them to "fit more flexibly into the calculations of [economic] planners."[27]

On a more theoretical plane Lerner also discussed the concept of power in a cooperative framework. He claimed that "a Copernican turn in our political thinking" generated fears

of government which made it difficult to "the transfer control from the oligarches to ourselves." He noted that:

> "There is an enormous difference between political power when it is personal, tyrannical, unchecked, and political power when it is democratically arrived at and democratically controlled. But once you have democratic power, it is fatal to fear to exert it to the full as the same fear would be fatal for the absolutist."[28]

Lerner was also succinct in the centrality of unions in the creation of democratic power. With the CIO's union drive "may become the spearhead of a drive for recasting our institutions until they assume, under the economic conditions of today, the shape that the democratic elements in our past have intended them to have.[29] A similar point was presented by *New Republic* writer Mary Heaton Vorse. The democratic assertion of power was for her both fundamentally attributable to labor groups and responsible for the decline of the concept of planning as a function of the free market and private property. In an article entitled "A Year of the CIO" she claimed that

> "[s]hifts of thought have occurred during this struggle whose full implications are not yet understood. New conceptions of ownership [have begun] to arise, involving not the transfer of property from one class to another, but the incomplete recognition of a change that has already occurred. The legislation of this country has shown a progressive recognition of this changed conception of ownership. Through labor laws and the control and regulation of stock markets and utilities the country has by implication asserted that big business is public business."[30]

Whatever his actions, Philip Murray's statements clearly echoed the cooperative vision of Soule, Lerner, Vorse, and others. Discussing the closed shop rule, for example, he noted that when joining a union became mandatory, labor unions were open to the attack that they, too, were tyrannical in their pursuit of narrow economic gains. Murray acknowledged the closed shop was a device to protect unions. Without it, however, using power directed towards the common good was not possible. Later noting that wildcat strikes and slowdowns were evidence of immature unions, he stated that increasingly

responsible unions could now take their place at the public mantle. "This new effort has not only a much greater chance of success than the previous two but is designed to influence the common weal more effectively."[31]

These statements suggest that the necessary "Copernican shift" had begun among a number of *New Republic* activists and political scientists. The blending of public and private was to construct a situation in which private desires were linked to the public good through union participation and not "the invisible hand." Union involvement provided the "first step" towards democratizing the state and democratic public economic planning through "flexibility," "wage-earner representation," and a "willingness to bear necessary sacrifices."

3. History and the Restoration of Substantive Democracy

A number of these writers also discussed the need for a critical history of private power. The most conscious discussion of this was seen in Lerner's work, but Soule and others made continual reference to a presentist perception of labor struggles rooted in the *laissez faire* paradigm.

During the 1937 General Motors strike George Soule attempted to identify the social and historical conditions leading to industrial strife. Using a kind of case study approach, he traced the history of the strike back through the bypassing of the NLRB, presidential intervention, and the resultant "feeling... that the administration had not enforced genuine collective bargaining as intended under Section 7a [of the Wagner Act] and that if the workers were to get that, they must do so be a demonstration of their own power." He noted that "[t]he action is not a rash one, a sudden flare-up of mere combativeness... [it] represents the attempt to establish collective bargaining on which everything else hangs... [including] recognition of the union as sole bargaining agency - ... the long fight against employer-dominated representation plans."[32]

Presentist interpretations of labor conflict generated the view that labor groups were overeacting to immediate conditions. "News from General Motors plants is being interpreted by much of the press as if labor relations in automobiles had no history, or at least none before John L. Lewis and the CIO announced their intention to organize the mass-production industries. But social phenomena do not develop overnight, and important social movements must result from mass pressures as well as from the action of leaders.."[33] Vorse, similarly, talked of an altered perception of history generated by Robert LaFollete's committee investigating attacks on unions. "The appalling revelations... have shown the astonished public what weapons employers use... from now on historians will have to concede to the organization of labor its place as one of the great processes of democracy, only now arriving at its tardy maturity."[34]

Despite this reform orientation, however, Soule often became a realist. Outlining the prospects for governmental reform for the "Next Four Years" he began by stating that "[m]ost Americans have now forgotten the mood of the depression and the early months of the New Deal. Yet... recall that mood before trying to see where we are, and to look ahead." The point was to be clear about the depth of the problem, and hence the palliative character of the governmental reforms that had been initiated. "[N]o informed person believes that either the plans or practices of private industry and finance has so changed prices, production, wages and profits may not again get out of adjustment, or that serious unemployment may be avoided in the future..."[35]

His deeper point, however was that a critical sense of crisis had passed, and that a new reality had been assimilated. In forgetting the depression a key historical opportunity was lost: there was insufficient strength and knowledge within government and the working class to take advantage of the moment. What was needed was an infrastructure that would enable future opportunities. Thus, he noted that "the time has passed for the sort of rapid change that may be achieved in a crisis. The forces of conservatism, though defeated in

the last election, have the power to obstruct new measures to which they would be most violently opposed."[36]

Unlike Soule, Lerner's writings were directed at the academy as well as the general reader. Identifying seven conservative historical research traditions within the academy, Lerner noted that "American history needs rewriting" and stated that "[t]here must be room, among these interpretations, for the story of the life-and-death struggle in American history between majority will and minority rule."[37] In sketching what a new history might look like, he wrote favorably of "[the] critical struggles... with plutocratic control" and democratic movements held in check by constitutional structures -- a reapplication of the "familiar material of American political science." Though massive amounts of details had been uncovered regarding democratic movements, he noted that they did not yet understand the "fullest meaning of it for the present."[38] Having focused on the inability of the producing classes to generate prosperity, he distinguished between the "mask and face" of democracy, and maintained it was meaningless and "a good-looking glove on a diseased hand."[39]

Despite a focus on "positive planning" for the restoration of economic health, Lerner made it clear his concerns were broader. In history, he noted, one could find an essence of democratic forms in different settings. Viewed as the social manifestation of an "inherent decency" he contended the term could be applied to indigenous American Indian and North European tribes. Conversely, belief in a "permanent democratic norm" based on a rigid adherence to constitutional doctrine did not insure democracy.[40] It was all well and good to reject planning as a threat to civil liberties central to democracies. It was necessary, however, to look at history to adequately describe liberty. "The fault does not lie in the idea of civil liberties as such. It lies in the social context in which the idea has been developed... [It is currently a] protection for property rights... [though it may

provide,] as for example [with] the National Labor Relations Act... safeguards for majorities or potential majorities..."[41]

As he stated it, capitalism was based on violent interaction in its focus on competition. This was not, however, a violence inherent in the American spirit:

> "It has been part of the American experience from the time we liquidated the Indians and took the continent away from them, up to the present time when the record of our contemporary violence is written in the pages of every daily newspaper. But I do not mean to imply that violence is in any mystical sense part of the American national character. It proceeds rather from the historical fact that [the] admixture of vigorous peoples has sought to exploit the ruthless spirit of competitive capitalism."[42]

Competitive individualism had produced economic hierarchies and an increased distance between an economic world and a political world trying to control it. Thus he stated that "[w]e made a good deal once of the sanctity of the individual, but we have seen individualism turn into the anarchy of laissez-faire[.]" With the resultant "disquieting cleavage between economics and politics," Lerner contended, came both "nihilism" and "malaise."[43]

The importance of organized labor was its centrality to the *democratic* reunification of the two worlds. Lerner can be labeled as someone embracing the "new [Keynesian] economics" in his support for price controls, downward redistribution of income, and only limited socialization of production. Like more public Keynesians Thurman Arnold and Beardsley Ruml, Lerner claimed that trusts could be controlled by regulation of prices.[44] Unlike his compensatory brethren, however, Lerner thought the labor movement would insure a more complete balance of the American community: it would avoid the ineffective "monstrous lament" of liberal social legislation, and offset the conservatism of the middle class.[45] As deeply entrenched as the middle class was in the American polity, attempting to bypass it would ignore historical realities and be "adventurist."[46]

Conversely, limiting participation of an "energetic" labor movement would be equally ahistorical: Blocking the labor movement would be:

> "...[lifting] a barricade erected against fascism: through their economic power and through their influence upon mass opinion, democratic trade unions are obstacles to the fascist advance... [and] a necessary economic base for progressive political action... a nucleus for the cultural formations of the future."[47]

For Lerner, organized labor was at the core of an attempt to create an "organic" society. As with Soule, Saposs and others, Lerner began with the identification of the divergent interests of labor, middle and capitalist classes. Rather than a false reintegration suggested by *laissez-faire* doctrine, communism or fascism, however, his focus was on possible paths for democratic reintegration of those interests.[48] Thus, he contended that in his "rediscovery of the past" he found "a strange new amalgam." The labor movement apparently blended with the middle class by offsetting its nationalist conservatism. Claiming discovery of a "deep conviction," he stated that the fusion blended the "proletarian [and]... nationalist concept... the two most powerful movements of the modern world."[49] It was in and only in that balanced state that he found the possibility for neutral administration in the public interest. It was not "on the emotional basis of a common sympathy with the underdog...[but] by disinterested experts, of consumption, production, investment, trade, and income distribution in accordance with social objectives set by bodies representative of the majority."[50]

Conversely, in the alternative world, he foresaw deeper decay into competition between selfish interests. Though theoretically part "will of the people" and "inevitable evil" their "translations [are] always meretricious... The democratic machinery of government is a continual threat to the propertied interests, and they must constitute themselves pressure groups to ward off that threat..." And while Lerner's attack on the "seigneury of the big corporations" could be labeled simplistic, his concern for deeper issues of representation were clear. Left unchecked, interest groups would:

> "condition... the legislature to respond only to pressures of what we call 'public opinion.' And at that sort of game the oligarches have the cards stacked... the majority principle operates best not in *ad hoc* crusades but in polls, when the issue of general direction is presented."[51]

Discussing his fears of transient "psychic majorities" where groups can "concentrate all their fire on a specific issue" he further contended that the "recent upcroppings [of the] cross section straw poll[s]... are at once enormously useful and subtly dangerous. They shorten the lag between majority opinion and our knowledge of it; they quicken the pace of the democratic process... [yet] give democracy a renewed sense of its strength..."[52] Given the potential for abuse, he recommended that public opinion polling be directed under the same concept of neutral administration outlined for banking, investment, and income regulation.[53]

With alternative worlds constantly in tension, then, Lerner feared decay. History provided a source of rejuvenation for his comprehension of contemporary dilemmas, but it was an uneasy condition. He summarized that he "dwelt on the historical perspective because without it a good deal of the current controversy over labor democracy will seem so much sound and fury, unmotivated and undirected. If you understand the historical forces that have shaped the labor movement, you will not be seduced into the cloud-cuckooland of wishful thinking on either side..."[54] A kind of American Marx, he sought solidity in history that was rooted in labor. When labor movements became too focused on immediate gain, he noted that "[a]bove all else, labor forgets its rôle in terms of the whole fabric of economic development."[55]

4. Summary

While more extensive examination of private documents, personal histories and writings outside this group might reveal more depth and clarity concerning those who rejected laissez-faire assumptions, it is clear that a coherent program for labor centered reform existed among these writers: It focused on *tangible* participation in the workplace, with

further expansion needed in participation at the national level. It ran counter to domination by "interest groups" and the "psychic majorities" of straw polling. These writers saw a dominant, institutionalized belief in self interest that mitigated labor's ability to provide the basis for alternate conceptions of representation. Writers in the *Nation*, including Harold Laski, were making assertions quite similar to Lerner's.[56] A political science critical of private power and laudatory of enhanced group participation was developing at the same time.

B. Political Science: Private Power and Structured Participation

Between 1937 and 1946, a number of theorists sought to create a political science which either implicitly or explicitly embraced a critique of private power. These tended to critique either elite planning theory (as with the SSRC behavioralists), or support a corporatist style of labor participation within government. Again, however, these writings were speculative - describing what an alternative science might look like. Thus they called for the rejection of *laissez-faire* assumptions, the need for histories more sensitive to the relationship between private power and institutions, and attention to the vital role of labor in the polity. A number of activist social scientists were certain that encouraging expansion of the labor movement was economically, ethically, and constitutionally defensible. A prominent and extended movement does not appear in political science, but discussions did exist and are worth recounting.

1. Approaching a Critical Social Science: 1937-1941

a. Robert Lynd:

Asserting the presence of coexisting cultural and economic spheres, Lynd argued that *laissez-faire* ideology and bureaucratic structure in the economic sphere had a subterranean effect on specific non-economic spheres. He broke these down into areas as diverse as the structure of neighborhoods, the academy, and categories of understanding. Thus, Lynd pointed to a "doctrine of casualness" which he defined as an ideology directing research and generating social norms. Within this doctrine, variables and

research agendas had been developed. "In the very process of its precise ordering of data, [social science] displays cultural lags, distortions of emphasis, blind spots, and a propensity to play it safe at exposed points."[57]

Central to the argument was the failure of contemporary analyses to see both the "cultural whole" of a situation, and the individual manifestation of that situation. He took exception, for example, to the analytic distinction between "economic" and "political" man. Addressing the 1927 work of G.E.G. Catlin[58] he stated that:

> "When economic man,' 'political man,' and "social man" are accepted as one and the same person, truly heroic abstraction is necessary if one is to view economic behavior apart from social behavior, political behavior apart from economic behavior, and so on... It is not extravagant to say that scarcely any area of institutional analysis can fail to take on new meanings when set thus in the close context of the 'totality of individuals' living."[59]

Lynd contended that institutions were clashing together in ways that were not functional, and this went undetected given social scientists' tendency to reify the separate and narrow categories they examined. By moving between cultural and individual analyses and putting the analyses into historical time, Lynd's goal was to see the ways in which pathological phenomena took their toll on the individual. Identification of laissez-faire pathologies would thus guide research. Examining what would now be described as socialization theory, Lynd stated that:

> "We have been "house-broke" in varying ways-gently or roughly, consistently or erratically, - by people bigger and stronger than ourselves and able to exercise authority over us. For convenience, we say we have "grown up," "become socialized," "been acculturated." What we mean is that we have learned, under the sharp sting of necessity, how to "get by" and get what we want and avoid trouble in terms of the habit systems of our coercive elders, who in turn had picked up their habits from the retrospective habits of their elders..."

The "doctrine of casualness" in its various forms precluded certain styles of thought and social action in addition to reinforcing others. Among them were approaches to both private power and the "labor question." Variables, laws and studies were generated either randomly or in accordance with the dominant business ethic:

> "'[C]ompetition,' for instance, as a subject of theoretical discussion, tends to be accepted unquestioningly as a thing fixed by the natural order; the problem for the theoretical discussion then becomes the dualism of "competition *and* monopoly," and social science can turn its back on the relevant problem of the human costs in daily living of the competitive operation of our economy."[60]

Lynd continued, noting that "while our machine technology derives largely from recent inventions, our labor policies straggle unevenly back to the English Poor Law dating from the age of Elizabeth and to the English Combination Acts of 1799..."[61] he asked, "Why is 'labor problems' as a research field so heavily concerned with labor legislation and with statistics of wage rates, of wage differentials, and of unemployment, and so little concerned with, e.g. analysis of labor actually on the job and at home, of labor's motivations and frustrations, and the kinds of fresh operational theory that will include this living stuff of labor?"[62]

Like Lerner, Lynd claimed to be presenting a fundamental shift in the concept of science being developed: science, through history, could reveal the pejorative influence of private power on social, academic and legal forms. As he stated it:

> "Each human being is his telescoped past experience in culture pressed by vital impulses against present circumstances; and history enables him to extend this experience beyond his personal life-span. If the sciences of human behavior in culture must be continually aware of the present circumstances, including the rhythms, motivations, and growth-processes of the human stuff that drives them, they must also just as surely deal with the rôle of past processes and events in shaping the character of the presence, and with the implications of these past things for present action. The place of historical analysis in social science is, therefore, basic and beyond question..."[63]

Despite the clear role Lynd attached to the use of history, the emphasis was not great enough for Max Lerner. Reviewing Lynd's work, he claimed that he had placed too much hope on "pattern sciences" such as anthropology and psychology. Thus, he outlined what an adequate historical theory might look like:

> "The pressing social inquiries today must be those turning on how power is captured and consolidated, why economies break down and how they can be gotten to work, how men think politically and how their thinking is manipulated, what new legal and administrative formations are emerging and how they can be used for human purposes, what revolutions are, why and how they occur, and how the revolutionary energies can be turned into humanist channels. In short, so far from discarding history, we need more and more to focus our attention on an adequate theory of history - which is to say, an adequate theory of social change."[64]

Despite the possibility for debate, Lerner was careful to note that their differences were ones of degree, not of kind.

b. The *Journal of Politics*:

The first article in the first issue of the *Journal of Politics* was George Sabine's "What is Political Theory." In that work he repeated remarks he had made in his 1937 publication of *A History of Political Theory*: both stated that the belief in value-free inquiry ought to be completely abandoned. Why this was chosen as the opening work was not discussed. Suggesting that he was searching for an alternative foundation for social inquiry, however, Sabine stated that:

> "The conclusion herein defended is that logically the three kinds of propositions are quite distinct; in short, that the likelihood of an event's happening and the desirability of its happening are quite without any logical correlation. And this conclusion implies a destructive criticism of pragmatism, in so far as pragmatism has claimed to be more than a chapter in social psychology."[65]

Sabine later generalized that "objectivity" appeared to refer to acceptance of "simple-minded unconsciousness of valuations that have become habitual."[66] Placed in the context of the first three years' writings of the *Journal of Politics*, Sabine's work appears to be a kind of permission slip to develop scientific practices with more utopian or reformist implications.

Mulford Sibley consciously criticized political scientists' belief in the natural development of institutions in the article "Apology for Utopia." Sibley claimed that the historiography of William McChesney Sait's *Political Institutions* was one rooted in a formalist vision of natural phenomena. Sait had identified idealistic social planning as a false "excogitated" idea which was destined for failure. Sibley replied:

> "Excogitated ideas are [supposedly] 'parasitic thought forms.' For Sait the construction of a Utopia, either implicitly or explicitly, would fall within this realm; and he who would chart the course of society by first adumbrating a goal and then striving to attain it, however slowly, through appropriate institutions, would be rebuked for his failure to understand political processes..."[67]

With respect to the role of groups in policy formation, Sait registered his anachronistic disapproval by proving to be, at best, annoyed. "In fact, the sociologists have given to interest groups an importance which, in most cases, they do not merit."[68] His specific stance on labor referred to being "badgered by utopian experiments" and monopolistic practices which impede the natural flow of prices.[69] Sibley responded harshly:

> "With equality in the political realm, and inequality in that of economic, it is not surprising that a never-ending bickering should go on. Politicians attack the citadels of wealth, and the possessors of that wealth will frequently make concessions for the sake of a harmony which is so necessary for business itself. In the end, however, the natural order must inevitably triumph over the artificial; and since economic inequality is based firmly on the former, and political equality an expression of the latter, there can be no doubt about the rest. [quoting Sait] 'Business moves along its own orbit and responds to the working of a higher law.'"[70]

Sibley not only identified the need for a political science that avoided viewing history as the evolution of perfection, but was working from a critical stance towards private power. Having argued that *Political Institutions* was indicative of the theoretical orientation of the *American Political Science Review*, Sibley concluded that:

> "[this work], to the careful reader, is valuable, if for no other reason, because its implicit but confused theory of *Reason* and *Nature* exhibits the defects of a methodology which relies on *History* but fails to take account of *Value*... This shrinking away from theory, this unwillingness to take what might be taken seriously, this curious assumption that the task is done when facts selected according to some unconscious hypothesis have been gathered - these are the characteristics of American political science today."[71]

Where was political science to go? The analysis included a critique of private power, but had focused on the inability of "conventional theory" to move beyond implicit acceptance of the status quo. Sibley, like Sabine, contended the need to declare the political values in existing institutional analyses. He went further than Sabine, however, by lauding utopians' courage to pursue "political progress."[72]

Lippincott, however, had moved to a more concrete definition of an alternative science. In Lippincott's 1940 discussion of the "Bias of Political Science," the diagnosis differed only slightly from those offered by Lynd or Sibley. Like Lynd, it assumed the problematic results of society centered around private power and acquisition. Indeed, it appears to reflect a search for public community similar to the collectivists. As he stated it:

> "Material values penetrate deeply into our lives. Material welfare has become an end in itself... rather than a means to an end. We work in a system of acquisitive economics... It is obvious that in such a system economic interests profoundly affect the state; it is a truism to say that those who own property can bend the will of the state to their will, and create a system of privilege...."[73]

As with Lynd's "doctrine of casualness," Lippincott claimed that "material welfare" invaded academic inquiry, noting that "[t]o participate, if only indirectly, in control, and

to share the benefits of supremacy, does not engender doubt in the basis of these things but, on the contrary, establishes their excellence. Men who have experienced rapid advancement in their career and have found that life is good are hardly inclined to question a system that so quickly discovered their talents."[74]

Yet another critical analysis discussing reform was undertaken by Gunnar Hecksher and James Robbins. Like Lynd, they argued that "[Given] the restricted scope of many contemporary studies of governmental institutions and processes, political science has not succeeded in freeing itself from the crabbed view of the State which prevailed among the nineteenth-century classical economists."[75] They further contended that:

> "The New Deal left no precipitate of constitutional reform by way of buttressing group autonomy while guarding public interest... as the New Deal passes into history to make way for what promises to be a more quiescent era, [it is clear] that the problem of groups is being merely tabled and not solved."[76]

In the liberal orientation of constitutional law, groups existed in a nether world. Hence there could be no discussion of the public interest with respect to the role of labor groups or corporations without confronting the problems of group rights in conflict with individual rights. Their reintroduction of the dream of "functional representation" repeated the dream of Laski and Cole, even though the authors proceeded with caution.

> "The member of the trade union, the shareholder of a large company, the farmer who is a member of a cooperative producers' association is bound to his group by an allegiance that is very strong indeed. When a conflict of loyalties arises, he is not unlikely to sacrifice the interests of the community to those of his group. In fact, this is so obvious from recent experiences that no detailed evidence is called for."[77]

Despite the pessimism, however, the deference to the group in constitutional law was a moot point. As Robbins and Hecksher stated it, "[f]unctional federalism has become a

fact to a rather notorious extent. Private corporations, under the protective wings of the due process, the equal protection, and the privileges and immunities clauses, have had carved out for them an area of special privileges amounting to a fourth category in constitutional law. This fact is concealed under the doctrine of limited government..."[78] For these authors, identifying this kind of "fact" merely clarified actual practice.

Highlighting the need to develop a new model of inquiry to realize a corporatist vision was also central to their argument. Calling for a turn to concrete research Robbins and Hecksher argued that:

> "The data which are relevant to the discussion do not all lie within the boundaries of the orthodox field of government. They must be sought in that "unofficial" area below the level of the organs of the State, in the governments of groups. When these are studied and reported upon, it may be possible to show that a new sort of "free corporativism" is in the making within our own society: a corporativism in which autonomous groups, grown to maturity from below, and not together by some dictatorial architect overnight, share with the government of the State, openly and constitutionally, the function of promoting the interests of the community in all their variegated aspects."[79]

As with Dimock, Robbins and Heckscher noted that "...it is well known that the uncontrolled, and apparently uncontrollable, battles between organized labor and organized capital had something to do with the emergence of Fascism in Italy as well as the financing of Nazism in Germany."[80] But were also clear that social science was to assist in the assurance that the corporatism that occurred remained one that rose from below.

Peter Odegard's 1940 *Journal of Politics* entry into the discussion returned the debate into the appropriate use of pressure he saw with the Anti-Saloon league. His contention that political scientists must work in conjunction with the "Democratic Service State" sprang from, again, a critique of wealth concentration: government arose for the expansion of freedom, and should do so again. Odegard's defense of the "democratic service state"

began with the classification of "measures" of government intervention to try and distinguish between the critics of it as a "challenge to liberty." Odegard classified government into the regulatory, promotion/conservation, and supplemental services categories, pointing out that the government regulation of the 1900s was a regulation that capitalists had, themselves, requested:

> "Indeed, government regulation has come in response to pressure from organized groups, often the very groups to be regulated, which ideologically cling to the eighteenth century theory of *laissez-faire*. To describe this development in such terms as a struggle of "Man versus the State" is to indulge at best in a half truth. Rather, it represents the demand of various and sundry group interests for state collaboration in raising standards of practice and in mitigating or reducing competition not only among rival groups but within the group itself... If the growth of the state intervention of this kind marks the emergency of a servile state, it is a servility that has in large measure been sought and assumed rather than imposed."[81]

When continuing his distinction between servility and service, he referred back to organized labor, noting that there is "a striking difference between a democratic service state which intervenes to guarantee the right of workers to organize in unions of their own choosing and a totalitarian state which outlaws all associations but those sponsored by the party in power; between a state which exposes and prosecutes those who interfere with the civil liberties of others and a state in which denial of free expression is a cardinal principle of public policy..."[82] Labor was not used other than as an example of a violated right. Nonetheless, it provided him with an example of the ethical and civic role of political science. He went on to contend that "...our job is one not alone of scientific description and dissection but also of propaganda for those great human values that lie beyond the reach of logic or of science."[83]

These writings did not present a unified theory of a critical political science, but they indicated a leaning towards something on that order. The call for both a historical critique of current practice and a science of enlightenment resembled the call of *New Republic*

activists to reject assumptions based upon a unity of interest between laissez-faire capitalism and a substantive conception of democracy. Lynd's desire to understand the "housebroken" citizen and Sibley's desire to "apologize" for utopian thought followed Lerner and Soule's rather passionate call for a labor oriented reassessment of social, political, and academic practices. Lippincot's suggestion that political science abandon its embrace of "materialist ends" also followed the reform orientation of the *New Republic* activists. The work of Gunnar and Hecksher was revealing in three ways: it called for the "open" recognition of group influence in constitutional law, it sought to maintain the integrity of groups "from below," and identified the need for new forms of data collection to achieve this goal.

1. Kiplinger, W.M. 1936. "The Political Role of Labor" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. xx, p. 125.

2. Soule, George 1936. "Organized Labor's Rôle in Our Economic Life" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* Vol. 184, p. 6.

3. Saposs, David 1936. "Employee Representation as Labor Organization" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* Vol. 184, Pp. 195-6.

4. Saposs op. cit., p. 198.

5. Garrison, Lloyd 1937. "The National Labor Boards" *Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science*, p. 142.

6. Lerner, Max 1938. "Democracy With a Union Card" *The New Republic* Pp. 210-11.

7. ibid.

8. ibid., p. 211.

9. Bliven, Bruce 1937. "The Cassandra Racket" *New Republic* July 14th, p. 273.

10. Murray, Philip 1940. "Labor and Responsibility" *Virginia Quarterly Review* Vol. 16. Pp. 276-7.

11. Lerner, "Democracy" op. cit., p. 211.

12. ibid., p. 215.

13. ibid., p. 217

14. Tomlins, Christopher L. 1992. "The New Deal, Collective Bargaining, and the Triumph of Industrial Pluralism" in *The New Deal: Conflicting Interpretations and Shifting Perspectives* edited by Melvyn Dubofsky (New York: Garland) Pp. 305-332.

15. Lynd, Robert Staughton 1936. "Democracy's 3rd Estate: The Consumer" *Political Science Quarterly* Vol LI No. 4, p. 500.

16. ibid., p. 489.

17. Fierst, Herbert A. 1936. "Consumer Coöperation and Labor" *New Republic* November 18th p. 69.

18. Soule, George 1937. "The Next Four Years: A Summary" *The New Republic* p. 131.

19. Soule, George 1937. "Labor's Decisive Victory" *New Republic* March 17, 1937 p. 156.

20. Note that some rational choice theory suggests that high levels of unionization and union resources present employers with a situation in which they wish competitors to unionize -- paying similar wage levels, and seek state support for enforcement. In the presence of high union density and workers who "consider the interests of all" the employer would find the cost of resistance higher than the cost of participation. For a theoretical discussion of rational choice theory and application of the defect-defect condition to post-war labor, see Rogers, Joel 1990. "Divide and Conquer: Further Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Law" *Wisconsin Law Review* No. 1., Pp. 1-143., especially pages 1-15. For the "evolution of cooperation" condition presented by the Wagner Act see Barenberg, Mark 1993. "The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation" Harvard Law Review Vol. 106 No. 7 Pp. 1379-1496.

21. Soule, George 1936. "Organized Labor's Rôle in Our Economic Life" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* Vol. 184., p. 9.

22. Cooke, Morris Llewellyn and Philip Murray 1946 [1940]. *Organized Labor and Production: Next Steps in Industrial Democracy* (New York: Harper Brothers) Pp. 39 and 46.

23. Dimock, Marshal 1941. "Labor's Part in War and Reconstruction" *American Political Science Review* Vol. 35 No. 2, p. 219.

24. ibid., p. 227.

25. ibid., p. 229. Emphasis added.

26. Lerner, Max 1939. *It's Later Than You Think: The Need for a Militant Democracy* (New York: Viking Press). Pp. 191-204.

27. ibid.

28. Lerner, Max 1938. "Power is What You Make It" *New Republic* Nov. 23, p. 70.

29. Lerner, "Democracy With a Union Card" op. cit., p.211.

30. Vorse, Mary Heaton 1937. "A Year of the CIO" *New Republic* June 2, p. 91.

31. Murray, op. cit., p. 50. Discussion of union maturation is in chapters 4 and 5.

32. Soule, George 1937 "Behind the Motors Strike" *New Republic* Jan. 20th Pp. 353-4.

33. ibid., p. 353.

34. Vorse, "A Year of the CIO" op. cit., p. 93.

35. Soule, "The Next Four Years: A Summary" op. cit., Pp. 129-30.

36. ibid.

37. Lerner, *Its Later Than You Think* op. cit., p. 91

38. ibid., Pp. 92-5.

39. ibid., p. 97.

40. ibid., Pp. 88-9.

41. ibid., p. 119.

42. Lerner "Democracy with a Union Card" op. cit., Pp. 220-1.

43. Lerner, Max 1938. "Wasteland" *New Republic* November 2. pp. 355-6.

44. Lerner, *It's Later Than You Think* op. cit., Pp. 159-166. On Ruml and Arnold, see May, Dean 1981. *From New Deal to New Economics: The Liberal Response to the Recession* (New York: Garland) Pp. 127-139.

45. Lerner *It's Later Than You Think*., p. 103 and pp. 101-112 generally.

46. ibid., p. 77.

47. ibid., p. 194.

48. ibid., Pp. 142-145.

49. ibid., Pp. 81-82.

50. ibid., Pp. 138-9.

51. ibid.

52. ibid., Pp. 115-16.

53. ibid., p. 116.

54. Lerner 1938 "Democracy" op. cit., p. 216.

55. ibid., p. 215.

56. Laski's voluminous writings and placement in the political context cannot be fully addressed here. Nonetheless, he was fully convinced, somewhat like Lerner and Soule, that a particular historical stage had been reached. In his 1939 comment on "Why I Am A Marxist" Laski, for example, delivered a personal and academic testimonial, stating that "I have been driven to the conclusion that no class voluntarily abdicates from the possession of power. I have come to learn that the private ownership of the means of production makes it impossible for the democratic idea to transcend the barriers of class without the capture of the state power by the working class... the dominant ideas and principles of that society will be set by the way in which, in any moment, [society's] property relations are working." The reference to the permeating character of business ethics is similar to Lerner's, as is Laski's belief that "At this historical stage we have reached, the will of the people is unable to use the institutions of capitalist democracy for democratic purposes. For at this stage, democracy needs to transform class relations in order to affirm itself; and it will not be allowed to do so if the owning class is able to prevent that achievement." Laski, Harold 1939. "Why I Am A Marxist" *Nation* January 14, Pp. 60-61.

57. Lynd, Robert S. 1967 [1937]. *Knowledge for What? The Place of Social Science in American Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press) Pp. 115-6.

58. Catlin, G.E.G. 1927. *The Science and Method of Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf) Pp. 131-135.

59. Lynd 1967, op. cit., Pp. 27-28.

60. ibid, p. 37.

61. ibid., Pp. 19-20.

62. ibid., Pp. 35-36.

63. ibid., p. 130.

64. Lerner, Max 1939. "Knowledge for What" July 5, p. 258.

65. Sabine, George 1939. "What is Political Theory?" *Journal of Politics* Vol. 1 No. 1, p. 6.

66. In his late 1940s and early 1950s publications declaring the beginning of the "behavioral revolution," David Easton portrayed this stance towards objectivity as a source of impotence. See Easton, David 1951. "The Decline of Modern Political Theory"

Journal of Politics Vol. 12 No. 1, Pp. 36-58.

67. Sibley, Mulford 1940. "Apology for Utopia" *Journal of Politics* Vol. 2 No. 1, p. 58.

68. Sait, Edward McChesney 1938. *Political Institutions: A Preface* (New York: Appleton) p. 515.

69. ibid., p. 65 and p. 77.

70. Sibley op. cit., p. 61.

71. ibid., p. 73.

72. Sibley, Mulford 1940. "Apology for Utopia II" *Journal of Politics* Vol 2 No. 2, p. 188.

73. Lippincott, Benjamin 1940. "The Bias of American Political Science" *Journal of Politics* Vol. 2 No. 2, p. 126.

74. ibid p. 136 and throughout.

75. Robbins, James J. and Hecksher 1941. "The Constitutional Theory of Autonomous Groups" *Journal of Politics* Vol. 3 No. 1, p. 4.

76. ibid., Pp. 18-19.

77. ibid., p. 15.

78. ibid., pp. 17-18.

79. ibid., pp. 27-8.

80. ibid., p. 16.

81. Odegard, Peter 1940. "The Political Scientist in the Democratic Service to the State" *Journal of Politics* Vol. 2 No. 2, p. 150.

82. ibid., p. 156.

83. Odegard, op. cit., p. 157. The mechanism guiding his science was not well developed. He stated only the need to "lay bare the structure of organized political society, to indicate its origin, the direction of its growth," and to "provide the data upon the basis of which plans may be formulated to guide its future development." In the end, he returned to a natural science model. At the center of his analysis, nonetheless,

remained a distrust of wealth concentration and a belief in the need to protect labor's right to organize. Odegard's stance is difficult to interpret. In a later work he lauded Pendleton Herring's defense of a weak party system in Herring's *Politics of Democracy*. At the same time, however, his work in the 1950s implicitly deviated from Herring's in his critique of the "myth" of the "group basis of politics. See Odegard, Peter 1941. "The Politics of Democracy" *Journal of Politics* op. cit.

Chapter 2

Democratic Capitalism and the Moderation of World Trends

The politics of democracy provides a means of accepting labor as an emerging interest without disruptive effect. This transition depends in large part upon labor leaders playing the game of politics in a way that will enable the party politician to profit from labor support.

Pendleton Herring
1940

There are certain psychological consequences of acquiring a skill. Skill can be acquired by discipline. The individual must suppress his impulses toward irrelevant activity. He must sacrifice the present for the future. But all men are not born to sacrifice equally. Some men acquire skill easily because they take readily to self discipline; others find it arduous and repugnant. This is the sacrificial aspect of learning. In return for what the individual gives up in the present, we make promises of future happiness... We can clearly see that the task of America is to achieve the skill society, free from the distortions and the tragedies that have beset the skill revolution in other continents.

Harold Lasswell
1942

While activists focused on strengthening the labor movement to enhance democratic participation, figures close to the SSRC and the University of Chicago were focusing on the idea of moderation: Charles Merriam, Lewis Lorwin, Arthur Holcombe, Harold Lasswell and Pendleton Herring stressed the alternate importance of a moderating middle class. The idea of a political "middle" did not figure heavily in the 1930s writings of Merriam, Lorwin and Herring, but they did identify the idea of a moderating "mixed" form of government which would sidestep the "isms" of fascist and communist doctrine. Essential to their theory of mixed forms was the denial of rights for any groups making

immoderate claims. Within moderated demands, administration could meet the variegated needs of specific regional, economic and ethnic groups.

Arthur Holcombe and Harold Lasswell were far more detailed in their conceptualization of the term "middle." Holcombe and Lasswell presented the need for a middle class based on historical arguments, and defined the term as a rejection of labor activism. All four writers, it is noted, made one of two claims: that an activist labor movement did not exist in "America," or if one formed, America would be following world trends towards fascism or communism. Three of the ways to moderate the New Deal's version of world crisis was through the use of mixed governmental forms, the strengthening of the middle class, and the moderation of group interaction through "dialogue."

A. Mixed Governmental Forms: The *Sui Generis* State

In their classic 1932 study for the *Social Science Research Council*, Adolf Berle and Gardner Means stated that 19th century classical economic theory of "private property, private enterprise, individual initiative... [and] competition" was no longer applicable to contemporary life. Classical economic theory rested on the presence of both small and competitive producers and rational individual consumers realizing the laws of supply and demand. The corporation was "potentially... the dominant institution of the modern world... [and] brought a concentration of economic power which can compete on equal terms with the modern state." The critique of private power was similar to that of the collectivists. Unlike collectivists, however, the focus was on restoration of economic health rather than undertaking fundamental critical analyses of institutions: governmental reforms could be minimal, including the use of public corporations and the creation of credit provisions to restimulate the economy. Capitalism could coexist with democracy.[1]

Extending his comments in the 1935 *Annals*, Berle identified the need for the "reconquest of economic liberty," and pointed out that under current economic conditions, "[w]e have

liberty to go and attempt to catch the moon, but it is hardly the kind of liberty that is worth very much to us."[2] He described the problem as "a stage of development - which may be called the latter phase of the application of science to life" which "now must be reflected in our political and governmental institutions."[3] Specifically, the latter stage separated "ownership and possession, or at least ownership and management." Beginning with railroads and extending into the banking system, "irresponsible ownership" had to be addressed.[4]

Under current conditions, Berle was not sure how to proceed. Simple income guarantees for working groups might "debase the population" while loan guarantees to new businesses would simply debase credit. The tradeoff for Berle was simple. "I should prefer to debase the credit. That can be restored. [But a] debased population can only be built up again after centuries of time and effort."[5] Maintaining the basic structure of private enterprise was the best way to "navigate the rough waters ahead, preserving at once our concept of liberty, and in preserving both, nevertheless secure to civilization the advances [of] applied science..."[6] he stated that "[w]e must therefore create a situation in which it will be profitable to [employ] if we expect business to do it..." In 1935, temporary spending on work-based programs was the only solution that met all criteria. "So far as may appear at the moment, the public works solution is therefore the only one in the field, to the extent that private business does not function."[7]

Berle's embrace of temporary public works, popularly dubbed "pump priming," was another aspect of his belief that increased credit and deficit spending under the guise of the Keynesian "New Economics" would not debase the economy. Though the chief architects of the final theory lay with more prominent figures such as Marriner Eccles and Henry Wallace, Roosevelt's decision included Adolf Berle, as well as University of Chicago political scientists Beardsley Ruml and Paul Appleby.[8] In Berle's 1940 discussion of economic policy he noted that "[n]obody ever did anything in this country, either publicly or privately, without 'spending' something; that is the way things get done.

The real question is who spends and what comes out of it."[9] Discussing the need to finance borrowing he stated that:

> "Credit, today, is the modern equivalent for the old quartersection of undeveloped land... putting the tools of production into the hands of the thousands of little people, small businessmen, [and] new enterprises, who can enter small businesses, or can make more useful and important the business they now carry on... Their success automatically provides for an increasing number of people."[10]

In the chapter entitled "One Nation Indivisible" he related his sense of the unifying character of credit. Having already declared his devotion to the "religious heritage [of] the United States" and its dedication to "every human life and human soul..." he furthered that "God has endowed every one with the right to find his own way toward the realization of himself..."[11] The focus on credit met those criteria. "You will notice that the result would not be to stifle private initiative, but to give it tremendous additional scope."[12] An appropriately constructed credit system not only identified a solution, it identified problems. A unique governmental form in Tennessee could be enhanced if credit mechanisms were restructured. The federal government's Tennessee Valley Authority provided mass consumer electrical power through a "pyramided finance" structure which made electrical power too expensive for lower income consumers. He continued, noting that "The Tennessee situation is not unknown elsewhere in the United States."[13]

While activists sought to enhance union power to effect political and social reform, Merriam discounted this possibility in both pragmatic and philosophical terms. A political realist, Merriam saw no possibility for any fundamental "industrial democracy" movement in the United States. Characteristically understated, he noted that "less is heard today of industrial democracy" and noted that:

> "Liberty involves a wide range of alternative choices in which autonomy is possible - choices that are not confined to industry, but reach far beyond. 'Individualism' and 'enterprise' are not limited to an economic area, but run

> through the whole gamut of human living... 'individuality,' 'personality,' have many facets, including the economic, but not ending there. It is the function of a democratic association to give the widest possible play to the widest possible range of choices by its citizens... producers' choices... consumers' choices, and workers' choices, and leisure time choices, and cultural choices of a wide variety."[14]

Merriam worked within that perspective in a way which emphasized forms of social groupings other than labor, and forms of government designed to address those separate, ununified groupings. He contended that:

> "The problem of cohesion in the modern state involves the relationships between, say, two or three ethnic groups, two or three religions, three or more economic classes, several well defined geographical regions, and a mass of cultural groups of innumerable types... out of these combinations emerges the power situation, which involves association for some common purpose, and the emergence of government and the rulers"[15]

In his work he spoke of individual groups either in ethnic, regional, religious and economic terms, yet assumed that this immediately developed into the "commonwealth." In the latter case he stressed that "that the total gains of commonwealths are mass gains produced by the common effort and that these gains are to be enjoyed by the mass that made them possible."[16]

In 1933, his *Trends* committee had claimed the need to realize interest group "adjustment," accepting government expansion which would address the unique character of different sectors of society:

> "The hybrid nature of some of these creations [of government agencies] may be the despair of those theorists, both radical and conservative, who see the world only in terms of an unquestioning acceptance of one or the other of two exclusive dogmas, but these innovations will be welcomed by those who are less concerned about phobias than with the prompt and practical adjustment of actual affairs to the brutal realities of changing social and economic conditions. The American outcome, since all the possible molds of thought and invention have not yet been exhausted, may be a type *sui generis*, adapted to the special needs, opportunities, limitations and genius of the American people... the student of social trends

> observes nothing alarming in the widely varying forms of social adjustment undertaken by government, whether maternal, paternal, or fraternal from one period to another."[17]

What mattered most was a commitment to creativity in governance rather than a "dogmatic" doctrines such as "functional equity." Since he discounted production, he continually stressed the need for equity in distribution. "The contrivances of democracy must give assurance that the gains of civilization shall be equitably distributed." Creativity in governance was inseparable from finding political and economic arrangements that proved effective:

> "the means of effecting this result are subordinate to the ends in view. The basic understanding is the seed, the root, the life from which the means spring and upon which they must depend... Whether this involves absolutely free and unrestricted competition, or controlled competition, or monopoly, or semi-governmentalization... is relatively immaterial in comparison with the general principle... democracy has not inherent and necessary relationship with any special form of economic production or distribution."[18]

Though Merriam contended the need to remain open-minded, he was most articulate in his support for the maintenance of electoral processes, common counsel in representative bodies and "scientific" public administration and planning.[19] Most important, however, was planning. In "the central problem of balance" he noted, "[t]he best which any group of economic planners can do [now]... is to lay plans for making plans."[20] On the one hand, this required a body of elites to coordinated governmental development of U.S. natural resources. On the other hand, this required attaining "equilibrium" between the ethnic, economic, and regional groups who would be realizing these goals.

Under the assumption that blended economic forms could achieve equitable distribution, Merriam's writings continually stressed the term "equilibrium." In his 1934 *Political Power* he claimed that in the adjustment of tension between groups "the birth of power may be observed" and went on to state that "[t]he social situation involves the maintenance of equilibrium between groups, classes, factions, by whatever term

denominated."[21] He extended this in a 1936 lecture on "Putting Politics in Its Place" by stating that the fundamental "control systems" by which we live cannot be explained by such gross political abstractions, but exists in the "moving equilibrium" of politics and the "basic patterns of association... the government of the family, the government of the church... each in its domain." Like Lynd, he contended that "what [theoreticians and practitioners] may call 'economic' and 'political' activities... the experienced observer of social trends... is unable to discover... such exclusive differentiation."[22] Yet Merriam was working within a "whirling equilibrium" that was to realize revolutionary changes superior to the order seen in "the phantom interpretations of outworn systems."[23]

Merriam's National Resources Committee appeared, in the end, to be Merriam's attempt at creative, non-doctrinaire governance. The group conducted studies recommending sensitivity to regional variability, needed public projects, the funding of research, and the coordination of different planning agencies at local, state and national levels which might direct the country out of depression and away from fascism. And though this group made suggestions to executive and congressional agencies, Merriam felt that concrete endorsement of specific projects would move too close to either centralized planning or the committee's association with corrupt political machines.[24]

A similar ambivalence towards the idea of "class" was evident in the work of Lewis Lorwin. In a 1934 APSR discussion of the rise of the "New Deal Planning State" Lorwin critiqued some labor goals as "Marxist," frighteningly corporatist and "counter to our permanent values." Middle class proposals were, similarly, involved in a deluded search for centralized administrative units and an "organic solidarity in which group inequalities and group interests are happily merged in a higher national purpose."[25] He doubted the ability of the middle class to "build up a new equilibrium with proper regard for the interests of the masses of the people." Fearing the difficulty of regulating industry, middle class sympathizers might risk aggressive and fascistic union regulation, or more aggressive control of monopolies. Thus, Lorwin stated that:

> "[t]he middle class nationalists must make up their minds as to which way they are going, and with whom. For if they decide to throw more weight upon the side of the working population, they must drive deeper into the control of industry and the methods of regulating the distribution of national income... building a new class of civil servants capable of developing a deep sense of professionalism..."[26]

Anticipating his later work with Merriam and the National Resources Planning Board, he chose the stance similar to Merriam's: there might be an intrinsically American solution. As he stated it:

> "There are basic differences between the New Deal in America and the social movements of Western Europe. The peculiar features of our New Deal are its greater flexibility, its spirit of tolerance, its respect for individual and group rights, and the effort at voluntary action. The reasons for these features are the vague demarcations between economic groups and classes which have been the foundations of our democratic traditions, the faith in the dynamic possibilities of our industries, the survival of frontier mental attitudes... and our easygoing attitudes towards social doctrines and theories."[27]

Because socialist doctrine ran counter to "our permanent human values" and regulatory solutions were fascistic, he sought moderation within a deeper American consensus directed by administrative elites:

> "Can the "plain people" of America, with the aid of socially-minded experts and leaders, build up planfully and peacefully a new economic and political equilibrium based not upon concepts of totalitarianism or corporatism, but on broad and flexible principles which aim to reconcile pragmatically popular control with governmental leadership, individual efficiency with group responsibility, economic security with orderly change, and social solidarity with realistic freedom?"[28]

As with Merriam, a significant component of Lorwin's beliefs rested on his conception of labor. Lorwin contended in 1933 that the AFL required increased centralization to make unions more amenable to economic planning. His assertion began with a critique of John Commons' theory of labor evolution, suggesting that the limited power of the national federation lay within a web of constraints both internal to unions and in U.S. social

structure overall.[29] Variation in levels of unionization was a product of constant exposure to business cycles, inter-industry differences, challenges from non-skill unions and migrant groups, as well as the "egoistic" self interested behavior of some union locals.[30] If brought under administrative rule, unions could be managed with "flexible control." As he stated it, "[t]he trend toward a semi-legal, quasi-public unionism in the United States is a phase of a movement which seems worldwide in character. In all countries, the voluntary or so-called "free" type of unionism is having difficulties maintaining itself, if it has not been entirely destroyed."[31] Without the problems introduced by "[business] combination and monopoly... and [t]he growing importance of the credit mechanism and the rapid increase in productive capacity," free trade unions could survive. In the presence of those problems, however, came a "protest against instability" from a broader public, as well as pressure for "collective control and for economic cooperation as opposed to economic conflicts."[32] He noted that

> "under these conditions a free labor movement becomes less and less possible. The tendency will be to reduce the amount of all conflict and to enforce national standards of economic conduct at the cost of limiting individual and group action."[33]

While local economies accepted strikes because "they were accepted as part of the price paid for economic freedom and industrial progress" nationalized systems made it clear that "[o]pposition is no longer to be valued as a constructive force."[34] Labor was to be organized, but the impetus for it was administrative stability rather than democratic participation.

The writings of Berle, Lorwin and Merriam display little discussion of a "middle class" ideal, but clearly emphasized moderation through the use of credit, planning, and administered unionization. Their insistence on "equilibria" and free-form "creative" and "blended" governmental systems were a clear rejection of "dogmatic" and "conflict" oriented philosophies.

B. Labor and the Promise of the Middle Class

1. Arthur Holcombe: The Middle Class and Urban Labor

Arthur Holcombe's works on labor and the middle class in 1933, 1935 and 1940 were similar to Lorwin's. In the discussion of the *New Party Politics* in 1933, Holcombe identified the presence of the electorate's shift from rural to urban areas, and speculated that sectional conflicts would be replaced by class conflicts. The implications were then developed in his 1935 *Government in a Planned Democracy* and his 1940 discussion of *The Middle Classes in American Politics.*[35]

Dismissing the predictions of Marx as mythic, he considered the Leninist style of party mobilization of workers as a distinct possibility. Given this, he recommended that people understand the need to "reckon with the facts" about social upheaval and suggested that the most effective insurance against either fascism or communism was the injection of middle class values into working class groups.[36] The conscious use of the middle class was not, as far as Holcombe was concerned, mere speculation. He grounded it, rather, in the argument that Aristotle's observations about social stability were manifested in modern class structure. To find stability, leaders would have to produce a group that could balance tendencies towards oligarchy and majoritarianism.

In his 1933 work, the definition of the term "middle" was only partially developed. He was clear that "middle" referred to both levels of material wealth and an attitude. The central function of the middle class was to be the arbiter between the lower and the upper class: a middle class centered around the role of conciliation and a sense of "otherness" from the upper and lower class. This dealt with the problem that social movements from the lower classes polarized politics and set the stage for fascist reactions among leading capitalists. Thus, the "middle class" offered the only basis for a "rational" decision making frame of mind, "diminish[ing] the violence of the class struggle... [and] prolong[ing] the life of the modern state."[37]

Holcombe, however, also claimed that America *had* no proletarian class given the size of managerial, entrepreneurial and "declasse" categories.[38] Though fearful of instability from labor, he contended class consciousness could never really take hold in the United States. He not only attributed this to the non-industrial makeup of the working class and the temperate orientation of the upper class, but a "deeper" middle class consciousness among the groups that were not "working class."

In 1933 Holcombe's work blended an empirical stance with a normative one. On the one hand, a middle class would provide for a more stable politics and solidification of the modern state. "It promotes those special interests which conform most closely to the general interest of the state... the least objectionable of the imperfect kinds of justice."[39] On the other hand, the point was moot:

> "it is impossible to believe that proletarian class consciousness is inevitably destined, as many Marxists have asserted, to obliterate the middle class consciousness of the white-collar and other skilled workers in American industrial areas..."[40]

In any event, he outlined the program needed for the "right constitution of the class itself" and stated that "[t]he most important task of middle class politicians" was to "strengthen the middle class consciousness of the skilled workers... the surest sign of the political well-being of the modern state."[41] In practical terms, the "program for the middle class" included use of the lower class for juries, protection of the lower middle class tradesmen with mechanic's liens, protection of the upper classes with virtual property qualifications for partisan participation, and protection of the middle class with increased use of merit systems for all forms of middle class employment. "The equivalent of the Preemption and Homestead Acts in an urbane age is the merit system... [which] destroys the privileges attached to wealth alone."[42]

As Pendleton Herring would also claim, Holcombe contended that urban politics was purging "rustic" and inefficient rural politics. This new political system required "a revolution in the attitude of the individual towards government" and a private sector which must adopt an increasing awareness of actions involving the public interest. Because this was only possible in the presence of supportive public opinion, Holcombe stressed the need for public enlightenment using education oriented towards each separate class. "[T]he improvement of the administrative system is ultimately an educational problem. It is a part of the great problem of civic training in a democracy."[43]

As with Lorwin, Holcombe's later works continued to stress the importance of middle class moderation. In *Government in a Planned Democracy*, he described planning as the moderation of the "class conscious state" with middle class perspectives. In his 1940 *The Middle Classes in American Politics*, however, he further outlined the idea of being middle class as both a subjective and theoretical phenomenon. His 1935 idea of a "planned democracy" called for representational forms which would match the features of the corporation: an enlarged managerial class and a split working/owning class. The planning state thus required the expansion of bureaucracies for regulation of the sectional interests within the managerial class.[44] Political planning, however, included the formation of parties and other institutions which ameliorated the effects class consciousness.

> "The true function of middle-class parties is to mitigate the violence of struggle between the upper and lower classes and to assert the supremacy of community interests over class interests of any kind. The middle class is forced to protect its own interest, which is that of the mean between the extremes. To do otherwise would involve a confession of the inferiority of its claim to the allegiance of its own members."[45]

The defense of his claim he contended that the middle class would be unable to maintain a numerical electoral majority without incorporating part of the lower classes into it, and needed to do so since labor groups were "more likely than capital to try to redress its

grievances by means of a special political party organized exclusively in its own class-interest."[46] The result of an expanded middle class would be, then, "the equilibrium of the state."[47]

As with the creation of bureaucracies for dealing with management, the "representation of labor" was to be achieved through the creation of an institution specific to the conflict between labor and capital. Holcombe saw the National Industrial Recovery Act's outline for a comprehensive collective bargaining system as a "suitable institution... for the representation of class interests" and saw industrial unions as the best way to mitigate the possibility of a labor party. He noted that "[i]f there are not to be strong independent labor parties, there must be strong labor or industrial unions." He encouraged the idea of an "experimental attitude" within the middle class perspective given the fact that "if politicians do not experiment, business and labor organizers will."[48]

In Holcombe's 1940 discussion of the middle classes, he defined the term "middle" as a general stance of moderation that could be traced through the formation of the American Republic. Indeed, the tradition was there for any wage earner to grasp should he so desire. "It is easy to exaggerate the importance of objective measurements of the middle class... what is less than very rich and more than very poor is a matter of opinion. There is no middle class, politically speaking, but thinking makes it so. By due process of thought any wage-earner can promote himself into the middle class." Indeed he went so far as to state that:

> "a substantial part of the wage-earning population of the United States has promoted itself into the middle class... its size is determined by the persons who compose it under the influence of tradition, education, and personal reflection... in short, the middle class in American politics is essentially a subjective phenomenon, and is radically different from the middle classes of European countries."[49]

The idea of moderation in Holcombe's work was layered. Social equilibrium was achieved by creating in government whatever moderating institution offset developments within society. The middle class party tempered class conflict outside the workplace, collective bargaining managed class conflict in the workplace, and executive bureaucracies managed inter-sectional conflicts. This would also, however, be tempered by parties of the middle class. As noted above, however, it is in his last work that it became an intra personal entity. The act of self promotion from the working to the middle class resembled Lorwin's belief in an American harmony. For Holcombe, workers' self promotion generated the middle class that would end class tensions — any worker who actively denied the need for activism would be embracing America's true heritage as a benevolent Republic.

2. Harold Lasswell: The Middle Class and the Benevolent Laborer

a. The Middle Class in History

In his 1935 discussion of the "Moral Vocation of the Middle Income Skill Group" Lasswell repeated the assertions of Holcombe in his belief that there was an unrealized middle class which was ethically compelled to moderate proletarians and plutocrats. Lasswell's middle class is most interesting in its dependance on the idea of labor substituted with the idea of *skill*. Labor groups suggested the idea of class conflict, while skill groups simply suggested the presence of technical knowledge. Lasswell added to that the idea that groups were in competition for "deference" and "goods," concluding that processes of modernity generating "functional differentiation" and the "gradation of material environments" created a middle class.[50] The problem with the emerging middle class in the United States was its bifurcation into those favoring a bourgeois outlook, and those favoring a proletarian one:

> "One great fissure which divides the middle income skill group separates the older constituents from the new elements who are affiliated with the labor movement...[the new group being] 'renegades' from the older middle-income skill

> formations... and [with each group] saying 'bourgeoisie' with hiss and 'proletariat' with a flaunt, resentment turns to bitterness and curdles indignation."[51]

With the processes of modernity generating both the new middle class and proletarian class tensions, it was up to a new middle class to end the "political confusion." This, he claimed, was possible by "clarifying" the nature of the processes involved, and enhancing this clarification with the proper "symbols." Clarification began with denial of the presence of an American "proletariat," claiming that it was a subjective product of the petit bourgeoisie. Holcombe stressed the ethical need to embrace a balance, but added that an industrial class barely existed in the United States. Lasswell, however, claimed that the idea of a proletariat was based on mistaken interpretation of facts altogether. He implied that political activists were merely disaffected portions of the middle class.

> "it should be recognized that the campaign in the name of the 'proletariat' was an indirect mode of expressing the middle-income skill ideal. It was members of the middle income skill group, notably Marx, who furnished the intellectual leadership and often the organizing genius for the 'proletariat.'[52]

This same stance was made more emphatically in his conclusion, where he stated that the language of class was thankfully weak in the United States. "Our manual workers and the skilled workers have not been infiltrated by a vocabulary which sets them off from the rest of the community." He continued, asserting that "[w]here the *class struggle* subsides into the background the *skill struggle* comes to the fore."[53] .

In this 1935 writing Lasswell's primary concern was with weighing the possible vehicles for reunification of the divided middle class. On the one hand, the middle class was "incompletely self aware" and embraced a "degrading passivity." In his rare use of italics, he contended that reunification of the middle class could be achieved by embrace of a work ethic:

> "The word 'skill' contains the essential key to the psychological problem of self discovery... It can be contended that 'Americans of middle income' are those who make the most *sacrifices* in study, in conscientious performance of duty, in upright citizenship. *Sacrifice in obtaining socially useful skill constitutes a first claim on social reward.* Sacrifice also is an inner experience which unifies those who discipline themselves to acquire skill. Here lies the principle which generates the common basic outlook in skilled mechanics, intellectuals, and enterprisers."[54]

In short, Lasswell's 1935 discussion of the middle class closely paralleled Holcombe's in the sense that both tried to create a middle class by asking workers to reject a degrading and un-American association with the idea of a "working class."

In an apocalyptic 1940 discussion of the "garrison state," Lasswell made no mention of the role of the middle class, though it is apparently discussion of a polity without it. The "garrison state" was the result of institutional responses to crises, and its goals were to limit risk by "socializing danger"- bureaucratizing society under a ruling elite. Similar to Lorwin's assertions about the decreasing acceptability of strikes in an interconnected society, Lasswell warned that the garrison state would eliminate popular action and public opinion. "Rival parties will be suppressed," "[l]egislatures will be done away with," and "the ruling group will exercise a monopoly of opinion." Moreover, the elite subjected the populace to a militaristic elite. "The lower strata of the community will be composed of those subject to compulsory labor, tending to constitute a permanent pariah caste" and "[t]he respect pyramid will probably resemble the income pyramid."[55]

Lasswell's final 1940 comments on the "garrison state" left him with a dilemma he resolved in his next work. Claiming science would identify a new form of state, he predicted the possible characteristics of it - "antiplutocracies" and "world proletariats." At the same time, there was a kernel of hope that certain democratic values might also be preserved. "What democratic values... and how? ...[and w]ill the human costs of a garrison state be reduced if we civilian-ize the ruling elite?... What are some of the devices capable of overcoming bureaucratism?"[56]

b. Moderation Through Public Opinion

In the context of domestic calls for governmental regulation of business, it is telling that Lasswell delivered such a foreboding discussion of the "Garrison State"-- the document might easily be interpreted as a response to European fascism alone. In his next work (1942) he clearly hoped, however, to avoid political decay and achieve *Democracy Through Public Opinion.* In that work Lasswell continued to address the concerns highlighted by democratic collectivists and New Deal activists. These concerns included the need to reduce monopoly power and to insure the presence of "respected jobs." They were achieved in a way that avoided governmental centralization: suspicious of governmental power, he discussed a society with infinitely diffused power. Unlike Europe, American conditions made this possible.

Lasswell began by noting that "local conditions" were important in determining the direction of world trends, and that the United States had a series of local conditions that precluded the rise of fascist and communist trends: "there is no need for America to slide unwittingly down the European path through private monopolism to dictatorship[.]" As with Merriam and Lorwin, he concluded the key to be in the presence of natural resources and a heritage of unity:

> "America has been free to face the basic issues of the new century, free from the paralyzing dissensions of the recent past... [and] a unified community, unified in the possession of stupendous resources... there is need of clarity about the position of America in the total historical process of our time. By perceiving the trends of the time, democracy can live and grow."[57]

The idea of the "total historical process" clearly referred to his scientific theory about the forces of bureaucratization and the rise of skill leading to the "garrison state." There is also a mythic quality to the assertion, however. It resembled Merriam's hopes for a "sui generis" state and Holcombe's claim that American society was "radically different" from its European counterpart. Lasswell was, after all, referring to *America* within a "total historical process."

Despite Lasswell's faith in the exceptional character of American development, he identified the need for reforms and information that would guide those reforms. "[W]e must faithfully distinguish between the letter and the application of written rules of law. The rules may speak of majority control, [but] the facts may belie the forms... We must learn the truth, not by analyzing texts, but by observing the processes of active politics."[58] With respect to business, he suggested that public opinion be brought to bear against monopolies:

> "An enterprise ceases to be a business when it abandons the pursuit of profit or when it monopolizes the market... [and] American business is slowly strangling itself for lack of insight into its essential characteristics. Slovenly use of the word business in newspapers and magazines aids in this self-destructive process. To imagine that all who engage in private enterprise are engaged in business is a deadly fallacy.... Private bureaucracies bear the same relation to genuine business that tumors bear to the healthy body. Tumors are growths. They look like part of the body, but they threaten to destroy the integrity of the organism as a whole."[59]

At the same time, however, there were also "all-union towns, such as isolated mining communities, where local sentiment is intolerant of any 'traitor' who dissents from the union line."[60] He went on to contend that "The American system rests upon a deep suspicion of the dominance of any single hierarchy in the life of man. Whether that single hierarchy is government or business or church, the American system is on guard....The American system is thus a vital balance."[61]

The central point was not just that democracy could be threatened by any monopoly, but a point far different from the activist stance of the collectivists: democracy existed everywhere to *some* degree at least, and could be thought of in quantitative terms:

> "The practice of justice is manifestly incomplete when majority rule is neglected. On the other hand, the extinction of majority rule does not mean the annihilation of all justice, for the rulers of any society give at least some measure of deference to the people at large... [t]he degree of democratic government achieved in practice is constantly varying from time to time and place to place. We can think of it as a social variable, expanding one moment, contracting the next."[62]

Thus, Lasswell's conception of reform was extremely limited: he addressed the need to regulate monopolies but also claimed monopolies did not eliminate democracy. At some points his proposals sounded syndicalist: "[voting] shares could be allocated to important functional organizations... [of] farmers associations, small business associations, and labor unions of America." Conversely, democracy could be found in the interstices of everyday life, implying need for very little reform at all:

> "In the broadest sense, all who make important decisions are leaders and politicians... Politicians are the influential persons in society, Whether they are named banker, manufacturer, merchant, trade unionist, party leader, party boss, or not, they are politicians."[63]

This middle road generated his focus on the use of public opinion as a tool to be used either for anti-monopoly reform or for creating middle class moderation. "We know that the level of democratic attainment depends upon public opinion, and that opinion, like democratic government itself, is a social variable of ever-shifting scope, direction and intensity of expression."[64] If there was opinion flow, political institutions could improve it and be improved *by* opinion flow. The formula, however, was as much concerned with individual therapy as it was with political reform. "Public opinion in the public interest must serve the two ends of adjustment and catharsis."[65] He noted that "[i]n this world of mammoth machines and giant organizations the friends of democracy not infrequently experience moods of defeatism."[66] Without catharsis came "tinder for blazing anti-democratic acts."[67] With public expression came opportunity for the expression of group identities. "[T]he diversity of the modern age is not without its positive gains for democracy... [a]s society becomes more subdivided into worlds of experience, nearly everything is favored by somebody. Individual differences can find complex forms of cultural expression."[68]

In 1940, the garrison state loomed large in his work. In 1941, however, he took the opposite stance, claiming "[n]othing is more threatening to peace and order than the breakdown of the monopoly of violence in the hands of duly constituted public

officials..."[69] The most fundamental theme had become the need for political, social and personal structures to adopt the splintered view of power embodied in the constitution. "To engage in the unqualified praise of private enterprise or of government enterprise is to confuse the public about the basic principles of American society. A corollary of the American system of check and balance is the need of qualified praise for either channel."[70]

C. Pendleton Herring: Moderation through Public Opinion

Similar to Holcombe's search for a capitalist/worker equilibrium, claimed that the defining characteristic of American history had been an evolving sense of compromise between doctrines of minority and majority rights. In his 1941 *The Politics of American Democracy* Herring attempted to both calm and engulf debates.[71] Moderation was achieved by a rejection of utopias, and this was amply displayed in the history of American politics. The civil war represented the first American experiment with ideological intransigence, and the rise of ideological parties or a labor party might well create a second. His remedy was the embrace a tradition of "practical" politics and a tradition of moderating dialogue between groups.

1. Anything but a Labor Party

Herring also discussed American "banners of belief" which were a response to contemporary issues, and to the rise Nazism, Fascism, and the reactionary embrace of classic Liberalism. Responding to the libertarian writings of Herbert Agar and Lerner's collectivist calls for a unification of labor, farm and consumer groups, Herring presented these as ideal examples of extreme applications of calls for minority and majority rule. His analysis began with a reading of American political history as successful when the two doctrines were blended, failures when they were not. His discussion included support for New Deal reforms by placing them within this interpretation of American history. He responded to critics who saw the New Deal as extremist by claiming that Republican

control of the federal machinery was part of a broader historical process that had to be reversed.

> "The New Deal in response to these new demands effected through political channels a distribution of wealth unattainable through the [previous] economic system. This process of distribution cannot be treated as a partisan doctrine, but rather as the necessary consequence of the functioning of the political system."[72]

New Deal Democrats were not extremist democrats but Democrats dealing with extreme conditions: the party system could be embraced as a critical vehicle for conciliation and union. "Looking Forward," he contended that political parties should not assemble programs from abstract principles, but with an eye to the maintenance of stability. He stated that "[t]he question that party leaders must consider is not: How distinctive shall party policy be? Rather it is: How far can the program develop without alienating the present loyal interests?"[73] Seeking to limit the challenges to New Deal gains in achieving the public interest, he discussed the choices facing the Democratic party. Having developed a series of justifications centered around compromise and pragmatism, he contended that party enhancement of working class ties would be unwise.

> "For the Democratic party to maintain a militantly liberal policy based on the sectional strength of populous states would require an increase in class consciousness among urban industrial wage earners. This class consciousness would have to be strong enough to change the complexion of the sectional citadels of capitalism... his line of argument, though often used, stresses the special interest aspect of party make-up almost to the exclusion of factors which we have urged of equal importance... [T]he future of a party lies... in its skill at compromise, synthesis and manipulation..."[74]

The centrality of compromise was generated by his beliefs of what was in store for those "looking forward." Extrapolating from present conditions, Herring was sure that future trends would include attempts to rewrite the constitution, class conflict in general, and increased conflict over issues of economic regulation. Worst of all, however, was the thought that this might result in "a new bill of economic privileges" created by the "early

enthusiasm of the New Dealers." It was best, he advised, to "start a steep climb in a low gear... [p]redictions of conflict come largely from leftist intellectuals... I believe they underestimate the capacity of democratic governments to meet the basic needs of their citizens."[75] Again embracing compromise, he repeated Lorwin in his assertion that "[t]he answer to such questions will come in terms of our skills in administration, both public and private."[76] Stated more succinctly, he continued that:

> "In the minds of some persons interested in the labor movement, for instance, [idealism and party unity] seems to be more important than the gaining of tangible ends. The attention of most labor leaders have been focused upon finding ways for advancing the strength of their unions by gaining wage and hour concessions than in preaching loyalty to a conceptual picture of what kind of social order would be best in the future. Over a long period a new class basis may win general acceptance. In the meantime, if violence is to be avoided, compromise is inevitable."[77]

Herring stressed that any hard alliance between labor unions and the Democratic party was going to be a clear departure from an American tradition of moderation. Moreover, it was not needed. "Major parties can avoid left wing strength without going all the way to the left."[78]

Herring was a realist who was certain that activists' goals were utopian. For labor to thrive, it was best to follow the American trend towards middle class temperance. "A labor party's success would depend on increased class consciousness... It seems remote that employees, any more than employers, will discover wide area of common interests." Because of this, labor needed leaders attuned to narrower desires; "...fighting spokesmen and single-minded champions... [with] greater scope if they remain outside the political parties... not non-partisanship but rather aggressive bargaining with the dominant political party."[79] Herring identified these characteristics as aspects of the "mature" movement. "Labor leaders have been more widely accorded a respectable status... more generally

accepted as sober middle-class citizens. These minority movements have come of age. Industry is on the defensive."[80]

Civil conflict could, for Herring, deepen into a second civil war. Hence, *The Politics of Democracy* was devoted to finding the brilliance of a national vision of infinitely splintered compromises. Conflict was acceptable, but ideologically based conflict was not. Moreover, it was not really in the American tradition. "The period of government by discussion is but a tick in the clock of historical time."[81]

2. Public Opinion

While collectivists contended political corruption was a product of a *laissez faire* ethos, Herring claimed it was both a rustic aspect of American history and a necessary evil. He stated that "[t]he vices of our politicians we must compare not with the virtues of the secluded individual but with the vices of dictators..." and he went on to add that "[t]he skill exercised by those who seek a *via media* holds society together..."[82] The infinite splintering of power was not a mess, it was a glorious mess. Glorious not only because it held society together, but because it was improving. This vision was seen in terms as specific as the evolution of neutral agencies where "[t]o meet the petty politician's favoritism and fixing, social agencies and social services are being improved and extended..."[83] As did Merriam, he stated that:

> "[c]ommunal life and government I picture as a moving equilibrium... [d]emocracy is not to be defined in terms of the interests of any group or combination of groups. Its vitality depends upon the free interplay of such forces... [l]eadership under democracy must decide when the times call for consolidation and when they call for renovation..."[84]

It was in this conception of "interests" that Herring began to assemble a theory of objectivity and compromise. For the activist to adopt the vision of labor or farm groups was to abandon the tradition of the "free interplay of forces." It was this "free interplay,"

indeed, which he identified as "public opinion." "Under the theory of public opinion set forth [here] there is not common will or substantive mandate for a political party to carry into execution. The political process in a democracy lies not in the expression of a mythical popular will but in freedom for the group will that press for expression."[85] He continually recited the point that "[it] cannot be superimposed. It must grow within the society..."[86] At the base of it appeared to be his assertion that ideas were secondary to objective processes. He contended that "the act comes before the thought" and claimed that "the insistence that social relationships be determined by the clear statement of logical alternatives...fails to operate according to formula, and falls back upon irrational appeals."[87]

It was the *dialogue* between discrete interests that Herring thought was intrinsically American.[88] Just as Lasswell had argued, public opinion was not just a series of poll results, but the description of a process antithetical to the silence of idealistic unity.[89] "It does not entail" he stated,

> "any assumptions as to the superior wisdom of mass opinion or the rationality of man. It is enough if we allow for the free interplay of opinion, to tolerance of opposition, and a widespread participation by interested citizens in the discussion of problems that touch them closely."[90]

It was a gentleman's politics - a mechanism through which the "interested" would proceed with their moderated demands.[91] "Under democracy[,] rule by public opinion provides those conditions whereby special interests are free to seek a working compromise harmonious with the values prevailing in the community... the policy that emerges is the product of many interactions and during this process the responsibility is distributed widely... [it] is yet the breath of life in the politics of democracy."[92]

D: Conclusion

The writings of Merriam, Lorwin, Holcombe, Lasswell and Herring repeated intrinsically similar themes. Each writer rejected calls for government centralization based on a "realist" assessment of the labor movement. These assertions ranged from Merriam's and Lorwin's claim that it did not exist, or Holcombe's and Lasswell's assertion that its presence was an aberration of American values. Each writer also included heavy doses of faith in capitalism and a work ethic in their theories. Merriam sought the restoration of economic opportunity through the NRPB, Lorwin claimed the presence of "the spirit of voluntary action" and "faith in the dynamic possibilities of our industries, Holcombe noted that workers could "promote themselves" into the middle class, and Lasswell proclaimed that "sacrifice constitutes the first claim on social reward." Finally, of course, came Herring's claim that there was a "moving equilibrium" and *via media* to be embraced.

With power perceived to be disseminated between individual cultural groups or between economic classes, these writers' repeated emphasis on "equilibrium" is understandable.[93] From this came Holcombe's and Lasswell's assertion that a "vital balance" was achieved through free form dialogue. This equilibrium allowed democratic capitalism to exist, with "catharsis" possible for those who were caught in the "mammoth machines and giant organizations." The term "equilibrium" had two connotations: one as a scientific model for social peace and a second as an assertion that other political theories created the unstable conditions leading to fascism and communism. Moreover, these writers concluded that administrative elites needed to orchestrate power sharing either through "education oriented towards each separate class" or "dialogue" between groups with moderated demands.

1. Berle, Adolf A. Jr. and Gardner Means., 1932. *The Modern Corporation and Private Property* Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences acting on behalf of the Social Science Research Council of America (New York: Commerce Clearing House) Pp. 345, 345-351 and Pp. 356-7.

2. Berle, Adolf A. 1935. "The New Deal and Economic Liberty" *Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science* Vol. 178, p. 45.

3. ibid., p. 37.

4. ibid., Pp. 37 and 41.

5. ibid. p. 46.

6. ibid., p. 37.

7. ibid., p. 46.

8. May, Dean L. 1981. *From New Deal to New Economics: The Liberal Response to the Recession* (New York: Garland) Pp. 145-6 and 129-151 generally.

9. Berle, Adolf A. Jr. 1940. *New Directions in the New World* (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers) p. 64.

10. ibid., p. 61.

11. ibid., p. 54. More extensive discussion of his theory of the relationship between Christianity and American development is in Chapter 6, "Heirs of the Future" Pp. 126-141.

12. ibid., p. 62.

13. ibid., Pp. 62-3.

14. Merriam, Charles 1939. *The New Democracy and the New Despotism* (New York: McGraw Hill) p. 78.

15. Merriam, 1964 [1934]. *Political Power* (New York: Collier) Pp. 32-3.

16. Merriam *The New Democracy* op. cit., Pp. 35 and 38.

17. Mitchell, Wesley C. and Charles Merriam et. al. 1933. "A Review of Findings by the President's Research Committee on Social Trends" *Recent Social Trends in the United States* (Westport: Greenwood Press) Vol 1, Pp. lxii-lxiii.

18. Merriam, *The New Democracy* op. cit., p. 101.

19. Merriam, *The New Democracy* op. cit., Pp. 104-186.

20. Merriam, *Social Trends* op. cit., p. xxxi

21. Merriam, *Political Power* op. cit., Pp. 31-32.

22. Quoted in Merriam, Charles Edward 1936. "Putting Politics in Its Place" *The Role of Politics in Social Change* James Stokes Lectureship on Politics, Stokes Foundation: New York University (London: New York University Press) Pp. 35-42.

23. Merriam, *The New Democracy* op. cit., p. 46. Barry Karl notes this was all linked to the rejection of fascism and communism. Merriam's work on the NPB and the NRPB was the "culmination... of a philosophical position which he had taken throughout his career: that the projection into the future of present tendencies in American national life could reveal continuing ideals realizable without revolution and built on the base of what America was rather than what it would need to become... [his] committee based its entire rhetorical position on the necessity of preserving democracy in a world in which democracy was under serious threat." Karl, Barry D. 1974. *Charles Merriam and the Study of Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) p. 268.

24. ibid., Pp. 226-283.

25. Lorwin, Lewis 1934. "Social Aspects of the Planning State" *American Political Science Review* Vol. 28 No. 1, p. 19.

26. ibid., p. 21.

27. ibid., Pp. 21-2.

28. ibid., p. 22.

29. Commons, John 1927. "Trade Unionism" in *Encylopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: McMillan).

30. Lorwin cites on the 5 factors on labor exceptionalism.

31. Lorwin, Lewis 1933. *The American Federation of Labor: policies and prospects* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution) p. 462.

32. ibid.

33. ibid., Pp. 461-2.

34. ibid.

35. Holcombe, Arthur H. 1933. *The New Party Politics* (New York: W.Y. Norton); 1935. *Government in a Planned Democracy* (New York: W.Y. Norton) 1935; 1940. *The Middle Classes in American Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).

36. Holcombe, *The New Party* op. cit., pp. 36-54. The quote is on p. 54.

37. ibid., p. 116.

38. ibid., Pp. 84-118.

39. ibid., p. 116.

40. ibid., p. 106 and Pp. 106-113 generally.

41. ibid., p. 117-18.

42. ibid., p. 125.

43. ibid., Pp. 127, 140 and 125-140 generally.

44. ibid., pp. 102-137.

45. Holcombe, Arthur 1935 *Government in a Planned Democracy* (New York: W. W. Norton) Pp. 141-2.

46. Holcombe., *Planned Democracy* Pp. 72-3.

47. ibid., p. 101.

48. ibid., Pp. 101, 79 and 139.

49. Holcombe, Arthur N. 1940. *The Middle Classes in American Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press) Pp. 49-50.

50. Lasswell, Harold D. 1935. "The Middle Income Skill Group" *International Journal of Ethics* Vol. 65, No. 2. Pp. 136-7 and 132.

51. ibid., Pp. 127-8.

52. ibid., p. 131.

53. ibid., p. 137.

54. ibid., p. 130.

55. Lasswell, Harold D. 1940-1. "The Garrison State" *American Journal of Sociology* Vol. 46, Pp. 461, 463, 464 and 455-468 generally.

56. ibid., Pp. 467-8.

57. Lasswell, Harold D. 1941 *Democracy Through Public Opinion* (U.S.A.: George Banta Publishing Co.) Pp. 169 and 171-2.

58. ibid., p. 12.

59. ibid., p. 149.

60. ibid., p. 12.

61. ibid., p. 139.

62. ibid., p. 15.

63. ibid., Pp. 123 and 124.

64. ibid., p. 19

65. ibid., p. 21

66. ibid., p. 167.

67. ibid., p. 156.

68. ibid., p. 167.

69. ibid., p. 100.

70. ibid., p. 139.

71. Herring, Pendleton 1940. *The politics of democracy: American parties in action* (New York: W.W. Norton). Both strategies were evident, for example, in his inclusion of photographic plates of historical presentations of democratic politics in front of nineteen of the chapters. Each of these prints includes figures engaged in dialogue, suggesting that compromise is the enduring American tradition.

72. ibid., Pp. 119-133.

73. ibid., p. 159.

74. ibid., p. 160.

75. ibid., p. 166.

76. ibid., p. 164.

77. ibid., Pp. 164, 166 and 167.

78. ibid., p. 160.

79. ibid., p. 171.

80. ibid., p. 173.

81. ibid., p. 135.

82. ibid.

83. ibid., p. 143.

84. ibid., p. 85-6.

85. ibid., p. 325.

86. ibid., p. 327.

87. ibid., p. 271-4.

88. See note 71, above.

89. Herring, *The Politics of Democracy* op. cit., chapter 3.

90. ibid., p. 309.

91. As noted above, this is suggested by the use of artwork in Herring's original text to show the tradition of benevolant dialogue.

92. ibid., p. 313.

93. One source traces their embrace of the concept to G.E.G. Catlin. For a rather favorable discussion of the origins of equilibrium ideas, see Russett, Cynthia Eagle 1966. *The Concept of Equilibrium in American Social Thought* (New Haven: Yale University Press) Pp. 102-110.

Chapter 3

Democratic Capitalism and the Administration of Conflict

> The ultimate goal of the developing profession of administration is, probably, administration by an expert, but a socially adequate standard of expertness will then include a capacity or facility for judgement in which his policies and decisions are guided by the test of optimum satisfaction on the part of the groups affected by his administrative acts.
>
> *Avery Leiserson*
> 1942

The idea that a unique form of public administration could be generated in the United States carried weight with figures who later worked in the late 1940s SSRC Committee on Political Behavior. This chapter examines the writings of several of those figures, as well as alternatives being proposed by other figures associated with the University of Chicago. The common thread among proto-behavioralists was "balance." Public administration had to be conceived in a way that coordinated group activity without suppressing it. It was to be conceived of in a way that did not allow interest groups administrative autonomy or subject groups to defacto socialist regulation by overbearing administrators. In discussion it was clear that unrestrained labor groups would polarize conflicts in a way that would make this form of administration impossible. In response, theorists like C. Hermann Pritchett and Eldon Johnson claimed that administrative agencies such as the TVA could provide an exemplar of progressive embrace of democratic goals, and apply them to unionization. Even if Johnson and Pritchett put an optimistic face on the role of labor, however, the administrative paradigm centered on the *controlled* participation of labor and business groups.

A. The Idea of Managed Participation

1. Pendleton Herring: Purging the Activists

Pendleton Herring's 1936 *Public Administration and the Public Interest* was similar to Merriam's work in its mixed trust and distrust of private power. Herring's goal was to define the role of an enlightened administrator who could mitigate the effects of capitalism through leadership rather than regulation. He departed from Merriam, however, in his endorsement of the mobilization of weak social groups to help achieve that end. Using case studies of eleven governmental agencies, Herring concluded that administration in the "public interest" required the careful mobilization of weaker interests to counter entrenched ones. It was impossible and undesirable to fully regulate industry, but necessary to accept present institutions and improve them slowly. What each case study documented, then, was the presence of increasingly progressive but flawed administrative machinery. This apparatus could be improved if administrators carefully mobilized weaker groups and included their interests in the policy process.[1] As summarized by Herring, the goal was to "keep the bureaucrat responsive and uncorrupted... [and] to join the citizen with the administrative process in order to utilize his particular expertness or to gain the sanction of his consent."[2]

Precisely how the system was to be "responsive" was closely tied to Herring's conception of the public interest. The Department of Labor, for example, had done little to protect the worker throughout history, and done a fair amount to harass the worker. Identifying its origins with the Knights of Labor and subsequent domination by the AFL, its evolution involved successes and failures. To its credit, for example, the Department of labor made a natural split from its original position within the Department of Commerce. This move made cleaner representation of interests possible, including the provision of sections for women and children. To its discredit, the Department of Labor had been involved in corrupt practices such as domination by the AFL and had been guilty of responding to popular hysteria. The Department has "readily responded to the cry: 'Deport the alien labor agitator'" and demanded expulsion of "radical" union members from its client

groups. The bureaucrats were forced to "either commit obvious injustices in executing their legal duties or else secure an amendment to the statute." From this came the point at which the department heads were forced to "assume the role of the crusader" in defending union radicalism.[3] As the case study unfolded, the reader was led to conclude that each agency has had its darker moments, but they were improving. "The Department of Labor in all its branches has undertaken a more positive policy. Its lead comes from the White House and not from the American Federation of Labor."[4]

With his alternative history of bureaucracy in place, Herring turned to an assessment of the New Deal. The news was good because it described administrative activism tempered by an educative stance and a realistic assessment of labor in the polity. "The very existence of a Department of Labor indicates that the state has assumed certain responsibilities toward certain of its citizens who are economically weak[.]" Conversely, unions could not be depended upon for enhancing social reform. "If this department is to be administered in the public interest, it must become a rallying point for those concerned with the welfare of labor. It is not enough to rely upon unions. The department's responsibility extends to both organized and unorganized labor."[5] More importantly, the role of the administrator was to use his office to publicize the plight of all workers. If administrators became too involved in employer-employee relations "the greater becomes the possibility of conflict, not only with employers, but also with the vested interests of labor."[6] The work of Labor Secretary Frances Perkins manifested Herring's concept of education and policy formation by the enlightened administrator:

> "The present secretary has invited wage earners to write their own program. A number of regional conferences have been called by the department recently for the purpose of bringing together union officials, social workers, leaders in civic affairs, and specialists in labor problems... In the development of adequate state labor departments she found the clue to the proper administration of those general principles laid down by the federal government... Secretary of Labor Perkins regards education as another important administrative duty. Workers must be given information that will enable them to understand not only the conditions within their own industry, but also the larger problems of all labor and of national

> welfare... At the present juncture the aspirations of [her new] information service are doubtless far ahead of its accomplishments. Nevertheless, its potentialities are far reaching.[7]

Herring's administrators were both coaches and referees: they needed able bodied players to counteract business, yet they were to avoid political conflict by using an "educating" and "fact finding" stance towards political conflict. "The Department of Labor, if it is to discharge its duties in the public interest, must help to bridge the gap between the selfishly divergent aims of capital and labor. It must strive to get the facts that will make a rational settlement possible. It must seek to aid labor in presenting its case by providing the facilities for conciliation and the data for negotiation."[8]

Further clarification used Merriam's National Planning Board as an example of benevolent administration. Merriam noted that "the general welfare rather than the pressure of special groups dictated the task. The... Board undertook to coordinate all planning activities within the federal government and to stimulate further planning in the states and cities..."[9] Herring's embrace of this model was amplified in the concluding chapter of the text where he claimed the advisory boards of the National Recovery Administration produced the same broad vision as the NPB. Distinguishing between coordination and centralized administration Merriam stated that "[t]heir authority... must stop here. Theirs is not an executive function. It must be reiterated that coordination is at best an advisory function."[10] He continued, stating that:

> "Experts have burned the midnight oil in devising utopian plans; in vain have they rubbed their student lamps looking for an almost magical reordering of the bureaus and departments. Major changes must come slowly and even indirectly. The possibility of reorganizing the federal administration depends on an understanding of the social forces and group pressures that stand in the way... As a practical matter, what the theorists might regard as ideally best in administrative organization must be reconciled with what is politically possible."[11]

In the end, interestingly, responsibility for the results rested with the groups and not the administrators. "There is much to be said for elevating [weaker interests] to a position of

major importance. The outcome, however, will not turn upon the intrinsic worth of these subjects, but rather upon the political support each can attract."[12]

Herring's view of political mobilization became qualified, however, as the decade came to a close: in his 1940 *The Politics of Democracy* he deepened his theoretical justification for reliance upon the executive administration of interests by attacking the idea of a unified party system. In *Public Administration* Herring had stated that "Washington" was "a national arena for class battles" and that "[a]dministration in the public interest necessitate[d] general agreement as to the broad social objectives of the government."[13] Though he stated that these "broad social objectives" referred to "[a] toleration of different religions, or of philosophies, social or economic... [and] readiness to make concessions in the intellectual realm," the precise nature of those concessions were not identified beyond the endorsement of the "fact finding" and "educating" roles of the "enlightened administrator.[14] In his 1941 *Politics and Democracy,* however, Herring began to prescribe the basis upon which democracy should be linked to "compromise." It referred to the rejection of visionary left and right wing groups, third parties, and ideologues within the existing major parties.

Relative to the democratic collectivists, Herring's view of the polity was somewhat cynical. Policy would be formed in deference to the public, but elites had to be realists and use their power instead of waiting for coherent guidelines from the public. "It is futile to appeal to the unselfishness of hypothetical good citizens or to the sanctity of abstract principles as a warrant for denying human needs. The time for traditional politics is past. Power conflicts call for interest adjustments through the careful formulation of public policy."[15] The collectivists had contended that the structure of the workplace could provide a forum for education, community participation, and participation in economic policy formation. Herring, however, claimed elites should make substantive judgments which were judged by a more passive public. "Thinking in abstractions is forced upon us

when the limits of personal experience are reached. Our troubles multiply when the average citizen sets himself up as an amateur economist or political philosopher."[16]

Like the collectivists, Herring did not claim that the only appropriate avenue for political participation was in voting. Referring to the general character of his views he stated that they "[do] not imply a brake on reforming zeal. On the contrary, I would cheer the zealots on; they are an essential part of the democratic process."[17] Case in point, Herring supported unionization because the workplace "can't produce the type of men which democracy needs if each plant is a little Oriental despotism."[18] What separated him from the collective vision, however, was its very call for a *collective* orientation. As long as groups competed, Herring suggested that a "general welfare" could be approximated without the "domination" of all groups by urban workers. Dismissing collectivist orientations to labor as utopian, for example, he stated that:

> "[it is a] policy based on the urban industrial workers' welfare. Under democracy, while we talk in terms of the general welfare and of the public interest, we recognize at the same time that actually concessions are being made to special interests. Our fights are not over this but rather over giving each element its share. This may appear tawdry and may at time accentuate short-run objectives [and] organized minorities. Yet it does remain close to the direct satisfaction of the demands arising from the community."[19]

The point was that there *were* no interests besides "actual" narrow ones. Groups were to face that fact, and compete for moderated material goals through existing institutions. When their desires were not moderated by elites, the results of the "demands arising from the community" were potentially disastrous, as they had been both with the civil war, and in post civil war politics. Herring contended that the negative results of reform politics could be seen most clearly in at least two arenas: in the simplistic and volatile beliefs of the average citizen, and in the irrational policy outcomes generated by those volatile groups. He referred, for example, to the "antics" of the Anti-Saloon league as "barbaric as witch-hunting." Women had sought regulation of tavern owners and brewers, but should have realized that temperance "[could not] be realized through crusades for restrictive

laws but through psychiatric treatment designed to reach the causes..."[20] In a related observation he stated that "[t]he antislavery movement and temperance cause had outstripped the equal rights crusade. In vain did the women protest. Their superior right to the franchise over the millions of illiterate Negroes given the vote by the Fourteenth Amendment was disregarded."[21] Generalizing to third parties, he summarized that "[o]ur minor parties have inclined strongly to the devil theory of history. Theirs is a nigger-in-the-woodpile politics. Plutocracy, they insist, is the cause of all evil."[22]

2. Avery Leiserson: Deputizing the Interests

A similar attempt to expand the idea of interest representation was undertaken by Avery Leiserson in his 1942 work *Administrative Regulation*. He first examined the ethical justifications for giving interest groups the power for self regulation, then considered the concrete forms that delegation of authority might take. His discussion of the relationship involved the idea of an exchange: groups received authority for self regulation in exchange for their coordination by administrators. Within this relation, administrators were to insure competition and protect minority representation amongst the interests. Practical suggestions included the appointment of representatives from interest groups onto advisory boards, the use of neutral administrative boards, and the "federalistic" division of authority between public and private agencies.[23]

Leiserson's theory of administration was similar to Herring's in a number of ways. In the first place, Leiserson saw the administrator's role as increasingly critical in the process of governance. Indeed, their desire to normalize the process of group influence in politics was portrayed as running counter to existing concepts of governance. "In the prevailing current of thought in public administration the explicit endowment of private group representatives, responsible to private constituencies, with official responsibilities is prima facie suspect. The overwhelming trend of opinion favors the elimination of explicit interest representation in all forms but that of advice"[24] Conversely, Leiserson believed that administrators needed to avoid "objective" and "idealist" conceptions of the public

interest. Any utopian aspirations were to be replaced with the goal of seeking an ongoing consensus among existing groups under administrative purview.

> "[T]o restrict the meaning of social integration to an idealized, rational conception of social harmony, particularly one which happens to be held by a particular student, administrator, or board, is to fail to take into account the realistic view of politics as a continuous process of introducing an uncertain stability into a constantly changing complex of nonrational social forces. The purposes and results of public administration are a part of politics, defined in this sense, and it is one of the functions of public administration to aid in this stabilizing process."[25]

Leiserson was less vocal about the dangers of academic activism. Nonetheless, he described his work as a response to "a dangerous gap between... theorizing and intelligent social action. This gap arises from the fact that definitions of class and of desirable class aims... are necessarily imputed to or imposed upon such groups either by the theorists or by other individuals... [whose views] may be, but are not necessarily, held or accepted by the group in question."[26]

A number of more nuanced assertions were made in Leiserson's case studies of labor, securities, corporate and farm groups in the 1920s and 1930s. His more general comments, however, also reveal the outline of his work. On the one hand, Leiserson claimed it was a matter of practical impossibility for the administrator to defer to an "abstract" lower class interest. "If he is in the position of searching for a reliable indigenous index of group interest, he finds himself compelled to reckon with group organizations whose leaders speak and behave from the standpoint of an institutional experience in whose validity its members have implicit faith and loyalty."[27] On the other hand, he was acting on his belief about the impossible nature of utopian change.

> "No political theorist has yet been able to sketch the outlines of such a functional society within the limits of possibility in establishing consensus. Political realism involves realizing... that every act of public authority, assuming its legislative or constitutional validity, is but a hypothetical expression of the common good, the validity of which must be tested against the sounding board of the interests

> affected by its execution. Thus public administration in a democracy becomes a process of testing, through time and under the forms of the law, the satisfaction of group interests with the performance of public functions by the official bureaucracy."[28]

The reference was to all of the economic groups discussed in the study. Labor, however, figured heavily in his assertion. Circumstantially, the work was in part inspired by his father's (William)[29] intellectual orientation towards the management of labor-capital relations. A parallel was particularly evident in William Leiserson's highly public battle to save the National Labor Relations Board from administration by political activists. William Leiserson and Harry Millis were appointed by Roosevelt to derail the work of Wagner radicals in the NLRB. At the crux of the battle was the elder Leiserson's anger at the board's attempt to give labor a base of "polarizing" legal rights for use in collective bargaining. The approach William Leiserson inherited from John Commons was one establishing labor-capital consensus by using fact finding teams of social scientists. Facts, not law, would reduce intergroup tensions.[30] Coincidentally, Avery Leiserson stated that *Administrative Regulation* was "an inadequate expression of my father's emphasis on the central importance of problems of administrative judgement involved in integrating 'interests' with 'expert' views of public policy."[31]

Similar to the elder Leiserson's concern, Avery commented that "[t]he significance of the relationship between group interests and public regulatory policy lies not only in delimiting the content of group interest but in locating that content with reference to trends of social and political change."[32] The administration of interests therefore involved two interrelated elements: educating the interests and determining the nature of the "trends" that would be guiding administrators. Precisely how these "trends" would be identified was not at all clear. Nonetheless, Leiserson stated in *Administrative Regulation* that administrators existed to fill critical gaps left by law. Again suggesting the origins of a call for "behavioral" data he stated that:

> The idea that law is nothing but a body of legal propositions dominates legal thinking today... But modern investigation of the normative significance of the factual... and the practices of administrative boards has shown that [law] does not consist exclusively of legal propositions.... In a much greater number of instances judgement is rendered upon questions of fact than of law. And the fact is a matter of the inner order of human associations as to which the judge or public official obtains information from the testimony of witnesses and documents, experts, contract, agreements and declarations."[33]

While "facts" were to determe the coordination of groups, administrators were to be educating the groups by showing them the areas in which they had a unity of interest. The younger Leiserson noted that the process of collective bargaining, properly considered, revealed areas of common interest. More importantly, it revealed workers' desire to abdicate managerial responsibility:

> "It is not until after the acceptance of the principle of collective bargaining that the ensuing process reveals to both sides that there are large areas of function in which there is no essential conflict of organized or group interest... Collective bargaining educates the wage-earners as to the necessity for differentiating the functions of management and labor, and it usually convinces both sides of the advisability of restricting the overt struggle of outright conflict to as short a period as possible, ending with the joint determination of the method of distribution for a fixed period during which the productive process can go on for the benefit of all interests. Collective bargaining, in so far as it results in a realization on the part of both interests of the values of joint participation in and responsibility for the welfare of the particular industry, trade, or branch thereof, is definitely an influence toward increasing the scope of voluntary collective action and lessening the need for direct government controls.[34]

By understanding this perspective on interest involvement, the administrator insured the presence of minimum government: under the benign guidance of the administrator, organized groups retreated to their natural corners. Thus, it appeared to be something of a surprise to Leiserson that there was resistance to this formula. In his views, groups arose to represent sections of society, and the administrator was limited only by his ability to surround groups within his administrative domain:

> "The ultimate paradox of interest representation is that, although interest or class analysis is the most revealing method of explaining social phenomena, explicit representation of organized groups always struggles against a tremendous burden of proof. Both in the structure of legislatures and in the structure of administration, the prevailing body of democratic theory rejects specific forms of it. And yet, perennially, groups arise to demand such representation... If... interest representation becomes something of a political necessity, its adaptability to administration will depend largely on the nature of the administrative duties... A basic unity must be maintained, which means that the legal standard upon which public authority and responsibility are delegated cannot be compromised. When this condition is preserved, the limits of compromise are restricted only by the conditions which must be met in order to effect a relatively lasting agreement between the affected interests."[35]

As with Herring, Avery Leiserson embodied the intimate connection between political realism, increasing discussion of the need for "facts" and "opinions" to effect coordination, and the foundation of this on the unity of interest between labor groups and business groups.

3. Harold Lasswell: Identifying Trends through Public Opinion

The work of Harold Lasswell in the 1940s continued along lines quite similar to Leiserson's and Herring's. Specifically, Lasswell wrote of the need for dialogue between groups, and the need for political scientists to identify the very trends leaders were to use in the direction of American society. The most obvious manifestation of this lay in the creation of the University of Chicago's *Public Opinion Quarterly*, being directed by both Lasswell and Herring.[36] In Lasswell's description of how that leadership was to work and why it was necessary, was a conception of dialogue far more centered on the administrator than on the groups "free" to engage in commentary.

The public dialogue Lasswell sought was not a call for town meetings, referenda, and free form discussions. Rather, "public opinion" was to be overseen by "clarifiers." These professionals would insure that debate was relevant to particular political topics, using an intuitive "spirit of democracy" as a guide. Just as he uncovered the false character of the proletariat, other intellectuals were to uncover the "facts" about world trends. Clarifiers

took facts, disseminated them, and oversaw public debate with regard to them. "As you pass from the intellectual who is specialized on the discovery of truth, you come to those who clarify. Their task is to make new truth lucid to the beginning student, or the inquisitive layman."[37]

For Lasswell, the intellectual identified the perspective and means of cognition to be adopted by the average citizen.[38] "We need to become aware of which social practices - in the home, school, factory, office - contribute to anxiety, and which to security."[39] To that end, the average citizen was to become aware of the power of his private thoughts and his day to day discussions.

> "We are often under the illusion that if we have a thought in private it has nothing to do with the fate of society. We may tell ourselves that all politics is corrupt and that an honest man will stay out. It is significant, and even ominous, if we have such an idea. It probably means that scores or even millions of our fellow citizens are entertaining similar thoughts."[40]

Lasswell saw unrestrained introspection as problematic, however, and suggested that citizens learn skills such as word association tests to self diagnose their level of neuroses. Indeed, this helped rid the citizen of any proletarian baggage that might have been picked up in current political turmoil.

> "By studying myself, I may become aware that I am typical of all who are brought up in middle class homes, or better, in the nation. And I may be unrepresentative of the spontaneous reaction of one who was brought up to hate the "bosses" and to condemn every conciliatory gesture by and employers as part of a plot to pull the wool over the eyes of the employees."[41]

At the same time, clarifiers were to police public opinion for unfair practices within business as well. "An enterprise ceases to be a business when it abandons the pursuit of profit or when it monopolizes the market... American business is slowly strangling itself for lack of insight into its essential characteristics. Slovenly use of the word business in newspapers and magazines aids in this self-destructive process."[42]

In his 1941 work, Lasswell acted as the very "clarifier" of truth he had claimed was necessary to keep public debate grounded in reality. In his discussion of the economy he "clarified" that capitalists prolonged the depression given their timid investment practices. The clarifier's role was to remain objective, and not be "concerned with the dogmatic expression for one or the other alternative" of private vs. public investment. His main point was to have the "two alternatives clarified before the American public" and have the force of public opinion pressure either system to work. He based this on the view that the depression and ensuing electoral upheaval were produced by the failure of business to produce clear solutions to the depression. "The economists and the business men... failed as clarifiers to their fellow men." He addressed his colleagues, stating that:

> "We need to clarify the position of the ego in the processes of history... We need to provide appreciation for the exercise of socially useful skill... The irregularities of modern life can be overcome as public opinion is clarified about the technical means of providing for an adequate, steady flow of investment; and as opinion demands provision for security and opportunity on a respected job, regardless of the oscillations of private enterprise."[43]

By claiming the need to clarify the presence of the choice between the mixed and private economies, Lasswell was presenting a mixed economy as a viable alternative to *laissez faire*. At the same time, however, he was only going half the distance to collectivist calls for the political recognition of labor. As previously noted, he claimed that proletarian desires were "indirect expressions of the middle income skill ideal." Clarification could lead workers to be less suspicious of "the bosses," more open to the "conciliatory gestures" of employers.[44]

4. Leading by Example: The Government Corporation

Herring and Leiserson's fear of unregulated popular input highlights an alternative administrative stance: those who saw the government corporation as a way to lead by example as well as embrace the participatory dream of New Deal labor reformers. Work within the Department of Agriculture and the Tennessee Valley Authority not only provided an avenue for rural development and anti-depression public works spending, but

also showed the possibility of enlightened labor relations. As seen in work on the TVA involving University of Chicago's C. Hermann Pritchett, the logic of its creation provides yet another style of administration being considered by those close to SSRC theorists.

Eldon L. Johnson, writing while working at the United States Department of Agriculture, noted that federal unions had been seen as a problematic form of state power, and suggested a historical perspective for understanding its change: The *origins* of unions, he argued, were completely justified. Again resorting to historical analysis he noted that "middle class, white-collar psychology and a great variety of divergent duties successfully blocked the development of general unions in the federal service until increasingly bad working conditions broke down old barriers and supplied a new cohesive force."[45] The response, as he stated it, was generated by an anachronistic theory of administration:

> "Formerly, the unquestioned theory of state sovereignty proved to be an insuperable barrier to any careful study of public employee organizations or appreciation of their potentialities. It answered all embarrassing questions. It explained the paradox of autocracy in administration alongside democracy in politics. It justified ignorance where possible and repression where necessary in dealing with this 'state within a state.' While the venerable attitude lingers on, it is challenged on every hand by administrative realities which override the abstract, theoretical considerations...We find ourselves in a transitional period in which the authoritarian tradition has not yet been abandoned and the cooperative practice has not yet found general acceptance."[46]

For Johnson, the legal framework that led to an annoyed stance towards unions also led to a misperception of the difficulties involved in their management. Jurisdictional disputes had been interpreted as confirmation of labor recalcitrance and masked the possibility for understanding of a truly cooperative model of management. Attempting to focus on the possibility for cooperative efficiency, Johnson turned to the Tennessee Valley Authority. Far from Leiserson's stance that labor relations highlighted a natural labor/management division, Johnson focused on the efficacy produced by labor participation.

> "At the present time the most common type of cooperative machinery consists of irregular meetings between union representatives and directors of personnel or heads of agencies. Somewhat more formalized are the conference methods followed by the Tennessee Valley Authority and the conciliation committee systems such as those now operating in the Department of Labor and the Civil Service Commission... the scarcity of such systems should blind no one to the advantages of some permanent machinery in each important governmental agency for the free discussion of major personnel problems from the respective standpoints of those who have ultimate responsibility in making the policy and those who have primary interest in the effect of the policy upon themselves and their colleagues. Among the rewards of such a plan would be: improved morale generally; the employee's psychological reward which comes from a feeling of participation and identification with the organization; mutual education meaning better informed administration and better employee understanding of administrative viewpoints, problems, and limitations; constructive and creative employee participation resulting in more responsible employee groups; more willing compliance with administrative policies; less political and legislative tampering with strictly administrative problems; and prevention as well as adjustment of grievances."[47]

As with Johnson, C. Herman Pritchett's stance towards public administration in 1943 also involved an embrace of labor participation, as well as the claim that the government corporation would provide an example of public resource development unassociated with a step towards socialism. More importantly, it could provide an example of administrative efficiency and democracy to the reactionary business perspective. Pritchett noted that:

> "It would be disingenuous for the author to pretend that he has no biases in connection with the TVA.... He does not consider that one need be a disciple of Karl Marx or even of Norman Thomas to hold that the natural resources of our great rivers should be developed by and in the interests of the people. He does not feel that government ownership and operation of public utilities is a death blow to the profit system. He feels that the world wide trend towards statism, which has been greatly accelerated by the necessities of the present world catastrophe, must be resisted and kept within definite limits in the Unites States if we are to remain a free and democratic nation. But in his judgement public operation of power monopolies falls well within those limits, and he is quite willing to compare the democracy of the T.V.A. with that of the Commonwealth & Southern Corporation."[48]

For Pritchett, one laudable aspect of the TVA was that it had gone *beyond* the governmental grant of authority in spirit if not in fact, in engaging in good faith collective bargaining and the granting of democratic control to the workplace. In some sense, Pritchett had tied the expansion of opportunity to the noble treatment of labor. Pritchett boasted that:

> "The general T.V.A. policy of handling labor relations ran definitely counter to this limitation of the rights and powers of organized government employees... [but] the T.V.A. felt that there were other matters with which a program of union-management cooperation could be concerned, such as departmental rules and regulations, grievances, training opportunities, improvement of efficiency, safety of employees, and the general problems of methods, quality, integrity, and results of administration."[49]

Despite his early hopes for the TVA, Pritchett's later discussion of it in the *PAR* indicated his pessimism regarding its ability to maintain its progressive orientation. Under attack for its independence, the TVA had been "drained the corporate form... of most of its meaning; the governmental agencies called corporations are coming more and more to act like ordinary bureaus and departments."[50]

B. The Parallel with Political Economic Theory

The idea of administration being set forth by all of these figures bore a strong resemblance to more specific conceptions of late 1930s and 1940s political economy. Thematically, the idea of interest adjustment was inseparable from the economic liberal goal of keeping interests "free" for economic pursuits.[51] Yet there were other connections between these writers and the political economists of the period. Most notable was Pendleton Herring's Harvard tie to Seymour Harris and Alvin Hansen, which was mirrored by their participation in the wartime SSRC Public Administration Committee.[52] The public prominence of Brookings Institution director Edwin Nourse and Department of Justice prosecutor Thurman Arnold also makes them suitable candidates for comparison with the SSRC theorists: Arnold focused on prosecuting monopolistic pricing policy from the Department of Justice. Hansen was an extremely public figure, worked in

Merriam's National Resources Planning Board, and helped give institutional form to the ideas to sidestep fascism through creation of Merriam's "sui generis" state. All claimed that labor groups should yield to administrative authority with respect to "excessive demands."[53]

Similar to Lasswell's attack on "false" business practices defended through propaganda, Arnold claimed the need for sharper distinctions between monopolistic and "free" trade practices. In their romantic search for "pure capitalism," previous antitrust prosecutors had embraced romantic folklore surrounding the economy. Monopoly regulation was to leave a medieval search for "isms," and use more technical and focused controls on private power. Such a solution, he noted, might keep regulation from being portrayed as the "national Devil."[54] In his 1940 work *Bottlenecks to Business,* then, Arnold developed the concept of regulating monopolies by regulating monopolistic *pricing:* the public interest was not served by regulating business size so long as products were available. Indeed, the plan came with other features. It supported neither socialist bureaucratic planning nor *laissez-faire* utopias, and it blocked the key mechanism leading to fascism:

> "Today, the pendulum is swinging against broad general solutions... [price regulation] is practical because, as I have said, it takes up one industry at a time. There are two ways of filling a hundred bottles, of different shapes and sizes, with water. One is to put them in the center of the room and throw water at them with a dipper. The other way is to hold one bottle at a time under a faucet. The latter is the case by case method with which enforcement of the antitrust laws should approach American business problems..."[55]

He referred to the unifying "awakening consciousness of the consumers of America of the importance of prices and price policies"[56] and claimed that without truly free trade these groups separated themselves into warring, protectionist factions:

> "we find businessmen, farmers, and unions all fighting for the preservation of the particular bottlenecks they control. We find them turning to price fixing to protect their investment... The progress of the disease is not pleasant. It first creates a major depression. If it goes on too long it ends in revolution... dying agonies of

> thousands of little monopolies which have tried to insulate themselves against competitive progress."[57]

The perspective continued into 1942, when he discussed how the "four horseman" of "fixed prices, low turnover, restricted production and monopoly control" by business, farmers and laborers continued to cripple the economy.[58] Antitrust regulation provided critical social unity. Support came, he maintained, from 85% of the country: "...fourteen hundred active consumers' organizations. They are found in labor, in women's organizations, in churches - in fact in every group that has to think of prices..."[59] Central to Arnold's analysis was his assertion that protectionist practices existed in the presence of governmental failure to prosecute for violations of interstate commerce. Similar to Herring's recommendation for labor to limit itself to material goals, Arnold claimed there was "[a] failure of government to confine organized labor to legitimate labor objectives."[60] If strikes were for purposes other than reasonable wages, hours, maintenance of membership or health and safety, they were to be seen as "bottlenecks to business."[61]

As with Thurman Arnold, economist Edwin Nourse contended society was organized and held in equilibrium by price mechanisms. Nourse, however, was far more specific about the role of labor in a capitalist economy: a planning state could be avoided if collective bargaining outcomes were guided by experts, and business were guided by scientifically trained managers. For Nourse, the depression revealed circumstances in which economic equilibrium was confounded by the "polar regions of the sea, where... the physical laws of fluid do not apply." Economic analysts were taking a wrong turn in their focus on the pathologies of firm-level pricing.[62] Nourse pointed to the need for "[e]xamination of the bilateral group negotiation as an organizing process of economic life" and stated that "nongovernmental organization for multilateral group bargaining [could be]... the truest and fullest opportunity for universal self-expression combined with technical efficiency."[63] Planning organs inevitably warped the expression of preferences in a way that immediate bargaining did not:

> "Only those who are actual participants in an enterprise confronted by a concrete situation are capable of saying whether they would value a particular kind of security above a certain amount of income, whether they can afford to accept this lower wage as an alternative to that amount of unemployment... or be forced to give up a long familiar habitat or break a long-established routine... The very changefulness of our economic weather makes it necessary to provide for the voices of local operative groups to be heard in the making of directive decisions..."[64]

Just as Herring and Leiserson sought the enhanced use of administrators to limit conflict, so did Nourse. With respect to the U.S. Congress, Nourse noted that "even if it could actually discover and formulate the common material interest of the whole people, it is by its very nature inept as an agency for attaining that general interest. It lacks the necessary intimacy and flexibility..."[65] Herring had made an identical point in *The Politics of Democracy*. "An able administrative service is most likely to provide us with the integration needed by a society of increasing interdependence... Our administrative service has developed in response to the needs of particular groups. This has tended to make it responsive and representative. It has great fluidity."[66] Nourse identified the conditions under which just intergroup bargaining could occur, including functional equality between groups, democratic representation within each group, full disclosure of facts, and good faith use of professionals in bargaining.[67] The work of Avery Leiserson and Nourse also ran parallel to one another. Just as Leiserson sought to bolster and control the interest group, Nourse identified the need to work with efficiently organized groups. "If the interest group is badly defined or badly led, it becomes a poor agency for economic functioning." Within that framework, specialists reviewed a confederal system of groups. There was to be "decentralization of economic talent from the bureaus of Washington to the headquarters of offices of business corporations, cooperative association, industrial institutions, and labor unions."[68]

In his more extensive 1944 Brookings *Price Making In A Democracy*, Nourse suggested a revised and rejuvenated white collar class could embrace scientific management. Their training would focus on the stability of a system based on economic efficiency, low costs

and steady outputs. Within that system, labor leaders were to be more attentive to the need for "capital formation and to the need of profit incentives if remunerative jobs are to be permanently provided for them and their children and if better and cheaper goods are to be put on the market for them to buy."[69]

Under their leadership, the "mutual interests of employer and employee" were guided "not by force and in the darkness or twilight of partially disclosed facts, but by reasoned negotiation on the basis of frank disclosure of pertinent information."[70] Enlightened capitalists were to reduce monopolistic practices that produced deep recessions, and focus on lower prices and steady levels of production. Discussing the hypothetical new "professional businessman" he stated that:

> "His responsibilities are primarily to his company as a continuously functioning group within an industry which in turn is a sector of the whole economy. To realize that he promotes the real and abiding interests of the company as such only by considering it in this broad and long operational perspective is something very different from directing operations in the supposed interest of that undefined and undefinable entity-the public."[71]

More importantly, however, the reduction in monopolistic pricing produced a just society. He was not hesitant to identify the fundamental problem as one based in economic centralization:

> "There is an obvious incompatibility between the democratic concept of real freedom of enterprise for the individual and the aristocratic concept of complete freedom of enterprise for the corporate business, allowed to grow with no external restraint and to use its pyramiding power as it may see fit, both against small corporate unities and against the individual persons who contribute their productive efforts within the corporation itself."[72]

Like Pritchett and Arnold, Nourse was trying to democratize the corporation through education of the managerial staff on the democratic distribution of goods:

> "We have argued, therefore, that for the really successful operation of a system of free enterprise, the managerial staffs in whose hands these administrative

> functions come to a focus must abandon the aristocratic philosophy of concentrating the benefits of the system or the fruits of its operation upon a limited number of participants in certain titular positions or upon any class of participants... capitalists, the managers, the technicians, the white-collar workers, or the operatives."[73]

Individual work within a hierarchical system could not, realistically, produce a sense of efficacy. Conversely, "what might be called 'scientific' management of a system of private business would call for a systematic attempt to give all workers with hand or brain ample access to the use of natural resources... to the equivalent of freedom of individual effort (and its reward) which was embodied by Thomas Jefferson and Adam Smith in the notable documents in 'the spirit of '76.'"[74] Nourse finally distinguished between "Institutional planning" centered in government, and a three level system of "operational planning" divided hierarchically into financial, plant and managerial levels. The latter, he claimed to be the "real field of controversy" and happily avoided both the hazards of capitalist generated depression, and state-centered inability to "retain the intimate familiarity with minutely localized operative conditions[.]"[75]

Herring's own work made reference only to Hansen, but the themes remained similar to these political economists. Before, during and after World War II, Hansen supported various forms of "countercyclical" spending to be made in response to economic forecasts of unemployment and underconsumptionist wage levels.[76] Herring lauded the goal, stating that "Alvin H. Hansen is one of the forward-looking economists who sees no necessary incompatibility between 'the survival of private capitalism and a generous admixture of public investment.'"[77] The logic of this for both Herring and Hansen was that all groups would moderate their goals, thus making economic planning possible. Herring wrote that "fiscal policy need not necessarily represent the partial, immediate, and selfish view of narrow groups. Granted the exercise of reason, restraint and cooperation on the part of participants working through an appropriate governmental mechanism, a line of public policy might be established that would advance the wealth and happiness of a very large proportion of the population..."[78] Hansen concurred by

noting that under expert guidance, unions would surely cooperate. "With the over-all facts available, the labor movement as a whole may be counted upon to resist [wage] distortion."[79]

Summary

There is something elegant about the benign coordination of an increasingly complex social order: through carefully orchestrated coordination of social groups, governance could be kept sparse and non-directive. Reduced to its fundamental elements, it was a plan in which groups were given legal authority for self governance, and were required to yield to the benevolent direction of factually and philosophically grounded administrators. Below the surface, however, lay a series of details suggesting administrative practices far different from its theoretical discussion.

One aspect was a hefty fear of political movements and legislative dicta. For Herring, popular rule by the "amateur economist" essentially produced the "devil theory of politics." Nourse, similarly, remained certain that legislative direction of the economy "warped preferences" better left to directed bilateral negotiations at the firm level. For Leiserson's administrator the idea of a broader public interest was "too abstract" and required the administrator seek out a "reliably indigenous index of group interests." Under these administrators, workers were to find the "proper role of management and labor." Using an awareness of social trends, public administrators would avoid pursuit of an "idealized social harmony." While maintaining a "basic unity," administrators were to avoid a "hypothetical" conception of the common good. Just how these "social trends" were to be determined, however, was Delphic. The idea was being tested through the *Public Opinion Quarterly*, but Lasswell's description of it revealed a conservative stance toward popular protest. The "clarifier" helped guide public discussion, but was equally responsible for helping citizens be rid of political ideas which "generate anxiety." Similarly, citizens were to remain open to the "conciliatory gestures" of their employers. As with Arnold, of course, citizens were to be equally critical of when to use the term

"business," and when to use the term "monopoly" — the former being a title with some distinction.

A critical component of the goal was to "provide wealth and prosperity for a very large proportion of the population." By every indication, however, the bulk of this definition centered around the smooth functioning of capitalist operations to be managed by a benevolent elite. The outline of the Pritchett's and Johnson's goals within the TVA highlighted a far different agenda. To some degree, at least, their discussion revealed a concern with the production of equity as with the efficient use of resources. Their discussion of a successful experiment in cooperative management paralleled, of course, the ideas of the political activists writing in *The New Republic.*

1. Herring, Pendleton 1936. *Public Administration and the Public Interest* (New York: McGraw Hill).

2. ibid., p. 20.

3. ibid., p. 289.

4. ibid., Pp. 279-295.

5. ibid., p. 291.

6. ibid., p. 292.

7. ibid., Pp. 292-3.

8. ibid., p. 294.

9. ibid., p. 339.

10. ibid., p. 341.

11. ibid., p. 347.

12. ibid., p. 335.

13. ibid., p. 5.

14. ibid., p. 6.

15. Herring, *The Politics of Democracy* op. cit., p. 35.

16. ibid., p. 271.

17. ibid., p. ix.

18. ibid., p. 330.

19. ibid., p. 329.

20. ibid., p. 318. Emphasis added.

21. ibid., p. 321.

22 ibid., Pp. 181-2.

23. ibid., Pp. 134-159 and 262-285.

24. Leiserson, Avery 1942. *Administrative Regulation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) p. 12.

25. ibid., p. 4.

26. ibid., Pp. 7-8.

27. ibid., Pp. 7-8.

28. ibid., p. 268.

29. Avery Leiserson's father.

30. Tomlins, *The State and the Unions* op. cit., Pp. 207-213.; Dubofsky, Melvyn 1994. *The State and Labor in Modern America* (North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press) Pp. 149-161. The communication between William Leiserson and John R. Commons is particularly revealing on this point.

31. *Administrative Regulation* op. cit., p. ix.

32. ibid., p. 18.

33. ibid., Pp. 52-3.

34. ibid., Pp. 34-36.

35. ibid., Pp. 282-3.

36. Herring's involvement spanned from 1937 to 1944, though Lasswell's continued. For further discussion see Herring, Pendleton 1978."An unrehearsed interview with Pendleton Herring" Pi Sigma Alpha Oral History Project for the American Political Science Association. King Library Archives. University of Kentucky, Lexington. Tape 2 Side1.

37. ibid., p. 64.

38. Lasswell, Harold 1948. "The Clarifier of Public Discussion" *Quarterly Journal of Sociology* Vol. 34 Pp. 2-41.

39. ibid., pp. 33-4.

40. ibid., pp. 21-2

41. ibid., p. 41.

42. Lasswell, *Democracy Through Public Opinion* op. cit., p. 149.

43. ibid., p. 166.

44. ibid., Chapter 3.

45. Johnson, Eldon L. 1940. "General Unions in the Federal Service" *Journal of Politics* Vol. 2 No. 1, p. 24.

46. ibid., p. 23.

47. ibid., Pp. 52-3

48. Pritchett, C. Hermann 1943. *The Tennessee Valley Authority: A Study in Public Administration* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press).

49. ibid.

50. Pritchett, C. Hermann 1941. "The Paradox of the Government Corporation" *Public Administration Review* Vol. 5 No. 2, p. 389.

51. Robert Lynd's critique of academic political theory, noted in chapter 5 of *Knowledge for What*, held that the notion that the economy and the polity were separate entities was a "liberal fiction" inherited from the 19th century. Obviously, Herring would have disagreed.

52. To that end, the writers discussed below represent the intersection of two groups: those discussing the appropriate structure of the polity's economic structure, and those plausibly influencing the SSRC theorists under examination. While this group may or may not provide a representative sample of the ideas influencing the SSRC theorists, it provides a point of departure for more detailed analyses. The attempt is to take a representative sample of prominent writers discussing a range "democratic capitalist" ideas concerning the polity's economy, and compare those to the ideas of the proto behavioralists of the SSRC. In an attempt to keep those ideas plausible, the "reference" group has been defined as those linked to the SSRC writers either by their public institutions, by their being involved in direct debate by activists in the *New Republic,* or debates spawned by those linked to the SSRC proto behavioralists. Edwin Nourse and Thurman Arnold have been included given their public prominence within the New Deal and Fair Deal administrations, as well as their prominence in intellectual debates. In addition to his direct debates with Harvard political scientists Carl Friederich and Herman Finer, Edwin Nourse was a member of the Brookings Institute throughout the 1930s, and worked directly with political scientists Paul David (later chair of Harvard Political Science Department, who worked on the Committee for a Responsible Two Party System) and Bertram Gross (who worked with Nourse on the Committee of Economic Advisors under Harry Truman). Thurman Arnold's inclusion comes both from the extremely public nature of his work in the Department of Justice, as well as his frequent interchange with those writing in *The New Republic.* Alvin Hansen and Seymour Harris have been included, because of their prominence, Harris's personal connection to Pendleton Herring (according to Herring, they were closely acquainted with one another at Harvard), and Peter Bachrach's 1951 identification of them as influential figures of the late 1940s. The *New Republic* and *Social Action* writers have been included, of course, as continuing their collectivist critique of "democratic capitalism" of Nourse, Arnold, Harris, and Hansen.

53. Though there are no apparent prominent institutional relationships between these political economists and the SSRC political scientists, broader overlaps clearly exist throughout the 1940s. Highly public figures such as Alvin Hansen, Seymour Harris, Edwin Nourse, and Sumner Slichter straddled both the academic world (primarily at Harvard and the University of Wisconsin) in addition to their formal participation in the Office of Price Administration, the Council of Economic Advisors, and a host of other executive agencies. University of Chicago's Charles Merriam, Harvard Department of Government chair Merle Fainsod, and less prominent figures such as E.E. Schattschneider and Paul Appleby submitted discussions of political economy with these writers. In addition, Edwin Nourse and Alvin Hansen both taught political scientists during their years at, respectively, the University of Wisconsin and Harvard. Equally suggestive is Pendleton Herring's acquaintance with Seymour Harris at Harvard during the time Herring was assembling his theory of interest groups with political scientists Oliver Garceau and Lewis Dexter. See *Saving American Capitalism* op. cit. See also Penniman, Clara 1978. "An unrehearsed interview with Clara Penniman" Pi Sigma Alpha Oral History Project of the American Political Science Association. King Library

Archives. University of Kentucky. Lexington, Kentucky. See also " An unrehearsed interview with Pendleton Herring" op. cit.

54. Arnold, Thurman W. 1937 *The Folklore of Capitalism* (New Haven: Yale University Press) Pp. 1-20, 46-82 and 263-331.

55. Arnold, Thurman W. 1940. *Bottlenecks to Business* (New York: Renal and Hitchcock) p. 275.

56. ibid., p. 277.

57. ibid., p. 286.

58. Arnold, Thurman 1942 *Democracy and Free Enterprise* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press) p. 17.

59. Arnold, *Bottlenecks* op. cit., p. 281. For general discussion, I am using Brinkley, Alan 1994 *The End of Reform* op. cit., Pp. 106-117.

60. Arnold, ibid., 241., Arnold outlined 4 interrelated components of the conflict. A number of the unions were being led into strikes by self aggrandizing union bosses who were nothing but "corrupt political machines," intra-union fighting led to the cessation of production over petty issues of work definition, incompetent leaders stayed in place because unions held too few elections and the public was incorrectly blaming the Wagner Act as the source of labor/capital unrest whereas absence of boundaries were the real cause.

61. Arnold, ibid., Pp. 240-259. Since restraint of trade focused on problems that had achieved defacto significance, petty grievances would not be addressed. Moreover, strikes traced back to political machines and petty inter-union fighting were subject to sanction.

62. This had generated a tendency to move from focus on economic man, to a focus on firm-level price administration and their inability to deliver "true economic interests." Consideration of that possibility oriented economists' either for or against centralized planning, and he wished to highlight the conditions under which firms achieved revelation of true interests., ibid., Pp. 3-5.

63. ibid., Pp. 5-8.

64. ibid., p. 9.

65. ibid., p. 10.

66. Herring, *The Politics of Democracy* op. cit., Pp. 384-5.

67. ibid., Pp. 10-13.

68. Nourse, Edwin 1943. "Collective Bargaining and the Common Interest" *The American Economic Review* Vol. 33 No. 1, p. 1.

69. Nourse, Edwin 1944. *Price Making in a Democracy* (Washington: Brookings Institution) p. 288.

70. ibid., p. 287.

71. ibid., p. 435.

72. ibid., p. 433.

73. ibid., p. 434.

74. ibid.

75. ibid,. Pp. 184-5.

76. Brinkley, *The End of Reform* op. cit., Pp. 233-267.

77. Herring, *The Politics of Democracy* op. cit,. p. 396.

78. ibid., p. 399.

79. Bachrach, Peter 1950. *The Right to Work* Doctoral Dissertation. (Cambridge: Harvard University) p. 228.

Chapter 4

Challenging the "Pressure Group" State: Debating the Character of Democratic Unity

When the history of our era comes to be written - if there are any survivors to write it - its tragedy may lie not in the men of destructive will whose souls were coils of wild serpents and who used the arena of history for their mortal embrace, but in the men of good will who willed the ends they sought and could not will the means to achieve them.

Max Lerner
1938

As we fight the present war... in a tangle of ideological inconsistencies, the popular mood encouraged by government and sedulously sponsored by business, is to ignore controversial questions and to concentrate on winning the war... We shall emerge from this war well on our way to having a permanently planned and managed economy; and if business controls the goals of that planning, that will mean management also of all relevant social and cultural life.

Robert Lynd
1942

Broadly considered, activists writing in *The New Republic* critiqued the "interest group" perspective from 1937 to 1943, with decreased commentary on it until 1946. The discussion was not specifically directed at writers in political science, though it certainly included them. Rather, *New Republic* writers like Lerner, Lynd, and Soule held that fundamental economic and political reform should proceed from a "positive," "affirmative," or "democratic planning" state that was antithetical to the fundamental orientation of negative and reactive "pressure" theory of the SSRC. Reformers' hopes lay in their support of institutions like the NLRB, the Office of Price Administration and the idea of planning as it came to be developed in the Wagner-Murray Full Employment bill of 1945. Writers discussed the need for increased union activity, the formal representation

of labor the War Production Board, and outrage over use of "public opinion" forums to muffle rather than clarify reformist issues.[1]

As planning for war production created new institutions and reoriented debates, the measure of democracy became one of equity of sacrifice: wages and security vs. profits. Critique centered around whether or not guarantees for price control, wages, or employment were manifestations of democratic practice.

Whether or not the new forms of planning were democratic or not became a discussion that arose time and again in a number of settings. Discussions took place in the *New Republic,* of course, but were once again in evidence in both academic journals and other popular journals to which SSRC theorists contributed. Most important to the discussion were their challenges to the democratic capitalist portrayal of labor groups as greedy. The following samples of writings from the *New Repbulic,* political economy journals, and the Christian reform journal *Social Action* reflect the continuity of the debate throughout the period under review. In the end, new concepts of planning resembled the old view of pressure groups. The participation of labor groups was as suspect as before: the only thing that had changed was the supposed nature of labor goals. Labor groups were first criticized because their political goals were said to be too abstract. The decade ended, however, with the critique that they were immoderate in the pursuit of concrete wage gains.

A. The *New Republic* Revisited: Responses to "Pressure Group Theory"

1. Rejecting "Pressure Groups" in Theory

In a rare direct exchange between *New Republic* activists and SSRC theorists, Max Lerner took exception to the fears Herring expressed in *The Politics of Democracy.* Lerner wrote that he was baffled by a number of elements in Herring's work. The list included Herring's concern for the survival of the two party system, and Herring's tendency to "[be] objective and yet [be] filled with value judgements." He took strongest aim, however, at the call for parties to be mere arenas for bargaining between interests.

> "He applauds rather than deplores, the fact that neither of the major parties in America is an outright liberal or conservative party. He [lauds] benignly the failure of third-party movements. And here I confess I do not follow him. I know that Mr. Herring is sincere in his belief that the party system, by blurring sharp divisions on social policy, has performed a service in the national interest. Nevertheless, if a totalitarian America should ever come it would be partly because of the way in which our party system has obstructed the relatively sharp changes needed in economic organization necessary for national survival today."[2]

Thus, Lerner critiqued the theme of moderation so central to Herring's book, and central to all of the democratic capitalists.

> "Mr. Herring has gone too far in following the tradition... of "On Compromise."... the party that wins should come into power with a clear notion of why it was elected and what it wants to do...if parties become too colorless for real loyalties, what substitute will men come to believe in? One might answer the nation as a whole; and the present efforts to whip up a factitious unity testify to the probability that this will be the trend... [but] such a unity is likely to be achieved at the expense of the party system about which [Herring and others] care so deeply."[3]

It is notable that Lerner did not focus on the centrality of self interest or the elite moderation of self interest so central to Herring. He did, however, bring up the topic in reviewing a book by John Chamberlain which resembled Herring's call for pluralist "adjustment" in governance. In an acid analysis of "the pluralists' Broker State" Lerner identified pluralists with a "traditional American contempt for theory." Pluralists feared that theory would lead to activism and thus "Grand Political Theory" was seen "as the very devil." The fears of conflict led these writers to "make a fetish of never making a fetish of anything... a monistic obsession with whatever is pluralist, pragmatic, full of loose ends, [and] in the nature of compromise."[4]

Lerner's objection to the focus on pluralism was its tendency to ignore both the relative weakness of those who would be mediating interests, and the absence of a positive social goal. "We must recognize that the [mediating] state cannot be considered apart from the structure of economic power... [t]o make [interests] the essence of democratic government is to confuse a necessary evil in a capitalist democracy with a creative

principle... we [currently] have neither economic freedom for the masses nor economic efficiency for the nation as a whole."[5] For Lerner, situational placement and cultural tradition generated the absence of a positive administrative vision. "How often have I heard even some of the government administrators curse the fact that, for all their technical expertness in detail, they have not been able to stand off at a distance and get a perspective of the whole...[their] discussions today start with the sense of chaos... and never get far beyond it."[6] The "negative" state was the product of the previous century, with "a tradition of state's rights"as well as "an expanding economy, a simple and cohesive society[.]"[7]

Robert Lynd was more specific, locating limits on administration embedded in an anachronistic concept of mission. On the one hand, governmental administration did not develop because corporate power had been cloaked in previous American crises. It was "cloaked under the sectional issue between the agrarian and the Eastern industrial states... [and generating] a naïve and dangerous popular faith... that democracy and capitalist enterprise are two aspects of the same thing[.]"[8] On the other hand, there was a general misperception regarding the relationship between business and government. Thinking that the political arena was a separate "aspect" of democracy, one would overlook governmental weakness as well as its acceptance of business values:

> "Organized business enterprise is less and less willing to tolerate checks on its activities by the state; more and more it needs the state as active ally; and the national state, in turn, having delivered itself over by accepting the definition of its welfare as synonymous with the welfare of its business system, needs increasingly the utmost of aggressive efficiency from its business men."[9]

Lasswell and Herring had defined democracy in terms of dialogue between competing interests, the sharing of power between all interests, and the use of benevolent administration to provide for coordination of interests. Lerner and Lynd continually responded by calling attention to the passivity of the process, and the absence of democratic guarantees within it. In the first place, Lynd was not sure that all interests

were content with their "local" traditions. "Business is in politics and the state is in business... and the public does not know what to do about this merging of powers up aloft over its head... the popular challenge expressed earlier in the campaign to curb bigness... has become confused and blunted... if he is not to oppose *bigness* itself... what *is* he to oppose about big business?"[10] Lerner stressed the need for a more active voice from labor to insure its own protection. "Democracy is not a class-room concept, worth pursuing because of the beauty of its contours or for some absolute validity it possesses. Democracy is only a pragmatic assurance that power will, on the whole, be used for and not against the community interests. That is why democracy never becomes vital until the question of power has entered... and the question of power has now entered the labor movement with a vengeance."[11]

John Chamberlain found the same fault with Herring that Lerner had found with Chamberlain: the absence of a substantive goal for the domestic economy. Reviewing Herring's book, Chamberlain noted that Herring "settles nothing: he cannot tell us how to increase production, turn depression into boom or dispense equal justice to all." The problem was getting trapped in Herring's "game" of politics.

> "The upshot of Mr. Herring's analysis is that sub-groupings in the larger categories of 'business' and 'labor' and the 'farmer' can achieve more for themselves by playing balance-of-power politics that cut across party lines than they can by playing the straight class-party game... if you play politics by organizing a syndicate, a union, an institute or a committee that is independent of party, then you are in a position to market your votes... [o]nly those belated adolescents who look upon political parties as substitutes for churches can see anything "immoral" in such an attitude."[12]

Herring responded only to Lerner. He reiterated several points -- his concerns regarding reform, his belief in individualism as a coherent doctrine, and his commitment to compromise in a stable two party system. The center of the argument, however, was that

the current system had to be proven intractable before reform should be considered. Herring claimed that "it still remains to be proved that our present party procedure cannot make the changes requisite for the survival of American democracy... it would be suicidal to throw overboard the very basis of [current] agreement... in the fear that our procedures might eventually fail." In response to Lerner's concern that people will have no "real loyalties," Herring reiterated the importance of the narrower world of the citizen.

> "Some voters giver their loyalty to the individual leader, some vote for their party symbol, regardless of content, others seek their interests through a more direct means. For labor there is the union movement, with its traditions, symbols, and tangible satisfactions. For farmers there is a farm movement that has taken its course through the years, unhampered by loyalty to any one political party... The politics of democracy is as varied, emotional, and intellectual as the people of this great continent. No amount of exhortation can make us consistent and orderly, but we can still use our parties as workable devices for the alternation of those holding political power."[13]

The positions were fundamentally at odds. Despite their differences. Chamberlain and Lerner were attempting to set up substantive guidelines for economic self determination and efficiency, contending this would generate "real" loyalties. Herring was impatient with those utopian "exhortations," and contended that the narrower loyalties of all groups had been mediated through tradition intrinsic to "this great continent." Lerner later commented that "'The American tradition' is one of the vaguest [phrases] in our language and one of the most loosely used... vested ideas [which] hold on... longer than the actualities they represent."[14]

2. In Search of the "Affirmative" State

With the labor movement providing the basis for the critique of "pressure politics," reformist writers in *The New Republic* identified aspects of wartime developments which showed promise for reform. At the same time, however, the character of the debate shifted as wartime planning introduced the possibility for "positive" governance of the polity. As noted in *The New Republic*, proposals for a full employment program embodied some of the criteria reformers had sought: guarantees for employment security,

workplace control, and the possibility for enhanced participation. At the same time, however, these writers identified the presence of corporate surrogates for planning. As the Full Employment Bill and the Office of Price Administration were weakened, Keynesian economists had joined *The New Republic* and were expressing their frustration with the "extravagance" of labor's wage demands and it's "impatience" with the economy.

One attempt to define their reformism came through critique of Thurman Arnold's anti-trust policies. Though Lerner contended that Thurman Arnold represented a relative improvement over previous anti-trust prosecutors, Lerner made it clear that Arnold's goals were not democratic. True democratic planning was "affirmative" rather than "negative." "In the negative state our political scientists evolved the concept of "pressure politics" - the pressures applied by special-interest groups on the government. In the affirmative state we must replace it by the concept of "economic strategies" ...choices must be made in response to the life needs of the people as a whole."[15] Arnold was criticized for traveling a well worn path in which courts denied rights to labor granted by legislatures. By leaving leeway in defining appropriate and inappropriate restraint of trade, conservative jurists might turn the clock back to the days of court injunctions limiting the right to strike. In 1939, *Nation* editors wrote that:

> "We think it for Congress and not for Mr. Arnold and the courts to decide the questions of public policy involved even in the examples he has set forth... It will be time enough to act against the uneconomic practices of labor when we have ended the far graver and more costly uneconomic practices of capital... labor rackets can be broken up without establishing precedents dangerous to the labor movement."[16]

Later responses from editors of *The New Republic* focused on an American tradition of self interest said to generate recalcitrant unions.

> "[a]ll these charges are a nice mixture of truth, half-truth and falsehood... Historically, the racketeer labor leader has usually appeared as a response to the racketeer employers. The owner of a business who did not want to bargain

> honestly with his employees has often found it expedient to bargain dishonestly with a fake union head."

Yet the same writers felt that both jurisdictional disputes between the AFL and the CIO must stop, as must their failure to engage in active public relations efforts to win the middle class. "They assume that the middle class is always against them anyhow... This sort of thinking is out of date by at least a generation... If labor doesn't clean its own house, the job will be done by someone else in a way that neither labor nor its friends will like."[17]

Rather than a simple embrace of Arnold's consumer vision, however, sympathy towards Arnold was linked to workplace joint labor-management councils by the CIO.[18] Anxious to point the direction housecleaning should take, editors claimed that unions were "coming of age" when following CIO guidelines using labor-management councils in the improvement of manufacturing practices. When one labor-management committee adopted a worker's proposal for improving bomb-fusing manufacture, editors said that "This is news, and it is less simple than it sounds, for at the bottom of it are ideas which cover a great deal of ground..." It was not just that the average worker had something to contribute, but that industrial unions could achieve, within the new institution of labor-management councils, a reunification of interest.[19]

> "[Labor management councils] are not meant to take over the functions or responsibilities of management. Nor do they supersede trade unions. They are the means of encouraging and giving expression to the ideas of workers and they can only function with full effectiveness in plants where unions have already provided an organized medium for expression."[20]

Thus, 1940 writings in *The New Republic* revealed positions tolerant of Arnold's. "No law has ever protected labor leaders or employers in such activities. And no one is a greater sufferer from these unlawful combinations than the members of the building craft unions themselves, who have been reduced almost to pauperism by them."[21]

Responding to assertions that unions were despotic, *New Republic* writers pointed out that there was no point to such a narrow self interest. One editorial noted that "we are being told that the CIO is preparing a labor dictatorship, or that it is smoothing the path for fascism or that the sit-down strike is an illegal and arbitrary weapon that no community can tolerate."[22] Editor Malcolm Cowley commented that power was necessary, but only to achieve democratic ends. "I do not want to magnify the importance of power in our total social problem and its solutions. Power is not bread or meat; it is not culture; it is not life or the ideas that sustain life. We cannot live by power, and a culture that seeks to live by it becomes brutal and sterile."[23] More to the point were claims that true freedom of expression came only in the presence of a full balance of power between employers and employees.

> "Those genuinely concerned about the security of free speech may well consider the need to embrace for the Wagner Act what they long ago embraced in other instances of labor legislation which seemed to cut down the liberty of the strong but only prevented exploitation of the weak. Those laws tried, as Holmes said, 'to establish the equality of position between the parties in which liberty of contract begins." May not this law fairly try also to establish the equality of position between the parties in which *liberty of speech begins?*"[24]

The *New Republic* dealt with similar issues surrounding fair dialogue in their own problems with the Associated Press [AP]. *New Republic* editors supported a 1942 anti-trust suit brought against the AP, which had claimed its status as a legal cooperative allowed it to restrict membership. "[G]enuine cooperatives... whether of consumers of farmers, are open to anyone who will pay their charges and obey their rules."[25]

The altruistic possibilities of a democratic labor movement were identified in a number of *New Republic* articles. As organization of the CIO was in its earliest years, writers stressed the presence of bridges between unions, and their desire to use power responsibly. Lorch argued that progressive unions were seeking broader benefits for their brethren.

> "The principle demand of the unions today is for an extension of the WPA to include 3,500,000 jobs for able-bodied unemployed people, and a three-billion-dollar fund to provide for these jobs for one year... [under the belief that a]ll workers should be employed on work suited to their needs and skills..."

Lorch's assertion was that this was an evolving "statesmanlike" stance, and that the CIO's goal was "to help the jobless worker *now*. It is a day-to-day fight to get the worker on local relief, to get him a WPA job, or to straighten out the problems of his unemployment insurance..." In the cooperative vision, union members were "cutting through delay and red tape in order to give the applicant prompt aid." In the end, with "this bold and flexible unemployment program, the CIO has been able to enlarge its work, not abandon it, as the depression deepened. It has held on to its old members to a surprising degree; it has reached thousands of new ones because it has met their most tragic needs."[26]

The search for "positive governance" and collectivist reforms extended into the war, but placed it in a far different and problematic light. While the creation of wartime institutions yielded the opportunity for more detailed critique of the "pressure system," the writers had to address the divisions between different unions. The wartime call for "all out production" rather than democratization of the workplace and restarting the economy meant that strikes had to be justified. A number of labor leaders attempted to display a statesmanlike stance with a "no strike pledge" for the duration of the war, but had to point out that strikes were justified when corporations failed to reciprocate with a "reasonable profits" pledge. By war's end, political scientists and political economists alike were assuming a stance quite similar to Herring's, Lasswell's, and Leiserson's: labor unions needed to moderate their desire.

One clear example of positive governance and labor statesmanship came from Frank Porter Graham's recounting of the 1942 WLB wartime production summit between business, citizen representatives, and unions. Discussing the logic of the War Labor Board, Graham wrote of the board's success in its "relentless search for reconciliation" of the divergent aims of "stability and freedom, a fusing of union security and individual

liberty in the midst of a world war." The product was an agreement in which non-union members were not forced to join unions, while existing unions were given guarantees of membership for the duration of the contract. As seen by Graham, this made for more stable production, did not encroach on the rights of non-union members, and stabilized production for the life of the contract. But Graham saw this as a formula with far greater significance. Overlooking its voluntarist implications, he identified its more liberal implications. The board was "backed by an increasingly strong public opinion for individual liberty." The resolution had, it would seem, global significance. "[I]t guarantees democracy in America against the tragedy both of the disintegration of responsible unions during the war and against defenselessness of workers after the war... [with guarantees] against a violent revolution and the rise in America of a fascist, communist or imperialistic dictatorship; and third, it affords... that all out production for destruction... shall be converted into all-out production for winning the peace and for organized plenty for America and for the stricken and hungry peoples still hopeful for freedom, justice and peace all over the world."[27]

With these positive examples, however, came a critique of agencies such as the War Production Board and the Office of Price Administration. The critique of the WPB centered around the assertion that the capitalist oriented management of the Board was inefficient, and that coherent democratic control of it would have produced greater production efficiency. Without making the system more coherent, "the present wasteful, narrow and chaotic system of production control will take us inevitably to military defeat[.]" The *New Republic* staff writer concluded by repeating the credos of Lerner's affirmative state. "[A] new WPB is needed. It has got to be an agency capable of determining what this country has on hand - men, materials, tools and transportation; it has got to be an agency with a vigorous and bonafide division for the allocation of manpower, to replace the fumbling political commission..."[28] A similar critique was leveled at those attacking the Office of Price Administration. Labor groups were represented by the OPA's Labor Policy Committee, and despite ongoing attempts to limit

their input, one observer noted that they had become the "conscience" of the OPA.[29] *New Republic* accounts seem to support that claim. Facing continual de-funding and regulation under an increasingly conservative congress, enraged *New Republic* writers attacked those responsible for its reduced funding:

> "The end is now in sight... To get that result, business and the farm bloc used their big guns. The food industry not only mobilized but marshaled the farm bloc, the retailers, the textile industry and Congress... I quote The New York Times — 'the administrator has been replacing local and regional OPA officials with appointments suggested by congressional representative of the areas involved.'... Though the headlines now say that business men and Congress are hopeful of the OPA's policy and that opposition to the OPA is easing, they will not stop until the OPA is finished with."[30]

The result was the call for labor mobilization with the labor unions. Discussing "the catastrophe of last November [elections]",[31] a *New Republic* article noted that "[i]t is a little late, but here it is. The CIO is serious about politics, apparently determined to do the practical thing by the elections of 1944." Enraged by the defunding of the OPA, reactionary labor legislation, and corporate war manufactures profiteering, the editors went so far as to allow labor to declare that "[o]ur energy from this moment forward is to devote our full strength, energy and ingenuity to letting Congress know that the American people are sick to death of what is, at its least, pettifogging perfidy... [and] must recognize that the best place to start is where there is already a good deal of organization: the labor movement. In every community in America within the next few weeks there should be established a real unity among the CIO, the AFL and the railroad unions on a plan for carrying out this immediate program."[32]

The UMW's protection by John Lewis, however, provided the need to defend the idea of "affirmative" governance under more difficult circumstances. With Lewis' staunch defense of the miners came accusations that he exemplified self interested unions and their leaders. *New Republic* writers responded from a number of perspectives. One was to

highlight Philip Murray's comparative devotion to the responsible organization of power, and the increasing economic pressure on a livable wage.

> "Murray took note of [a difficult situation]...[and] served public notice that he 'had given loyalty [to Roosevelt], and expected loyalty in return, as president of the CIO.' The whole [conflict with the UMW] is an unsolved problem, but because Murray is an organization man, devoid of ambitions for personal power, I am inclined to put my money on him for the long haul."[33]

Lewis' independent stance, however, was seen as antithetical to a cooperative framework for governance: capitulating to the radical politics of one interest gave incentives for others to respond in kind. "The fact that Coal Administrator Harold L. Ickes concluded an agreement with [John] Lewis, morally if not legally a special one, means that other labor leaders will find it hard to maintain the statesmanlike position on stabilizing the cost of living they have taken in the past. Indications now are that labor is about to join ranks with most of the other organized segments of the population in favoring inflation as the easiest way out of its own special dilemma."[34]

The logic held that "pressure politics" produced aggregates fighting for higher wages and profits, while progressive unionism produced increased possibility for cooperative governance. One union leader writing in *The New Republic* noted that "[n]ational unity without labor as the binding agent is not conceivable." He went on to reflect upon the dilemma created by calls for responsible unionism within a system of competing interests. "There is uncertainty over the fate of the economic-stabilization program. There is industrial unrest over the unbalance between stabilized wages and unstabilized food prices. There are the power politics of labor, wherein sacrifice is a horrid word. And then there is the war against the government conducted by that formidable mallet-head, John L. Lewis."[35] Soule was more far reaching in addressing the implications of wartime developments. With the coal strikes providing Congress with impetus for anti-strike legislation in the Smith-Connally act of 1943, Soule claimed that inter-group conflicts would trigger the end of the democratization process. The bill was, therefor, to be seen as

a wake-up call for all parties involved. "[The bill] will not stop strikes, but is likely to provoke them... The mine crisis is not over; it is at best postponed... [but] it will be like the percussion cap set off by a railroad train, which warns the engineer to stop in order to avoid a collision... the task of stabilizing the economy is of immense importance... This is the struggle for post-war full-employment, vigorous democracy, and lasting peace.[36]

Another strategy to highlight the efficiency of the "affirmative state" was calling attention to Great Britain and its inclusion of labor in planning arenas. As one writer argued, their integration of labor into the economy and the polity made it comparatively easier to convert to wartime economy. Looking at Britain's fuller acceptance of wage, hours and organizational guarantees, the author wrote that "[w]ith these three questions-the source of so much potential controversy-settled, it was relatively easier for Britain to transfer herself from a peacetime industrial basis to that of full war production." The point was that with formal inclusion came cooperation in economic planning coming from a sense of equity. "Any sacrifice demanded by the nation from labor or management was willingly made, as neither side was suspicious that concessions asked were part of a plot to destroy the hard-won prerogatives of the other. Time honored practices have, therefore, been temporarily abandoned and sacrifices have been demanded from all, the consumer, the worker, and the employer... [and] no suggestion that the normal week should be sacrificed....[and] for giving up their right to strike... are given the protection of an impartial tribunal... to adjust grievances, after which they may strike." The final point was probably directed at the WPB. "Britain's experience can be useful in saving time spent on repeating well tried experiments."[37]

A similar issue arose regarding the equity of conscripting American workers. In Britain, it had been done with labor coordination. Were it necessary here, Lerner cautioned against reckless disregard for problems within the "labor market."[38] If needed, it needed to happen through labor. "If convinced of the necessity, the workers themselves through their organizations will and should sanction the essential mobilization of labor, and must

have a large share in putting it into effect... This is not only the democratic way, it is also the way to avoid the wastes which lead workers to believe that job conscription is necessary and unjust."[39] Lynd made the same point, but addressed it more broadly. "If democracy is suspended now, it will not reappear at the peace conference. If during the war we avoid the development of genuine democratic organization and participation, if we curtail the partial organization of labor we now have instead of moving forward to its thoroughgoing democratic extension, we can know for certain fact that democratic people's organizations will be similarly frustrated after the war."[40]

Repeated in a number of *New Republic* articles, the theme remained the same: labor was to be included either directly in the process of workplace governance or used to help execute public policy independent from business influence. Whether in price administration or wartime production policy, an affirmative government could exist, and would consist of an active attempt to view labor groups from a cooperative perspective.

3. Price Control and the Nebulous Reunification of Interest

The specific idea of an institutional framework for "full employment" arose as early as 1942 in *The New Republic*, though similar ideas existed in Lerner's "affirmative state" and the call for the fair and inclusive treatment of labor groups. In 1942 Soule made tentative reference to four technical economic issues surrounding full employment, including an orderly reconversion to a peacetime economy, control of inflation, countercyclical spending, and the avoidance of oversaving. The most provocative assertion, however, was the recommendation that income inequality be regulated lest all of the economic "perils" of price inflation be risked. The reference was to the risk of different groups wanting greater wages or profits.[41] Within a year, however, Soule was noting that as an idea, planning was here to stay. "The issue of whether or not there is to be planning is now a dead issue, but the issue of who is to do the planning and what it is to be like is a very live one. That is what is going to dominate the headlines of the future."[42] More interesting was the increased presence of economic planners Seymour

Harris and Alvin Hansin, (joined by political scientist Heinz Eulau) taking center stage in *New Republic* discussions of planning.

Responding to wartime calls for "responsible unionism," Soule was withdrawing from a previous focus on increased union strength and union rights. Instead, Soule identified the need to work within existing gains as the central task of reformers.

> "Many in this country fear the power of big business and would use the government to curb or even supplant it. Many others fear the power of government and, in the interest of liberty, oppose any drift towards socialism... Some think that it is essential to fight the class struggle before even attempting to plan. What the ultimate validity of these beliefs may turn out to be I do not know. But I do know that no one of them encompasses the immediate situation. We are not going to have state socialism in the near future; even organized labor... would [often] rather work for private employers rather than public ones... Meanwhile citizens as individuals and consumers must depend on government for protection against pressure groups-even their own. Therefore, to keep the national economy a growing concern, coöperation or balance among all these forces must be attempted. The effort to plan is an area in which it may most hopefully be tried. It is in the process of this effort that the next stages of the contests for power will be made manifest."[43]

Drifting towards realism, Soule began to focus on the need for all groups to share the responsibility in averting post-war economic disaster. The result was increasing impatience with labor radicalism, and more passionate pleas for public minded action amongst groups *New Republic* writers had diagnosed as myopic. Soule acknowledged their presence."The woods are full of profiteers and chiselers, and everybody knows it."[44] At the same time, however, Soule was anxious to declare what an equitable economic plan would consist of, and to call for voluntary adherence to it:

> "This is a challenge to democratic statesmanship: it must if it can reach down into the sources of democracy and obtain the acceptance, on a voluntary but collective basis, of a comprehensive plan... it would have to pledge even-handed justice at the same time to all important elements of the community... [including] wage increases [for all] equivalent to the rise in the cost of living... [in trade for]labor's pledge not to strike... [Extra wages] are to be paid in the form of war savings bonds... [with] food at such wholesale prices that no rise in present retail ceilings

> will be required... Such a compact, if it could be adopted by an unofficial congress of the interests at stake, would show our real capacity for democratic self-government. American like to think they can do necessary things without waiting for someone to pass a law. In this case they cannot afford to wait for Congress. Congress has failed, and we shall have to dot the best we can without it. Perhaps we can set it an example."[45]

It was this call for labor moderation which was repeated by a number of political economists writing both in and outside *The New Republic*. One critique came from George Soule during the controversial post-war strike wave. Though he was clearly sympathetic towards labor's predicament with respect to the OPA and postwar wage and price policy, he was nonetheless impatient with the strike activity of particular unions. Unions had kept their no-strike pledge during the war, corporate profits had soared with respect to wages, inflation was high, and the rank and file were justly disgruntled. But Soule placed unions into three categories, pointing out that John Lewis and a host of Railway Brotherhoods fell into a category of unions that were striking before entering into good faith bargaining arrangements. Unions had not become too powerful, but the only way to defend the labor perspective was to continue distinction between responsible and irresponsible unions.[46]

Writing in *The New Republic* in 1945, Harvard economist and ex-OPA administrator Seymour Harris chose the Republican post-war attack on the Office of Price Administration as an opportunity to discuss the character of planning. The OPA, he noted, had dealt with corporate profiteering far more effectively than the War Production Board, and it was critical that regulation continue if catastrophic post-war inflation were to be avoided. Central to this assessment was that the OPA had worked competently in past battles between business and labor. The OPA had been staffed by academicians (unlike the WPB), and the mid-1940s attack on unions had been repelled by professors who suspected that union-won wage increases had no necessary detrimental effect on profits. Indeed, a similar observation had been made by OPA labor economist John Afros, who was writing concurrently in the *APSR*.[47] Harris noted that:

> "A cornerstone of OPA policy is that every rise in cost should not be reflected by a corresponding rise of price. If wage rates rise, selling costs fall; if raw material costs rise, overhead costs per unit fall... Hourly earnings have risen at least twice as much as prices and yet profits of corporations, before taxes, are up three times... What does all this add up to? Price control has been remarkably successful."[48]

Harris was clearly critical of business and sympathetic towards union wage demands. Despite this perspective just after the war, however, Harris became increasingly critical of wage increases. Writing after passage of the Taft-Hartley act, for example, Harris performed a post-mortem on both 1945-46 economic policies, and the Full Employment Act debates. Though assigning blame for poor postwar economic performance to bad economic theory and Republican myopia, he was also critical of the increasingly successful wage demands by labor unions. Harris asserted that in those years:

> "[a]ppropriate policy called for relative declines in wages in these industries, which would have made the industries more profitable, and would at the same time have encouraged workers to move elsewhere. But powerful trade unions have preferred to keep wages at an uneconomic level and, therefore, to keep an excessive number of workers attached to the chronically sick industries."[49]

Workers were to move according to national labor needs, and "powerful trade unions" were impeding their doing so. A similar argument was made by Thurman Arnold just after the war. Though he had left the Department of Justice and returned to private practice in Washington D.C., Arnold wrote in *The New Republic* that the post-war strike waves and wage demands were short sighted in their impact on consumer prices. Pointing out that "business sets wages down as costs." He commented further that "the labor movement must be a consumer's movement, as well" and that wage demands should include a "campaign to increase production." Other *New Republic* writers were sympathetic to the idea that the argument "rightly stresses labor's stake, not merely in higher wages, but in full and steady employment". They noted, however, that the argument ignored the unequal treatment being given to labor and business in wage, price, and organizational restrictions. "If labor is assured of steady work at good wages, it won't be necessary to threaten unions with fines or jail sentences."[50]

As did economist Edwin Nourse, Harvard Keynesian Alvin Hansen contended that *laissez-faire* proponents were destructively utopian. Discussing Friederich Hayek's *Road to Serfdom*, he claimed that a deeper and somewhat romantic commitment to 19th century classical Liberalism was being masked with appropriate sounding references to the need for planning.

> "Is he for the Beveridge program or against it? That is the kind of tough question we have to decide... The best I can make out of it is that Hayek favors the measure of social security that England has... [but w]e are left in confusion. I suspect he is against Beveridge. And I think I know his past ideas well enough to be fairly sure that he was against all social security, as well as labor unions."[51]

They took greatest exception to Hayek's generalism. "Hayek is incredibly skimpy about the nature and character of the 'road to serfdom.'... we may infer that Alexander Hamilton was the first socialist... and August Comte... nurtured the roots of Nazism."[52] Indeed, other *New Republic* editors joined in calling the book "little more than an indignity" in its abandonment of Hayek's scholarly record.[53]

Hansen's planning, however, emphasized countercyclical spending more than institutional regulation.[54] It did include the emulation of Sweden, where "through trade unions and collective bargaining... and through the eager and intelligent participation in politics... the people as a whole have achieved as never before a high degree of personal liberty and freedom."[55] Hansen also, however, sought a more passive role for U.S. labor groups. As with Nourse and Arnold, the language he used to conceptualize social justice was based upon the conomic perspective of a price system. Lerner, who had centered his work in the a theory of structured participation rather than loose price mechanisms, had critiqued the use of prices to achieve social welfare as a system of "steel and putty."[56] It was, nonetheless, the center of Hansen's social vision:

> "[t]he full-employment program is designed for a *free* society. The price system, freedom of choice of occupation by individuals, private enterprise - this is the institutional pattern within which [our] full employment policy is designed to

> operate. Problems of wages, prices, industrial discipline and motivation are utterly different in a free society from those in a totalitarian state..."[57]

In seeking full employment, Hansen noted he was opening himself up for attacks from those who saw this as leaning towards authoritarian implications. Thus, he clarified the definition of "full" to overlook persons merely between jobs. As he stated it, "[f]lexibility in the labor market is a necessary condition of freedom. Thus, in a free society - a point which needs to be underscored - full employment cannot mean that at any given moment every person in the labor force is at work..."[58] On the one hand, he was clear to point out that unemployment was not going to be an anti-union weapon. He went on to state:

> "If we expect to manage the wage problem in a full-employment society, it will indeed be necessary to have a degree of flexibility adequate to meet the requirements of a dynamic economy. But it would be a fatal mistake to rely upon large unemployment as the means to control wages. In a full-employment society, statistically defined [as 2-3 million in frictional unemployment], the control of wages must be achieved through enlightened union-management cooperation and collective bargaining... I stress this matter of labor-market flexibility and control of wage rates, because this is certain to become a focal point of attack against a full-employment program."

Assurances notwithstanding, however, he cautioned that labor groups were not to become too entrenched. "The third and final condition of a full-employment policy is the organized mobility of labor... from trade to trade and from industry to industry... obstacles to fluidity must be removed, particularly restrictions on entry to specific trades and the unwillingness of the individual to change his job."[59]

To some extent, Hansen was conscious of the pejorative character of his argument -- he seemed to be aware of a balance between attaining material security on the one hand, and allowing unions their due in collective bargaining. Nonetheless, he did not hesitate to draw a line in the sand beyond which labor was not to pass. "Most people should continue normally in their chosen occupations and their settled homes. Organized mobility does not mean perpetual motion, but it does mean that labor, in accordance with the

requirements of a dynamic economy, shall move rapidly and directly to new jobs when there are new jobs."[60]

4. Summary

Hansen and Harris claimed that a full employment program based on countercyclical spending and a price control "system" would provide full employment and, implicitly, social justice. This claim, however, required that labor groups be thought of in much the same way that Merriam, Holcombe, Herring, Lasswell and Avery Leiserson had recommended: as a group which required moderation of its self-interested demands. It would be a just system because full employment was virtually guaranteed. To attain full employment, however, it was attendant upon labor groups to migrate to new opportunities as they arose. Moreover, this perspective was seen as the product of the NAM, aided by the decreasing effectiveness of the OPA.[61] While Soule was content to live within these limitations, others in the *New Republic* thought the fundamental character of their goals were being altered by business.

> "What, after all, is meant by full employment? Is Sir William Beveridge correct in saying that full employment means employment of no less than 97 percent of the labor force? What is the "labor force"?... The NAM, for example, believes that many who worked during the war should not seek jobs after it. Women workers "ought" to stay home-and therefore will... If any of these people seek jobs and fail to get them, they cannot be counted as unemployed, because it has already been proved by statistical "oughts" that they are not part of the labor force."[62]

It was also clear that the OPA was seen as a critical representative body for labor and consumer. For many, its destruction was the most outrageous example of corporate disregard for the public interest. As Lynd noted:

> "When organized big business, led by its top strategy board, the National Association of Manufacturers, killed the OPA, it inaugurated Operation Capitalism... big business shouldered aside the efforts of democratic government to control the economy and announced that it would itself do whatever was necessary for the public good and do it better than could any other system-particular any kind of government planning or control. The November elections

confirmed the power of big business to do the job in its own way, free from government interference."[63]

From Lynd's perspective, activists were to "identify and publicize the obligations American capitalism has undertaken and the tactics to which it will resort as it fails to achieve the promised stability..." This accounting was to include attempts to deny that commitments were made, attempts to shift responsibilities to others, attempts to redefine topics like prices and employment to their advantage, and to create internal or external crises in order to suspend their promises. "To identify these tactics as they occur and to point out their common origin is the responsibility of the left. Also, now that business has accepted, on the barrel, the obligation to provide permanent and stable prosperity, the left must keep the score."[64]

B. The Discussion of Labor in Political Science

1. Political Economy

Within the narrower confines of the political science profession, similar discussion of these economic arrangements were clearly present. Therein were deeper assertions about labor recalcitrance and the benefits of a "mixed" political system: labor groups should moderate their demands, with economic health determined by an ad hoc blend of public and private investment. Most importantly, these discussions highlighted the decreasing concern for the inclusion of labor perspectives either in decision making processes or in understanding the justifications for strikes.

In the period under examination, Columbia economics professor Leo Wolman was one of the earliest skeptics about the new role of organized labor in the political economy of the late New Deal. In a 1937 critique published in the *Political Science Quarterly*, he dispensed with the myth of collectivist goals, claiming that because unionization rates tracked prosperity, they merely reflected individuals' attempts to take advantage of labor scarcity.[65] Though the argument was more pointed than his others, Wolman exemplified a point fundamental to almost all of the writers presented below: in one form or another,

tangible material gain plays a critical theoretical role in distinguishing between appropriate and extremist labor demands.

Wolman's critique of the Wagner Act began with his claim that the act saw workers as helpless. As he stated it, unionization departed from a natural order in which "25,000,000 employees, excluding agricultural laborers and domestic servants have remained unorganized for decades" and that unionization was the product of "campaigns of... unparalleled vigor" by a "militant minority."[66] Thus he critiqued the preamble of the Wagner Act, which claimed the presence of "inequality of bargaining power... [which] aggravate[s] recurrent business depressions" as "doctrine [which] hardly squares with the relevant facts."[67] Accepting the new unionism as a given, he was anxious to highlight the ways in which capitalism was being stifled by it. Attacking the fundamental assumption that social good was realized by acknowledging the absence of mutual interest between capital and labor,[68] he claimed that abolition of company unions "all but denies the existence of a strong mutuality of interest between employer and employee..." and that "[d]isputes over representation have in the main been between the so-called bona fide unions and company unions."[69]

By and large Wolman painted a bleak portrait. He claimed that "anxiety" had led to the "los[s of] all sense of proportion... to have greatly overestimated the capacity of business to absorb the necessary costs [of unions] in the allotted time." Most important however, were the foreboding implications this held for economic health in general. As with Lasswell, the problem was the effect militant laborers had on the benevolent, self disciplined worker. He stated that:

> "By and large, they are a rare and irreplaceable group of men... In the best managed work-places of this country, men of this type have succeeded in creating among the members of their work-force the pervasive habit of self-discipline. This habit is indispensable to the democratic conduct of labor relations in modern industry. Once these cooperative relations tend to be undermined, for whatever reason, and self-discipline begins to relax, it is only a question of time before the quantity and quality of work will begin to suffer and the values of management to

> deteriorate... For it is clear that competitive industry cannot prosper in an atmosphere of dissension and distrust..."[70]

With obedience reduced and distrust enhanced, Wolman saw decline as inevitable. "If the future of our industrial relations is to rest on the assumption of an essential conflict of interest... then the conclusion may be ventured that neither labor nor management will profit therefrom."[71] Though his case was only weakly developed, Wolman seemed to tie the embrace of the philosophical perspective of a conflict of interest to labor unrest, moral decay and economic decline. By 1940, however, the critique became more focused. He saw this "turning point in labor policy" as a flawed economic and social policy. On the one hand government "policy towards business is to promote competition, low and flexible prices, [and] the abundant and continuous output of goods and services." On the other hand "the policy toward labor is to raise wages and prices... The two policies are incompatible in the long run. In time the government will either regulate union policy... or remove some of the special favors."[72]

In 1942 a similar fear of labor radicalism was discussed in the *Annals* by NLRB member William Leiserson. Unlike Wolman, Leiserson saw the problem less in terms of national economic performance than in the increased tendency of labor unions to inappropriately seek political ends. Labor sympathizers who thought labor was having "growing pains" missed the fact that labor's increased political activity might soon repeat a dark episode in its past:

> "All through the history of the labor movement in this country, Communists and social reformers of various kinds have attempted to capture the movement, control its policies, and divert the power of organized labor into social politics or revolutionary channels and away from collective bargaining and the institutions of stable industrial government which are its normal aims. Agrarians, Anarchists, Communists, Single Taxers, Socialists, Syndicalists, and other social reformers all tried their hands..."[73]

What Leiserson found most disturbing, evidently, was that labor groups had achieved consciousness, and hence might try to rise yet again:

> "The change in the bargaining position of organized workers was accomplished by united political action of working people... [and] [h]ere the very success of the American labor movement may well prove to be its undoing. It is now faced with the same fateful issues that have confronted European labor movements... it may engage in partisan politics, seek to feed on its power, and use it to oppress and to dictate to the people of the country, including its own members... no doubt the labor movement of the future will have to play a greater role in the political life of the Nation than it did in the past. But if this is to be done by injecting purely political issues into workers' organizations designed for collective bargaining objectives, then there is indeed danger ahead for the American labor movement..."[74]

In fearing the arrival of an actual labor party, Leiserson followed the same concerns as Holcombe and Herring. He was against centralized planning proposals or significant labor participation in industrial management. Leiserson had been selected to serve on the NLRB to moderate the more radical leanings of the original members.[75] More telling was his support for Sydney Hillman rather than Philip Murray. Hillman, unlike Murray, contended that labor should be better represented through CIO PAC lobbying of existing parties, rather than pursue plans of industrial co-management councils and participation in national economic planning boards.[76]

Harvard Political Science Department Chair Merle Fainsod, who had significant contact with Seymour Harris, also addressed the need for plans to reign in labor. As with Harris, Fainsod seemed equally critical of both business and labor groups for creating the need for regulation. Like Nourse, however, he left the idea of enlightened economic planning within business groups. Emphasizing the prevalence of over-reaction to fears of socialism, Fainsod asked if "in our drive for security [we will] create an all-powerful bureaucratic Frankenstein which ends up by telling us where we shall work, what we shall eat, what we shall produce, how much we shall earn... [o]r is there middle ground between complete private and complete public enterprise in which we can combine the civil and political liberties which we cherish...?"[77] Again, the problem was the relaxation of price controls at the end of the war, leaving labor, farm and business groups ready to polarize:

> "The danger consists in the fact that each group may make its own economic decisions with an eye only on what it conceives to be its own short-run interests. That danger is vividly illustrated by inflationary developments since the collapse of the wartime stabilization program. Some businessmen who should have known better have driven for higher prices in order to make excessive profits in a scarcity market... [and] certain labor leaders have resorted to monopolistic restrictions and paralyzing strikes to win compensatory advantages for themselves. A mixed economy operated in this fashion becomes very mixed up indeed, particularly when, as part of the reaction against war controls, government abdicates its responsibilities and allows the pulling and hauling of the great economic groups to prepare the way for catastrophe."[78]

Although this critique suggests Fainsod favored continuation of the OPA and was critical of Nourse's "mixed" system, his strongest hope lay in the increased number of "corporate liberals" in the business community - specifically, the Committee for Economic Development, who seemed to be avoiding the "dreary either or dilemma that there can be no compromise between private and public enterprise."[79]

Among some political economists, however, fears persisted. Harvard and CED labor economist Sumner Slichter felt that the increased size and character of labor unions had transformed a capitalist economy into a "laborist" economy. Thus, substantive and procedural precautions were to be taken to insure that the results of collective bargaining would not impinge upon the economically defined public interest. The point highlighted the increasingly harsh characterization of the bargaining process. Nourse clearly embraced the term collective in a way that valued local and national communities. With respect to wages, however, Slichter favored more statistical considerations based on regional and national considerations over local or industry centered ones:

> "Settling wages and working conditions on the basis of bargaining power... prevents the terms of bargains from being affected by the public interest - by such considerations as the effect of the wage structure upon the geographical distribution of industry, and thus upon the size of the national product, and by the effect of wage changes upon prices and the general level of employment... [we need] the development of a body of thought concerning what considerations are relevant in determining the fairness of wages and working conditions.... Of what relevance are competitors' and community wages in determining a proper rate?

> ...Does a rise in the cost of living justify wage increases? The rise in the cost of living means that demand is outrunning supply. Would [not] wage increases... aggravate the tendency...?"[80]

A similar point was made by economist and nascent political scientist, Charles Lindblom. Pinning contemporary economic recalcitrance more on labor than business, he published a critique of articles in the *Quarterly Journal of Economics* and the *Journal of Political Economy* which held that labor unions could not be considered monopolies. Claiming that the closed shop was mistakenly seen as the base of union monopoly power, Lindblom stated that the union power base was the blind use of force embodied in the strike. Avoiding historical discussion of labor's right to strike, he claimed that:

> "Common as the strike is, its significance for union monopoly is often missed. It is not simply a refusal to work. It is a punitive measure to force the employer to submit to the union... the union can control the price of labor if it can control the decisions of the employer, regardless of sustained control over the labor supply."[81]

In this work. Lindblom did not discuss the political nuances and economic formulae for wage determination developed by Nourse, Hansen, or Harris. Nonetheless, he developed alternative discussions of quite similar topics. Unemployment did not, for example, introduce any kind of price control over unions given the use of industry-wide bargaining and national wage guidelines. Similarly, it was only in highly competitive industries that unions would abstain from exorbitant demands. Industrial unionism "has made it possible for union jurisdiction to follow changing skills and technique."[82] In the end, he contended that:

> "Some economists have never tired of exhorting business leaders to lower prices. We are now no doubt entering an era of sermons to union leaders on their public responsibilities. But evidence is lacking to suggest that we shall meet with any more success in talking wages down than we have in talking prices down."[83]

Lindblom not only characterized unions as selfish, but took the reactionary stance that their conception of public interest was mere propaganda. Indeed he went so far as to suggest that while businessmen had enough awareness to feel guilty for their inflationary

actions, union leaders did not. "Perhaps we shall be even less successful [talking to unions], for while some business leaders are defensive and uneasy in their price policies, the union leader will ordinarily insist that, ethically or morally, high wage rates are desirable."[84]

These writers stood quite distant from activists' call for democratic participation defined through labor: Fainsod deferred to the judgment of the Committee for Economic Development; Leiserson sought participation through PACs isolated from the bargaining table; and Slichter sought to bring experts in to define outcomes of bargaining agreements. Lindblom took this departure to a new level, describing strikes as "punitive." Labor action was no longer seen as a form of democratic participation, and this view was gaining prominence within the profession.

2. Political Science and Alternatives to Direct Participation

It is notable that at the end of the decade, the issue of participation was taken up by political scientists in a forum concerning the central role of parties — a discussion developed in a highly publicized APSA report endorsing a *"Responsible Party System"* in 1950.[85] Whether or not this issue was intrinsically related to the wartime and post-war limiting of labor participation is a matter for deeper investigation. On the surface, however, the relationship between the idea of responsible parties and broader issues of labor participation in policy formation is clear. The participants in the 1950 *Party* committee, as well as its follow-up committee working in the early 1950s included a host of figures noted for both their work in political science and their support for full employment planning. The list included political scientists Paul Appleby, Stephen Kemp Bailey, Merle Fainsod, Bertram Gross, Fritz Morstein Marx, Jasper Shannon, and the Committee Chair, E. E. Schattschneider.

The past of these figures highlights some of the connections between the democratic capitalist promise of full employment and a "responsible party system." Appleby had, as early as 1938, been partially responsible for FDR's first steps towards deficit spending to

stimulate consumption.[86] Like Fritz Morstein Marx, he worked in the Bureau of the Budget during the war, and published extensively after the war about how to "implement the government's economic program."[87] Gross served as the assistant to Edwin Nourse on the Council of Economic Advisors.[88] Of equal interest is the intellectual development of at least three of the participants. In their observations of the NLRA and FEA, Schattschneider, Gross, and Bailey had commented at length on their direct observations of group pressure on economic policy. Bailey concluded that both party reform and increased reliance on presidential direction of the party was critical.[89] Shannon, who was being used as consultant on the role of the South in national politics, concurred.[90]

Schattschneider, Appleby, and Seymour Harris published synopses of their late 1940s views in the Christian periodical *Social Action*. Though the journal did not claim to be contrasting labor views of political reform with partisan ones, its late 1940s articles did focus on the topic. The focus on these topics suggests, as do their writings, that the journal was an arena for a debate regarding the appropriate realm of political action - either the party (Schattschneider), within the fragmented political structures of an interconnected society (Appleby), or in the workplace (Reuther et. al.).

In his 1950 work in *Social Action*, Schattschneider placed the significance of parties in the international context of the impending Korean conflict. As with those who had feared international fascism in the 1930s and sought domestic reforms to prevent it, Schattschneider claimed Korea threw a "disturbing light on all of our calculations concerning the future."[91] Schattschneider described his immediate concern as the need for decisive governance among the "forces that threaten to destroy or to subjugate mankind." Continuing the perspective developed in his well known 1935 work on *Politics, Pressures and the Tariff*, Schattschneider argued that the "pressure system" of interest groups was generating a Madisonian nightmare. In *Politics*, he had been pessimistic about the possibility of legislative or executive controls over group pressures. Referring to the ill fated representation system of the National Industrial Recovery Act, he was pessimistic

that "a system of vocational representation covering all economic interests... [could] be substituted for pressure politics", and he noted that "[i]t is hard to believe that the mere establishment of a national advisory economic council, or even of an economic parliament with full power, will really induce economic pressure groups to abandon their activities... The monopoly of the few must be attacked from another angle."[92]

In his 1941 work on *Party Government* Schattschneider contended that parties had failed to be adequately considered in scholarly work as a solution to interest group anarchy, and he maintained this stance after the war. As he described it, interest groups were to be considered minority players because "they do not attempt to win elections... do not make nominations and do not attempt to mobilize majorities... [and t]hey need not consider the implications of general control of government.." The beginnings of responsible control of government policy already existed between the parties. What was needed, he claimed, was cohesion within the parties.[93] In *Social Action*, then, he went public with his call for strong action:

> "Modern policies are worked out with great difficulty in a disintegrated governmental structure driven by an amorphous mass of interested minorities under circumstances more conducive to nervous prostration than to mobility and decision. The imposition of unprecedented burdens on a structure designed for another age has produced an *invisible governmental crisis*. Behind the confusion in American government is a basic *political weakness* which Americans must remedy if they are to survive in a dangerous world."[94]

The problem was, again, that the political parties had failed to control interest groups. Schattschneider identified the primary problem as one of coordination among competing interests. "The distinguishing quality of the new assignment is not so much the size of the new administrative establishment or the number of individual transactions that must be performed as the necessity for integrating manifold activities into coherent programs..." Thus the failure of the NIRA approach towards vocational representation pushed Schattschneider away from consideration of democracy in terms of the workplace.

Schattschneider was looking to the parties to provide the cohesion that vocational representation would not.[95]

Attempting to describe a post-war theory of government, Paul Appleby asked "Who Governs America?" asserting that less formal groups and individual citizens were, in fact, at the center. He stated that "[t]he citizen of the United States is vastly more important and influential than he knows." Like Lasswell and Herring, he contended that "[e]very expression of opinion on public affairs-in the barber shop or beauty parlor... is a contribution to the climate of opinion within which the government acts in its constant effort to achieve or maintain consent." Even more provocative was his assertion that silence was apparently a form of approval. "Every withholding of expression is similarly a vote."[96]

As with Herring, Appleby's solution to political crisis was to assert that the original goals had themselves been unrealistic. "A very great deal of the sense of political frustration which too many citizens suffer springs from an unconscious expectation of too direct and conclusive influence on their government." The point seemed to be that political demands, whether individual or group, were filled with unreasonable hubris and anxiety:

> "The individual citizen finds it hard to understand why the government doesn't do what *he* wishes it to do. Or a single pressure group, feeling deeply about some problem, can't quite become reconciled to the fact that the government does not accept its particular proposal... yet any of us, in a relaxed mood, would agree that each citizen's fair share of influence would be only one-one hundred and forty-five millionth of all citizen influence, and that the government probably should never let any one citizen or any group of citizens write the particular ticket for the exercise of governmental power."[97]

For Appleby, the absence of effective political voice in any one group was hardly problematic: Americans had more groups to voice opinions *in*. "It is significant that there are in the United States more organizations than in any other nation-and more kinds of organizations."[98] Moreover, the fragmented character of government laid government open "widely to citizen influence." Thus, he continued, "[p]olitics offers its own

representative system, then, in addition to the more or less representative systems of private organizations... correcting positions taken by popular pressure groups or by professional political groups."[99] Appleby's rationale was developed in greater detail in his 1949 work *Big Democracy*. Stating the need to deliver an "overlooked panorama" of American government, the text began with a defense of government and politics as entities which could not be defined economically. Appleby did not identify exactly whose definitions of politics and he was refuting, but the nature of his proclamation suggests that these assertions reflected his experience with New and Fair Deal politics.

The book's title suggests the outline of his analysis. The idea of a "big democracy" was that while individual citizen participation might be small, the system itself was a dense web of vitally interconnected relations that formed a democratic entity. He identified the need to abandon visions of rugged individualism and the "contempt for the too easily disciplined Caspar Milquetoast." Contemporary ideas about democracy should not, he contended, use romantic ideas about rugged individualism and the ability of the common man to have a large say in policy processes.[100] Appleby therefore discussed the need to find "one's proper level" of input both in general and in specific administrative functions.[101] Even more provocative were his assertions that social complexity was the reflection of individual complexity:

> "The very citizen who expects national government to be simple is himself a physical, psychological, political complexity. His life is a sort of working agreement between his various aspects. He has contradictory opinions and emotions...[g]iven some change in circumstance, some mild sentiment may become a passion or vice versa. Nor will he always know what change in circumstance affected him."[102]

In sum, Appleby took the same stance towards strong ideological beliefs taken by Herring: demands for coherence were unrealistic. Indeed, the confusion one found in American politics was something that citizens should celebrate rather than critique.

The man introducing Appleby to *Social Action* was less sure of the system's coherence, and certain that calls for coherence through party unity were dangerous. Ralph Flanders served as chairman of the Committee for Economic Development, and he had hired Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan as research directors. He also had worked as Chairman of the Federal Reserve, and strongly supported the Taft-Hartley Act during his U.S. Senate tenure. From this perspective, he called Appleby's picture "realistic." "In truth the processes of democracy are disorderly and it is a wonder that they work at all." Fearful of strong ideological commitments that would generate pre-war polarized politics, Flanders stated that:

> "It has been the ideal of some theorists to change the American legislative plan from our two parties which are in a position to steal each other's clothes into a new subdivision which would be based on fundamental differences of belief in fundamental principles. Such a change, in my judgement, would be disastrous. If parties are divided on matters of principle they will later subdivide on matters of principle. In turn they will sub-subdivide. That is the route by which we finally arrive at the unworkable European bloc system. If we are to remain effectively democratic we had best stay as we are."[103]

Publishing other articles alongside the discussions by Flanders, Appleby and Schattschneider, *Social Action* also presented a series of views by selected labor proponents. Again, the views ranged widely.

Writing during the 1947 debates over the Taft-Hartley Act, Marshal Scott entered into a three way debate between Walter Reuther and National Association for Manufacturers representative Leo Teplow on "Alternatives to Strikes." Though taking an apparently conciliatory stance towards unions, Teplow was consistent with hardline NAM policy, painting closed shops as a denial of the "right to work" and industry-wide unions as an excessive concentration of power. More important from the standpoint of labor and democratic theory, however, was his restatement of the 1930s doctrine of a "great... area of mutual interest" between labor and management and his view that an "enlightened attitude" on the part of union leaders should include "greater concern about the welfare of

all the people rather than organized groups alone." The statement implied that businesses were not organized groups, but that unions were.[104]

Conversely, both Reuther and Scott asserted the need for a more substantive conception of the problem. Reuther continued his early 1940s call for the creation of industrial councils that would generate both "economic democracy" and a co-managed workplace. Scott, however, created more of a historical perspective for the problem. Scott traced the history of U.S. work from independent artisanship to wage labor. He began with the claim that nineteenth century artisanship had generated standards of integrity that were transferred to the artisans' local communities. He then contended that because the goals of twentieth century factory labor shifted to the virtues of speed, standardization, autonomous management and stockholder control, the moral aspects of work had been inappropriately left behind. Indeed, communities now unfortunately assumed that business decisions were not open to public scrutiny:

> "Industry has become largely amoral. The management is hired to execute the policies of the board of directors; the board of directors is responsible to the stockholders... It is practically impossible to pin moral responsibility on impersonal corporations. And the men who work, as individuals, tend to accept this amoral scheme... believe themselves helpless in *the system.*"[105]

The central point was that in the interconnected modern economy, morality in the workplace was an intrinsically public matter and should include the church. As the following lengthy quote indicates, the church was not to be involved as simply another element of a complex system, but to help create democratic determination in the workplace. In that sense, the point was opposite Appleby's: the complexity of post-war society was a problem requiring workplace control:

> "The problem of Christian conscience in today's culture is to preserve the free individual personality in situations so complex that practically everything he does touches the lives of other people. In industrial relations this means that a system of democracy must be found, just as America fought for a system of political democracy a century and a half ago. Such a concept challenges the rule of

> absolute autocracy in industry, just as it challenged the rule of absolute monarchy in government... Basically the labor union movement in this country is comparable to our representative, legislative structure. Since the Church desires to hold men morally responsible it will have to uphold some such system which provides freedom of choice and self-determination. The men who work, through elected representatives, must have a voice equal with management in the rules by which they work."[106]

In a series of issues completely devoted to labor, other *Social Action* editors and writers also called for a more structured, substantive conception of democracy. Throughout his 1947 article, Scott stated that the Church "*will never convert all men until we convert all of a man.* This is the climate to be created."[107] The Congregational Church's executive committee was evidently anxious to show that they were going to back their words with actions. In the same issue they announced the need for fair treatment of pastors, including an acceptable minimum wage level and an accounting of how many churches fell below that level.[108] Similarly, the magazine published its own call for the reconciliation of "our industrial economy with our democratic tradition" including union members' "education and experience for effective participation in decisions."[109] In contrast to Schattschneider's definition of interest, another 1947 issue attempted to assess the particular elements of discord between farm and labor groups, identifying the rise of wage labor in agriculture as the basis for reconciliation of the traditional American labor-farmer conflict.[110]

The articles on labor continued in 1950 when writer Francis McPeek devoted an issue attempting to reconcile claims of the need for material prosperity, reduced inflation, profit, and international security with union autonomy and wage demands. His conclusion was neither pro-labor nor pro-business: if voluntary controls over wages and profits failed, government should step in and regulate both.[111] Business was criticized for generating "trends toward economic concentration of power [which are] alarming". The result of this concentration was that corporations were forcibly "administering" their prices so that profits were 13% higher than businesses which competed. Pointing to all actors, however, he stated that "the relatively wide sharing of material comforts in our country is proof enough that while amplitude is a positive good, it is no final answer."[112]

Throughout the article McPeek was trying to get the union-management debate shifted onto a deeper conception of morality. He noted that "[t]he governing idea behind "trusteeship" [in management] is that work should be a humble and grateful offering to the honor of God... No such [conception] is possible until daily work is imbued with religious significance." Speaking more generally, he continued that:

> "the battle in which we are engaged is not so much between one system of economic and another, as between a crude materialistic and a spiritual conception of man's work and being. If we cannot change the conditions of our employment and the nature of on-the-job relationships to the point where they minister to human dignity and afford a sense of vocation, then we have already lost."[113]

In short, he repeated the hopes for a workplace tangibly connected to the broader social fabric expressed by late 1930s and 1940s reformers

In this arena — one including reformers, political scientists, labor and the NAM — the contested definition of democratic participation continued to be evident. In all cases the subject of labor continually emerged. Schattschneider's experience with the failure of vocational representation generated distrust of the very "pressure system" that reformers sought to eliminate. Appleby's exhortation to celebrate the confusion of the system restated the case made by Herring: the search for coherence was brought about by unrealistic idealism. Appleby, indeed, went on to claim that citizens should abandon their romantic views of direct democracy and rugged individualism. The critique of weakness embodied in the figure "Caspar Milquetoast" was to be replaced with the idea that democracy was in the "barber shops and [the] beauty parlors." Contra Harris, ministers in the Congregational Church saw in this truncation of the workplace an arena in which they could not minister to "the whole man." NAM's Leo Teplow insisted "the system" was adequate in its provision of material comfort. The ministers pointed out that this was "no final answer."

C. Modernity and Working Class Participation: The Concluding Comments of Peter Bachrach and Avery Leiserson

In 1951, William Leiserson's son, Avery wrote a short history of the CIO in the *Annals*. In his belief that late New Deal and wartime industrial unionism had followed past unions in their rejection of political goals, his perspective was remarkably similar to the works discussed above. Moreover, its summary character suggests that he and others were willing to consider CIO radicalism a closed matter. Ironically, the doctoral dissertation of Peter Bachrach (published in the same year) argued that it was precisely labor's turn to politics which had generated CIO conservatism in the late 1930s. The two works help summarize the conflicting perspectives of the collectivists and the democratic capitalists.

A member of both the late 1940s SSRC Committee on Political Behavior and the APSA Committee on Labor-Management Relations, Avery Leiserson identified two distinct stages in recent labor history: 1) state resistance to unionization and bargaining, and 2) its more recent attempts to unionize in order to regulate labor. The concern with historical stages, however, was secondary to a deeper question: Why, in the presence of enormous unionization throughout the decade, had no labor party or class consciousness formed? The answer lay in labor's supposed historical tendencies.

Just as William Leiserson had argued, Avery Leiserson contended that union goals had been differing forms of business unionism. If unions had been "led" down yet another political trail, he contended, it would "consist of superimposing upon the trade union value system a political party superstructure, which would supersede historic political identifications of wage and salary workers." Leiserson defended this stance by noting that because labor was acting like a pressure group, the existing party system was better able to incorporate its desires. Remarkably, the article's main goal was apparently to eliminate any confusion on that point. As Leiserson presented it, the sources of confusion concerned the perceptions of the nature of unions, and their "true" internal structure.

With respect to public perception of unions, Leiserson claimed that popular myth saw labor as a social class, and one which could generate profound public good. Moreover, this was linked to popular misunderstanding as to the "true" character of modern societies. Debunking this myth, Leiserson claimed that "[i]n terms of emotional appeal, the class symbol has several ideological advantages over the [idea of] group organization... [but] it is rare indeed in modern industrial societies that a social class possesses a representative organization duly authorized to express its interests." As with William Leiserson, Avery asserted that idealistic views of labor failed to agree with "the facts." As with Nourse, Harris and Hansen, however, Leiserson was willing to claim that unions filled the needed role of "balancing and equilibrating, if not decentralizing, force against the power of both organized business and government." In any event, labor fit well with the kind of "modern democracy" Leiserson envisioned. Conversely, those who tried to "dramatize [labor] in terms of imputed ideal purposes and an "irresistible historical mission" failed to understand the "true" character of modern democracies.[114]

Leiserson's history was skeletal, but it pulled together a number of critical themes, including the naivete of labor idealism, the materialist basis for unionization, the conclusion that labor was represented within the two party system, and the more provocative conclusion that the limiting of labor participation in the polity was simply a "modern" phenomenon. What is most significant, however, is that Leiserson felt compelled to present the issue as a *settled* issue. It may have squared with the facts as he saw them in 1950, but the prolonged discussions of reform and labor activism highlight the presence of a far more problematic history. Leiserson's organizational placement in the University of Chicago, APSA Committee on Labor Relations, SSRC Committee on Political Behavior, and his familial linkage to the NLRB suggest the issues were not altogether settled. Indeed, Leiserson had plans to write a text entitled "The Politics of Labor" to mirror Herring's "Politics of Democracy."

Bachrach wrote a very different history. Though the work was primarily concerned with the feasibility of an immutable "right to work" within a capitalist society, the empirical portion of the argument included discussion of the systemic constraints on labor groups during the late New Deal. Specifically, Bachrach contended that in the late 1930s that the CIO had to ameliorate its radical budget proposals in order to insure Roosevelt's political viability. With the security of their unions linked to the Roosevelt administration, they could not realistically call for spending or centralized planning measures that would threaten capitalists. Hence, the beginnings of their conservatism.[115] Bachrach also thought the new capitalist arrangements would be unable to achieve any loftier goals. By reducing the importance of the workplace in its deeper dimensions, "the right to work provision of the bill could mean nothing more than the right to relatively useless work." More to the point, he claimed that "as long as the liberal uses an economic system as a standard, either explicitly or implicitly, for judging issues of public policy he will be unable to see or to champion a genuine right to work."[116] It was a point that repeated the claims made by Lerner, Lynd, and Fuller in the *New Republic* as well as writers in *Social Action*: there had to be a definition of democracy separate from the business focus on sterile economic terms.

More to the point, Bachrach contended that Keynesian economists were deluded in thinking that true full employment could be achieved without a more basic challenge to capitalist autonomy. Extensively quoting Alvin Hansen, Seymour Harris, and others, he questioned their belief that (as Nourse claimed and Soule hoped) the force of facts would compel voluntarist action to keep profits fair, wages high, and economic output constant. The problem was that for any given economic downturn, groups would and could make perfectly reasonable claims for actions which benefitted their interests over others, all in the name of long-term stability. Nonetheless, claims of harmony persisted. Henry Wallace, who assumed editorship of the New Republic in 1947, thought that full employment was possible "provided that pressure groups cooperate for the common good... a realistic and not wishful 'if.'"[117] Bachrach conversely claimed that only in the

presence of significant co-management of industry would labor be able to abandon its quite rational defense of its narrow, sectional interest -- a point Soule had made in the late 1930s.[118]

In the end, Bachrach's and Leiserson's characterization of labor groups looked similar: both claimed that labor groups tended to defend their narrow interest, and both thought labor was represented within the existing party structure. But while Leiserson was willing to portray this selfishness as a natural aspect of a "modern democracy," Bachrach saw a more complex and problematic history of labor development which, for all practical purposes, looked like Leiserson's warring "negative state." Counter to the liberal economists, he maintained that the Keynesians' ideas were "fallaciously founded upon the nineteenth century concept of the harmony of interest."[119]

Avery Leiserson was clearly willing to argue that government fulfilled its democratic obligations. Planners existed as strong challengers to the capitalist order. Such, at least, was indicated in Leiserson's 1949 Report from the APSA Committee on Labor Relations. Outlining the background for future research perspectives, the report discussed the need to model the increased role of government, and focused on the role of the Council of Economic Advisors (created by the Employment Act of 1946, headed by economist Edwin Nourse and political scientist Bertram Gross). The report noted that "...government today has become, among other things, a force seeking to assure that intelligence and rational considerations are not entirely overlooked in the persuasive process [of governance]." Bachrach, conversely, claimed that "the legislative history of [the Full Employment Act] illustrates the hopeless confusion between... the system as a means and human values as ends." The APSA report suggested that consideration of the role of labor participation was subsumed by equitable division of social goods. It stated that "[i]n establishing the Council of Economic Advisors, Congress was in a real sense setting up a political pressure upon itself... designed to give Congress more basic values than those of the organized interests..."[120] What Avery Leiserson saw in the CEA was the

"administrative regulation" he had discussed extensively in 1942. Bachrach noted that the new relations were purely voluntary, and would not produce true democratic planning.

C. Conclusion

The most prominent aspect of the reformers' dream was the creation of a participatory or "affirmative" sense of governance. Whether or not that dream was enabled by the OPA, co-management councils, participation in war production decisions, or the creation of employment policy, the measure was to be the meaningful and just inclusion of labor groups within the polity. Though not necessarily at the center of all debates or policy proposals, the idea that "[n]ational unity without labor as the binding agent is not conceivable"[121] is a statement that encompasses the meaning of reform. "Full Employment," for example, was to satisfy the goal of just and meaningful inclusion.

Lynd cautioned that the *character* of "full employment" was going to be defined by capitalists. Lynd warned of the capitalist "management of relevant social and cultural life." Similarly, Bachrach claimed that the post-war structure of the economy merely gave the "right to meaningless work." *Social Action* writers, similarly, saw management as an "amoral scheme." Political economists and political scientists alike appeared to be making the very accusations Lynd claimed they would. Political economists were claiming that labor unions were producing a "laborist" economy, and using the strike as "a punitive measure." If labor refused to be mobile, it kept alive "chronically sick industries." While reformers had no tolerance for the confusion of "the pressure system," Appleby lauded it. Politics was, after all, no more complex and confused than each of its citizens "physical, psychological and political complexit[ies]." Each citizen should expect no more than "one hundred forty five millionth" of the system's attention. The very term "labor market" was encircled in quotations by Lerner, suggesting its alien character to him. Schattschneider was one of the few political scientists who, in his discussion of the "invisible governmental crisis" hoped to bring an end to the chaos of the "pressure state."

That goal proved to be a critical dividing point between the SSRC theorists and those seeking alternate roles for the profession of political science.

1. Brinkley, *The End of Reform* op. cit., Pp. 227-264.

2. Lerner, Max 1940. "Party Government in Crisis" *The Nation* September 21., p. 251.

3. ibid., p. 252.

4. Lerner, Max 1940. "The Broker State" *The New Republic* April 8., p. 477.

5. ibid., p. 478.

6. Lerner, Max 1942. "Toward an Affirmative State" *The New Republic* June 8, p. 794.

7. ibid., Pp. 794 and 795.

8. Lynd, Robert S. 1942. "The Structure of Power" *The New Republic* November 9, Pp. 597.

9. ibid., p. 598.

10. ibid., p. 598.

11. Lerner, Max 1938. "Democracy with a Union Card" *Virginia Quarterly Review*, Vol. 14., p. 209.

12. Chamberlain, John 1940. "How Democracy Turns Over" *The New Republic* May 20., p. 676.

13. Herring, Pendleton 1940. "Two Party Government" *The New Republic* October 26., p. 403.

14. Lerner, Max 1942. "Toward and Affirmative State" *The New Republic* June 8, p. 794.

15. Lerner, Max 1942. "Economic Strategies in a Democracy" *The New Republic* June 22., p. 856.

16. *The Nation* 1939. "Blunderbuss" *The Nation* Dec. 2.

17. *The New Republic* 1940. "Labor Must Clean House" Feb. 5, Pp. 168-9.

18. Brinkley, Alan *The End of Reform* op. cit., Pp. 201-226.

19. *The New Republic* 1942. "Unions Come of Age" Aug. 10, p. 161. For general discussion, see Lichtenstein, Nelson 1993. "Great expectations: the promise of industrial jurisprudence and its demise, 1930-1960" in *Industrial Democracy in America: The Ambiguous Legacy* edited by Nelson Lichtenstein and Howell Harris (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press) Pp. 113-141.

20. ibid., p. 161.

21. Flynn, John T. 1940. "What Happened to the Boom?" *The New Republic* Feb. 10, p. 71.

22. *New Republic* 1937."Labor Laws - British and American" April 14, p. 280.

23. Cowley, Malcolm 1938. "Tract for Our Times" *The New Republic* Nov. 30, p. 7.

24. *New Republic* 1938. "The NLRB is Not Guilty" Oct. 5.

25. *The New Republic* 1942. "Monopoly in the News" Nov. 9, p. 596.

26. Lorch, Lee 1938. "The CIO and Unemployment" *The New Republic* Aug. 3, Pp. 357-8.

27. Graham, Frank Porter 1942. "Union Rights in Wartime" *The New Republic* June 29, p. 887.

28. Sancton, Thomas 1942. "Chaos in Production" *The New Republic* Aug. 31 Pp. 254.

29. Afros, John 1945. "Labor Participation in the Office of Price Administration" *American Political Science Review* Vol. 40 No. 2, p. 484 and throughout.

30. Mezerik, A. G. 1943. "The OPA Crack-Up" *The New Republic* June 28, p. 850.

31. Loeb, James Jr. 1943. "The Rising Tide of Progressivism: Organized Labor on the Political Front" *The New Republic* Aug. 9, p. 185.

32. *The New Republic* 1943. "Labor Goes into Action" Aug. 2, p. 170.; *The New Republic* 1943. "A Program for Political Action" Aug. 2, p. 172.

33. Lahey, Edwin 1942. " Philip Murray: Organization Man" *The New Republic* Jan. 12, p. 43.

34. Fuller, Helen "Labor's Case for Higher Wages" *The New Republic* Nov. 15, 1943 pp. 677-8.

35. Lahey, Edwin 1943. "What's Ahead for American Labor?" *The New Republic* July 26, Pp. 106-8.

36. Grammatical error in original text.

37. Williams, A. Wyn. 1942. "Production in a Total War" *The New Republic* June 29, Pp. 887-889.

38. The quotation marks are in the original, suggesting that Lerner disliked the term.

39. Lerner, Max 1942. "Manpower and the Unions" *The New Republic* Sep. 28, Pp. 365-7.

40. Lynd, Robert S. 1942. "The Structure of Power" *The New Republic* Nov. 9, p. 600.

41. Soule, George 1942. "Full Employment After the War" *The New Republic* Aug. 10, Pp. 167-9.

42. Soule, George 1943. "Planning Wins: But What Planning, and Whose?" *The New Republic* March 8, Pp. 309-11.

43. ibid., pp. 310-11.

44. Soule, George, 1943. "What to Do About Labor" *The New Republic* July 5, p. 15.

45. ibid., pp. 15-16.

46. Soule, George 1946. "Are Unions Too Strong?" *The New Republic* June 17, Pp. 881-4.

47. Afros "Labor Participation in the Office of Price Administration" op. cit., Pp. 479-484.

48. Harris, Seymour 1945. "The Attack on Price Control" *The New Republic* July 2, p. 13.

49. Harris, Seymour 1947. "Charting Our Economy" *Social Action* Vol. 13, No. 8. Oct. 15, p. 21.

50. Arnold, Thurman and Walton Hamilton 1946. "Thoughts on Labor Day" *The New Republic* Sept. 2, Pp. 252.; *The New Republic* 1946. "More Thoughts on Labor" Sept. 2, p. 247.

51. Hansen, Alvin 1945. "The New Crusade Against Planning" *The New Republic* Jan. 1, p. 10.

52. ibid., Pp. 10-11.

53. *The New Republic* 1945. "Poor Mr. Hayek" April 23, p. 543.; They maintained this stance in *The New Republic* 1945. "In Justice to Mr. Hayek" May 21, p. 695.

54. Brinkley, *The End of Reform* op. cit., Pp. 233-235.

55. ibid., Pp. 11-12.

56. Lerner was more direct in his critique of "interest moderation" and administrative coordination. Lerner distinguished between non-planning and planning as a parallel between the negative outlook of laissez-faire governance, and a collectivist embrace of positive values to be realized in new institutions. Democratic capitalists like Thurman Arnold, Mordecai Ezekiel and Gardner Means, he contended, were using weapons of "steel and putty" by using wage and price guidelines to control corporations. What was created was the illusion of democratic control that could achieve true full employment. "Because they have been unwilling to face the need for government planning and changed ownership relations, they have moved not toward full employment and the maximizing of national income, but toward the stabilizing of prices and wages under a contracting economy." Lerner, Max 1942. "Economic Strategies in a Democracy" *The New Republic* June 22, p. 857.

57. Hansen, Alvin 1945. "Beveridge on Full Employment" *The New Republic* Feb. 19, p. 250.

58. 250.

59. Hansen, "Beveridge" op. cit. p. 253.

60. ibid., p. 253.

61. See, for example, Fuller, Helen "Look Who's Planning!" op. cit., Pp. 104-6. Fuller's identification of the rise of planning in the CED was identical to Soule's: the CED represented an interest based response to what was to be seen as fully democratic in orientation. "The Committee for Economic Development, by it's own statement, is a business men's organization 'to promote and aid planning for high-level employment...'... a coalition of the National Association of Manufacturers, the United States Chamber of Commerce and independent big and little businessmen..."

62. *The New Republic* 1945. "Time for Action!" Sept. 17, Pp. 490.; See also, Seligman, Ben A. 1945. "Propaganda by the NAM: Economic Philosophy of the Big Boys" *The New Republic* Sept. 10, Pp. 309-312. Discussing the views of labor in the NAM's *Economic Record* Seligman wrote that "The *Economic Record's* attitude on labor questions truly exposes its atavistic economic philosophy. Henry Simons, to whom 'natural rights' are holier than human rights, cannot 'conceive of any tolerable or enduring order in which there exists widespread organization of labor.' Only unscientific sentimentalists, he says, will visualize the problem in terms of workers who earn little and entrepreneur who earn much...And labor monopolies are so much more dangerous to the body politic than industrial monopolies; they continually force wages above their natural level... with ominous threats and bitter attacks on collective bargaining and social

security... collective bargaining... crushes economic freedom. It is nothing less than a demoniac scheme to benefit labor union members at the expense of others." ibid., p. 311.

63. Lynd, Robert S. 1946. "Capitalism's Happy New Year" *Nation* Vol. 163., Dec. 28, p. 748.

64. ibid., p. 750.

65. Wolman, Leo 1937. "Issues in American Industrial Relations" *Political Science Quarterly* Vol. 52 No. 2, p. 164.

66. Wolman, "Issues in American industrial relations" op. cit., p. 167.

67. ibid., p. 168.

68. See discussion of Lloyd Garrison, Chapter 1.

69. Wolman, ibid., p. 171.

70. ibid., p. 254.

71. ibid., p. 254.

72. Wolman, Leo 1940. "The Turning Point in American Labor Policy" *Political Science Quarterly* Vol. 60 No. 2., p. 175.

73. Leiserson, William "Growing Pains of the American Labor Movement" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* Vol. 224, p. 4.

74. Leiserson, "Growing Pains of the American Labor Movement" op. cit., p. 5

75. Tomlins, Christopher *The State and the Unions* op. cit., Pp. 224-230.

76. Brinkley, *The End of Reform* op. cit., p. 218 and Pp. 201-226 generally.

77. Fainsod, Merle 1947. "Government and Business in a Mixed Economy" in Harris *Saving American Capitalism* op. cit., Pp. 175-6.

78. ibid., p. 177.

79. ibid., pp. 178-180. Lasswell and Kaplan may not have been at the CED until later.

80. Slichter, Sumner H., 1948. *The American Economy* (New York: Knopf). Pp. 37-8.

81. Lindblom, Charles E. 1948. "The Union as Monopoly" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* Vol. 62., Pp. 677-9.

82. ibid., p. 684-6.

83. ibid., p. 691.

84. ibid.

85. The APSA contacted a number of Newspapers and citizens groups during its October, 1950 release of the document. This produced articles such as "Political Study Hits Denial of District Vote: *The Evening Star* "Science Association Finds Valid Reason for Lacking in System" (Washington D.C.) Oct. 14.; Blackburn, Harriet B. 1950. "Intelligent Partisanship Called Need of the Hour" *Christian Science Monitor* Oct. 17.; *New York Times* 1950. "Reform is Urged in 2 Major Parties" Oct. 14.; Cater, Douglass., "U.S. Democracy - Theory and Practice: Campaign Tactics, Apathy of Voters Cause Concern" *Journal and Sentinel* (Winston Salem: North Carolina) November 5, 1950.

86. May, *From New Deal to New Economics* op. cit., p. 123.

87. Marx, Fritz Morstein 1945. "The Bureau of the Budget: Its Evolution and Present Role" *American Political Science Review* Vol. 39 No. 3, Pp. 653-684 and Pp. 869-898.; Appleby, Paul H. 1948. "The Influence of the Political Order" in "Formulating the Federal Government's Economic Program: A Symposium" *American Political Science Review* Vol. 42 No. 2, Pp. 272-283.;

88. Nourse, Edwin G. and Gross, Bertram M. 1948. "The Role of the Council of Economic Advisers" *American Political Science Review* Vol. 39 No. 2, Pp. 283-295.

89. E. E. Schattschneider 1935. *Politics, Pressures, and the Tarrif: A Study of Free Private Enterprise in Pressure Politics, as Shown in the 1929-1930 Revision of the Tariff* (New York: Prentice Hall).; Schattschneider, E. E. 1942. *Party Government* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart).; Bailey, Stephen Kemp 1950. *Congress Makes a Law: The Story Behind the Employment Act of 1946* (Westport CT: Greenwood Press).; Gross, Bertram M. 1953. *The Legislative Struggle: A Study in Social Combat* (New York: McGraw Hill).

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91. Schattschneider, E. E. 1950. "Our Unrecognized Governmental Crisis" *Social Action* Vol. 16 No. 8, p. 4.

92. Schattschneider, *Politics, Pressures and the Tariff* op. cit., p. 291.

93. Schaatschneider, *Party Government* op. cit., and ibid., 1948. "Pressure Groups Versus Political Parties" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* Vol. 259, Pp. 17-18.

94. ibid., p. 6.

95. Schattschneider, "Our Unrecognized Governmental Crisis" op. cit., p. 8.

96. Appleby, Paul H. 1948. "Who Governs America?" *Social Action* Vol. 14 No. 9, p. 4.

97. ibid., Pp. 5-6.

98. ibid., p. 8.

99. ibid., Pp. 8 and 10.

100. Appleby, Paul H. 1949. *Big Democracy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf) p. 119 and Pp. 118-127 generally.

101. ibid., Pp. 65-77.

102. ibid., p. 135 and Pp. 128-134.

103. Flanders, Ralph E. 1948. "A Keen and Realistic Analysis" *Social Action* Vol. 14 No. 9, p. 3.

104. Teplow, Leo "Alternatives to Strikes: A Management Viewpoint" *Social Action* Vol. 13 no. 4., April, 1947., pp. 20-1. For a discussion of NAM policy see Harris, *The Right to Manage* op. cit.

105. Scott, Marshall 1947. "The Worker and the Church" *Social Action* Vol. 8 No. 4, p. 27.

106. ibid., p. 28.

107. ibid., p. 27.

108. ibid., p. 26.

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111. McPeek, Francis W. 1950. "Industrial Relations and Christian Ethics" *Social Action* Vol. 16 No. 7, p. 26.

112. ibid., p. 27.

113. ibid., Pp. 26 and 31.

114. Leiserson, Avery 1951. "Organized Labor as a Pressure Group" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* Vol. 274, Pp. 110-112.

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117. ibid., p. 207.

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Chapter 5

To Labor in Political Science: Wartime and Post-War Debates

The grip of business and of conservative research foundations all but strangles independent critical thought in the social sciences in the United States. The British Labor Party has evolved from fifty years of organization, public discussion, and research on the left. In this country we have no such continuous tradition of Socialist dissent and inquiry as a basis for left programs. Brooking Institutions and Rockefeller Foundations do not do Fabian Society thinking. Our intellectuals generally are afraid to be thought 'radical.'...But no one in touch with American university graduate students can be unaware of the restless demand in this younger generation of social scientists for a chance to think without a bit in their teeth. It is labor and this younger intellectual group that must build a democratic program for America.

Robert S. Lynd
1946

People are not born social scientists any more than they are born classical scholars or mathematicians. Good social scientists are the product of careful selection and rigorous training, as are good chemists.

Pendleton Herring
1948

As they approached the end of the 1940s, at least three groups of political scientists discussed the need for knew forms of knowledge. The SSRC group (Pendleton Herring and those close to him) worked together in the SSRC Public Administration Committee, the SSRC Committee on Wartime Records and the U.S. Office of War Information. Their theoretical assertions continued to emphasize the realist view of a society made up of infinitely splintered interests whose coordination was best achieved by an elite cadre who "adjusted" policy demands. Administered pluralism required, therefore, an intellectual framework stressing the importance of detailed information and conceptions of groups as

interests. This, then, informed the post-war conception of *behavioral* theories and *behavioral* data -- all that could be known were the observable actions of self interested groups. The second group, the APSA Committee on Congress and the APSA Committee on Political Parties was far more reform oriented. Suggestively, their average age was 10 years greater than their behavioral counterparts, and they were more institutionally diverse, with ties to Harvard, Columbia, the University of Wisconsin and the University of Illinois. This group has been categorized by its search for progressive *institutional* reforms: new institutions that could realize the progressive goals of positive governance through the mobilization of resources and the reform of the political parties. The third category contains those scholars who saw the need for increased focus on research and reform, but stressed the need for the maintenance of the discipline's core obligation to civic education, critique of governance, and philosophic reflection.

A. Political Science as the Rejection of Reform Politics

In Soule's review of a Brookings Institute study recommending the revitalizing education of businessmen, he contended that this transformation of the business class proceeded from a baffling refusal to consider the feasibility of their ideas. The study itself mirrored Thurman Arnold's call for moderate but constant profits, but without Arnold's focus on implementation. "The study indicated that we can have full employment, a rising standard of living and immunity from economic relapse if business will devote gains in productivity to lower prices and higher real wages rather than to larger profit margins... [but t]he book throws little light on the more fundamental questions which concern why all these things are not likely to happen."[1] More to the point, the authors seemed to be limited by their very social location.

> "It is almost as if... a few sensible men sitting around a table had decided what ought to be done to make things work well, business and government, [and] thus enlightened, could quite simply go ahead and do it. In this sense, the Institution seems at times to be living in a dream world, ignoring the fact that a turbulent and disordered social complex needs something more than good advice."[2]

A similar point was made by Lynd, who was defending his *Knowledge for What* from critique. He referred to "[t]he aloof objectivity of the university campus" as well as "the very serious restriction of remoteness from the lives of men... to quote Max Lerner's title, 'it is later than you think.'"[3] Lynd's most important points were that the institutional reforms being made by social scientists misunderstood the depth of the social crises, and would not be of relevance to the "true" immediate world of American citizens. "If our economy is stalemated by the cultural institutions of laissez-faire individualism, does social science know how to contrive other institutions... and set 10 million idle, frustrated men to work?" He stated that institutions were being described as "self-supporting entities floating like Mohammed's coffin between earth and sky." Most importantly, he took exception to the accusation that he was stifling intellectual freedoms by recommending a focused research program. "Far from denying free play to intellectual curiosity, I want social scientists to be more dangerously curious about some of the things that, as I point out in the book, they find it convenient not to be curious about."[4]

True to form, Lynd held that university faculty were being subjected to the very pressures he sought to reform. "We academic folk live in a world of pressure groups and, unless I misread the signs, of tightening constraints upon intellectual freedom. In such a world, we must not abuse the fine phrase, 'pure intellectual curiosity' as a cloak for expediency." The critique could have been directed at any number of sects within the academy but Lynd addressed the call for "systematic theory." Lynd contended that recent calls for pure forms of knowledge cloaked a withdrawal from politics. "This assignment of priority to system-building... provides a perfect 'out' for the scientist who wants to talk about science rather than do it; for as long as any concept remains capable of further logical... classification, it is possible to postpone the evil day of putting one's theories to work."[5] The precise relation between the "pressure groups" and the "cloak" was not made within the article, but Lynd's later observations suggested a connection between "liberal democracy" and a similar discussion of political action. In that order the "relentless warping of men's lives and forms of association become less and less the result of

voluntary decisions by 'bad' or 'good' men and more and more an impersonal web of coercions dictated by the need to keep 'the system' running." It was a point similar to Lewis Lorwin's: just as strikes would be decreasingly popular in an increasing national system, Lynd seemed to be saying that academic activism would be "expediently" avoided.[6]

The tension between academic activism and a newer, pure science had already begun to be addressed by Pendleton Herring in his 1941 *Politics of Democracy.* Social scientists could engage in "utopian" speculation, but they would no longer be objective scientists. Indeed, these activists threatened disruption of a political order in seemingly delicate balance.

> "Too much of our present day confusion arises from the discovery that the world is not acting in accordance with the mental pictures we have as to what should be. The task of the social scientists is to note these differences and to alter his theories so as more accurately to analyze human behavior. When the social scientist turns from analysis to proposals for action he becomes a statesman or a propagandist."[7]

Herring identified utopian speculation as a job hazard for political scientists. "I am tempted to believe that the man of letters is often more impressed with the need for absolutes than the man of affairs... Hope for what might be is not, however, the attitude most appropriate for a critical scrutiny of what is."[8] Based on both his historical and ethical assertions, Herring outlined the characteristics of scientific theories and the characteristics of propagandistic ones. Political scientists were to avoid idealism and universalistic theories in the same way that interest-groups were to avoid utopian politics -- interest group demands and academic theories of social adjustment should *both* exhibit moderation. Indeed, it was in that moderation that Herring suggested that different theories be evaluated for the insights they offer.

> "If... data are selected, arranged and judged in relation to one set of previously fixed canons, inquiry is hobbled. Different pictures of reality may be procured by ranging the data of experience in accordance with a number of different codes of ethics or standards of value."

It was problematic, of course, that he had already favored a "canon" of moderation. This, however, became the center of his thesis: idealistic and utopian theories were not theories at all - but were symptoms of deeper problems within the social order.

> "Both the panaceas of the reformers and the principles of the conservatives are symbolic. They represent a transfer of attention from the booming, buzzing confusion of reality to the solace of the simple and familiar. They do not, however, advance us... toward adjustment of the underlying social difficulties that were the occasion of this search for facile solutions... It is when men of intelligence and ideals fail in answering social demands that the demagogue finds his chance.[9]

In short, Herring tried to assemble a seamless argument. On the one hand, he could defend his stance as more objective than utopians who merely "supported the urban worker." He could also, however, claim that the only values he was going to bring to his science were ones that were cautiously and critically adopted. By failing to acknowledge that his own view of science and American history began with "adjustment" as a core value, he could claim that he was open to examination of differing values. "In any attempt to explain causal relations we cannot proceed without positing certain values as of more basic significance than others. Causation can be explained only by selecting certain factors as more meaningful than others."[10] To some extent, Herring discussed the problematic nature of his claim to objectivity. His strategy, however, was to say that his deeper subjectivity was really a rejection of the rigidity in others. Implying that utopians disliked the freedom to question he stated that "...[this] objectivity is [based on] a subjective social ideal. It is the belief that questioning and testing are a good thing, and hence that the political beliefs justifying such freedom for inquiry are worthy of continuance."[11]

B: Work, Status and Reform in the Practice of Political Science: 1942-1951

Whatever else may be said about the evolution of the discipline during and after the war, the documents of the period continually reveal a tension between the practice of political science as a diverse and indeterminate discipline, and the practice of political science as

hierarchically structured profession which delivered a vital service to the administration of social conflict. The tension not only exists in explicit discussions about the institutional design of the profession, but also in discussions about discrete topics. Herring's claims about the appropriate structure of the polity became assertions about the appropriate structure of the profession. There were, however, voices raised in objection.

The terms "status,""work," and "reform" highlight the central concerns of three groups of political scientists calling for the discipline's reform in the late 1940s. The need to embrace middle class status over class was, of course, the solution that Holcombe and Lasswell had identified as critical to the avoidance of class warfare in the late 1930s. Others, however, hoped to keep the profession decentralized and accepting of a catholic definition of what would constitute professional action. These political scientists discussed the importance of teachning centereded around civic education, and the vital contribution that could be made by individual research work. However, a reform impulse was also born in the image of the organized labor movement: in the massive APSA attempt to create a "responsible two-party system" just after World War II.

This section examines these three responses by examining Herring's call for hierarchical disciplinary reform. This reform was, of course, designed to address the "rising demands" of interests groups seeking government recognition. The analysis of Herring and those close to him is divided into sections on theory and practice: first examining his arguments for establishing research hierarchies, then looking at the final goals the hierarchy was to enable. The third section examines responses to Herring by examining calls for maintenance of a diverse, decentralized, and essentially co-managed practice of political science. The fourth section examines the political practice of party reform as undertaken by the APSA Committee on Political Parties. It is stressed throughout that these are the discipline's responses to a common stimulus: the increased presence of government in employment and income maintenance policy.

1. Theory: Pendleton Herring and the Case for Hierarchy in Science

The connection between Herring's pre-war work and Herring's post-war prescription for science appears quite strong. Public records of his beliefs during his active wartime years are sketchy, but it seems he extended the idea of interest moderation to the practice of government administration, and in 1945 he identified it as a paradigm for general political science training, calling for an orientation of the profession to enhance generation of consensus among increasingly politicized groups. This marked one of the decade's earlier calls for the rejection of historical and philosophical approaches to political analysis.[12]

Reflecting his desire for informed politicians to generate consensus on policy proposals, Herring wrote in the 1942 *Saturday Review* that the public should look to the U.S. Government's Office of Facts and Figures for clarification of policy choices. Replacing the existing "public phlegm" about war mobilization with informed outlines of feasible policies, he stated that "[p]ublic information men have a defensible and necessary function in the modern state. Their work is highly useful in peacetime; in war it becomes essential... We cannot assume in the realm of ideas any more than we can in the realm of economics that the operation of natural laws of selection will result in everything working out for the best."[13] The assertion was seemingly critical of *laissez-faire* assumptions, but also reflected his earlier theoretical claims about the necessity for elite "clarifiers" of issues. At the same time, it lauded the role his University of Chicago colleagues were already playing in government. Along with informal connections to Herbert Simon, the Office of Facts and Figures was staffed by those such as Harold Lasswell and Gabriel Almond.[14]

The *Saturday Review* comments also may have reflected Herring's sense of his own wartime work. Assigned to track records of a number of wartime agencies, he worked on the Advisory Committee on Records of War Administration in collaboration with the Social Science Research Council and the Bureau of the Budget. The position not only put him in contact with political scientists staffing those agencies, but with more prominent

public figures such as the director of Office of Scientific Research and Development, Vannivar Bush as well as President Roosevelt.[15] By the war's end, Herring was highly supportive of the possibilities of administered policy. Writing on how to find the "Road from War to Peace" in reconversion policy, he wrote in the *American Political Science Review* that Congress should not gut agencies and presidential powers out of fear of increasing bureaucratization and centralization. Rather, he claimed the need to control the "centrifugal forces" minority groups would be applying to Congress - thus the need to control those forces by enhancing the lines of administrative responsibility to organize groups into policy coalitions.[16]

At war's end, and just two years prior to Herring's assumption of the presidency of the Social Science Research Council, he outlined a vision of this style of governance for the training of political scientists. In a research note on "Political Science in the Next Decade" he claimed the need to "burn the textbooks" and leave the "sequestered college atmosphere." Again, he pointed out that social groups which had become increasingly demanding required management. "Phases of our public life which a generation ago were properly treated as essentially economic in character have today become 'politicized.'"[17] Despite Herring's claims to "cheer the zealots on," the comment indicated his continued suspicion of the "rising demands" from "politicized" groups. Within that perspective, the discipline of political science had a well defined purpose.[18]

> "Political science has much to offer... Associational activity and the adjustment of group interests through legislative, executive, and judicial processes are both the subject-matter of political science and the substance of modern politics... To describe and analyze the problems that rest ultimately upon the phenomenon of political power is the high responsibility of students of government."[19]

Herring stated that political scientists were to study "men reacting to their institutions." In so doing, they could fruitfully "call upon disciplines such as psychology, anthropology, and sociology." He had *already* contended that individuals could find sufficient loyalties in their local worlds, but wrote as though the nature of that world was now open for fresh

examination. "We need to know much about the inner psychological wellsprings of thought and emotion and the influence of the environment upon the developing personality." Again, however, the explosion of ideas for research were held within the paradigm of adjustment between self interested parties. The new discipline was to study self interest from outside groups, and self interest *within* government as well: "The pressure of self-interest plays upon the governmental machine not simply from the outside, but also through rivalries between agencies and conflicts among officials."[20]

These were the conclusions Herring drew from his government experience in the war, and the conclusions he took with him to his presidency of the Social Science Research Council. It was immediately thereafter that he assembled the Committee on Political Behavior.[21] Herring contended that there was "nothing new in the viewpoint" he was offering. Despite the claim that this new science included nothing objectionable, the statement masked his long standing impatience with ideological "exhortations." The objectivity of Herring's "experimental attitude" masked his faith in private power and faith that "narrow interests" could be reassembled for the "commonweal."

It was in the late war volumes of the *Review* that Herring launched his increasingly strident assaults on the profession. The first came in an article with an anonymous author concerning "The Recording of World War II." As the APSR editor noted, the *Review* had never published an article anonymously, but was doing so presumably because of "policies adopted in government circles" - presumably, either national security or restrictions on political actions of employees. The editor assured the readership, however, that the article "comes first-hand from competent official authorities." In point of fact, it came from Herring, and was a discussion of the role of his Committee on Records of War Administration.[22]

The need for secrecy is both baffling and suspicious. If secrecy was needed for any reason, then it is unclear why the article had to be published at all - in 1944, it was hardly going to be a determining element in the war or in post-war prosperity. If secrecy was

necessary, it is even more baffling why Herring went to the trouble of listing his own name four times in the article, not to mention the centrality of his role as Chairman of the Committee. He further went on to list the names of 36 members of the committee (including his Chicago cohorts, V.O. Key, Earl Latham, and Avery Leiserson), and the names of over 38 specific agencies (and sometimes their locations) in the report. Indeed, the prominent exception to the use of names was the use of Roosevelt's. Roosevelt had lauded their efforts in writing, and Herring included portions of the note in the article. Rather than refer to him by name, however, he modestly referred to the note's origins from "The Chief Executive."[23]

Secrecy hardly seems to have been at issue - indeed, quite the opposite. Herring deeply embraced the idea that political scientists could bring their moderating perspectives into governance, and he took the opportunity to advertise the point by showing their centrality to both the war effort and to the "Chief" himself. The director of the Bureau of the Budget and Roosevelt had identified the need for proper recording of war efforts, and social scientists had the tools to do it.[24] Many of the suggestions were mundane, such as calls for uniformity in indexing and publication of agency records. Others, however, revealed his increased impatience with older methodologies. He identified the need to ignore "official minutes" of meetings, focusing instead upon "an awareness of the evolution of... developments at the secondary and tertiary levels." The most provocative suggestion, however, came from his call for topical studies on the specific impacts of the war. Partly stimulated by the SSRC, a separate Committee on War History was to provide:

> "guidance to scholars... [in] formulating their research plans... [T]hese plans will take the form both of monographic studies of various segments of an area and of more general treatments of larger fields... an excellent opportunity not only for studies by each branch of the social sciences, but also for investigations involving the combined efforts of many disciplines. For example, inflation could profitably be treated from the point of view of its fiscal and financial aspects, and of its social effects, of price fixing and rationing... while a subject like labor migration would bring into play psychological problems as well as economic social and political factors... it seems clear that war makes of society a laboratory in which

> great number of related experiments are going on simultaneously. Social scientists are the technicians to evaluate the process and the results."[25]

The idea that society had become a "laboratory" indicated the administrative perspective with which Herring was viewing the role of the profession. His concern with labor migration clearly indicated his base in the neo-laissez-faire planning perspective supported by his colleagues in political economy.[26] The call for the reform of the political science profession was not casually adopted, either. In addition to the proud listing of names and titles, the article ended on a self congratulatory note and call to arms. "The present opportunity constitutes a challenge whose importance is difficult to overestimate. Challenge, however, is not fulfillment."[27]

In "Political Science in the Next Decade" Herring added another layer in his discussion of how interest adjustment should define political science. This definition took two forms: definition relative to other social sciences, and definition within political science. Because of the focus on interest adjustment in particular governmental settings, political science could import perspectives without being subsumed by them:

> "To describe and analyze the problems that rest ultimately upon the phenomenon of political power is the high responsibility of students of government. The integrity of our discipline is based upon this foundation. Hence, cooperation with the other social sciences does not mean that political scientists should become amateur economists or psychologists... rather to utilize whatever factual data or analytical tools sister disciplines may offer for the development of our own field."[28]

Political science would remain distinct because its foundation lay in interest adjustment, leaving psychology and economics to be interpreted through the lens of interest adjustment. His second move, however, was more controversial. Interest adjustment needed to be conceived of relative to other perspectives *within* the discipline of political science. Herring did this by establishing three categories in the political realm: the "men

of belief," the "men of action," and the "men of understanding." The latter was, supposedly, the ideal political scientist:

> "The political scientist as a 'man of understanding' has here his most distinctive rôle and one that should not be lost sight of in the multitude of assignments that so many students of government have undertaken. The political scientist needs to carry on direct and systematic observation of legislators, politicians, officials, voters, and propagandists as they rub elbows together in the hurly-burly of political life... Political scientists, because of their broad concerns with the machinery of government, should be able to learn from practitioners who may have narrower interests and to develop these findings into an orderly general body of knowledge."[29]

The division may have been a simple assertion about what appeared to be most appropriate for the profession. It may also have been something of a strategic move. Herring's concept of a neutral science had just been critiqued in John Hallowell's attack on "Compromise as a Political Ideal." Indeed, Hallowell's critique in *Ethics* ran side by side with deeper critiques of science by F.A. Hayek and University of Chicago political science lecturer Hans Morgenthau.

Hallowell claimed the profession needed to continue to search for philosophical foundations and goals: the embrace of interest adjustment was the road to decay since some interests were not worthy of adjusting *to*.[30] Hayek claimed that the special category of facts in the social sciences made it impossible for it to be a truly predictive science. Its goals needed to be restricted to description, especially since arbitrageurs in middle management would fulfill the planning function political scientists sought to adopt.[31] Morgenthau also noted that irrational groups and the contingent character of social facts made true prediction impossible: the social sciences should strive to predict narrow outcomes upon which statesmen could act.[32] Herring's divisions, in short, avoided Hallowell's call for philosophy (Herring's "men of belief") and Morgenthau's call for "power politics" (Herring's "men of action).[33]

Herring's views continued into his presidency of the SSRC. In the second article of the first volume of the SSRC's *Items*, Herring built upon his assertions by addressing what the role of a *modern* social science was to be. In so doing, of course, Herring defined what was modern and how the social sciences were to facilitate progress. With greater clarity than his previous writings, Herring declared that we lived in an "administered" age, and that "administrators and other men of action are constantly making decisions affecting the welfare of countless numbers of their fellow men." The point was that in the absence of adequate information and understanding, "the quantitative degree to which mass destruction [was possible]" made it necessary to inform "those who attempt to manipulate social relationships..." According to Herring, the role of the social sciences in the "administered" age was based upon three basic elements: a science distinct from the humanities, a science which did not attempt to set social goals, and a science with a well ordered (indeed, administered) hierarchy.

The distinction between the humanities and the social sciences was crucial given the need to dispense with the idea of "intuition" in making authoritative claims. Taking exception to those who, like Hayek, sought excessive limits on the social sciences, Herring claimed the natural sciences provided a suitable model for emulation.

> "we have at our disposal the same rules of logic, statistics, and scientific method that we apply to observations of physical events... The fact that it is more difficult to use the scientific method with certain classes of data, e.g., human behavior, is not relevant. To argue otherwise is to argue that [certain phenomena] can be comprehended only by reflection and intuition."[34]

The same theme existed in his assertions about the ethical role of the scientist. Social scientists needed to avoid their "hortatory" tendencies and address "our present practical needs." As in 1941, this included a resistance to setting values:

> "The task of providing an ethical structure or value system for society has never been assigned to scientists and is quite outside any competence which their

> scientific training gives them. This is true of social scientists as of natural scientists. Either a natural scientist or a social scientist may contribute greatly to his problem if he happens to be a great man... but the establishment of a moral order is not part of the task of a scientist qua scientist. Strictly defined, it is not the function of the social sciences to determine public purposes or humanistic objectives, yet the work of social scientists can make great contributions to the commonweal..."[35]

Herring distinguished between the "hortatory" scientist and the scientist oriented towards the commonweal by emphasizing the role of method: as long as problems were addressed using experimental designs *by scientists*, the work would be avoiding the tendency towards the hortatory. The focus on the scientist was critical for similar work could be done by "social science technicians" just as physical scientists used laboratory technicians. To aid in the distinction, then, Herring identified the need for "rigorous training." Without it, work was simply not scientific:

> "This point is important because every science must ultimately establish the distinction between practitioners who are professionally trained to apply its findings and practitioners who are working precisely the same field with only the aid of their own personal experience, art, and wisdom... It is still not uncommon to find that a mother, a faith healer, or a practical nurse of skill and experience can heal a child in a desperate situation, yet few doubt the wisdom of distinguishing between professional physicians and these other practitioners..."[36]

Despite the supposed clarity of the distinction between the scientist and non-scientist, Herring claimed it difficult to identify just who was a scientist and who wasn't. In an effort to resolve the tension, he seemed to suggest the need to remain continually wary:

> "[i]t is relatively easy to identify the propagandist [for labor and industry], but less easy to identify specialists in the field of scholarship who conceal their hortatory approach under the guise of systematic inquiry. Perhaps the majority of those generally regarded as social scientists are primarily teachers or administrators who are consumers rather than producers of research, and could more accurately be described as practitioners than as scientists."[37]

Herring's hierarchical division of labor for political scientists was embodied in his use of the term "consumer": *scientists* would produce, and "practitioners" would consume. What

it meant to practice science was only partly defined, and he did make it clear that further definition was necessary. What he did know, however, was that inquiry should address interest adjustment within specific institutional settings. This was possible only for those who survived the "rigorous training" he envisioned. The focus on method would help distinguish between "hortatory practitioners" and scientists.

2. Practice: The Ends of Hierarchy: 1944-1948

Herring's own goals had clearly changed from depolarization of class conflict (1936 and 1941), to clarification of war goals given the "public phlegm" (1942), to institutional design appropriate for smooth post-war economic reconversion (1944). What is less obvious is the degree to which he was committed to particular forms of democratic capitalism. Yet Herring's theoretical assertions were *themselves* the product of a commitment to democratic capitalism - the "Keynesian" framework of countercyclical spending within a "mixed" system of ownership. Herring supported the ideas of self interest and pluralism *because* he rejected "utopian" theories of collectivist economic management. The sedimentation of these ideas into his work did not predetermine the maintenance of these ideas, and the public record does not offer an adequate portrayal of other SSRC theorists' specific commitments to democratic capitalism.[38] Two post-war debates, however, provide a preliminary outline.

One telling interchange was sparked by sociologist William Foote Whyte's 1943 *APSR* "Challenge to Political Scientists."[39] Whyte's article had nothing to do with Herring's proposals, but was a critique of "the purely formalistic approach" and the examination of "informal organization in its own right."[40] The article asserted that political scientists had been hampered by lack of field research and "been further handicapped by unquestioning acceptance of the democratic ideology... No progress can be made until the political scientist recognizes explicitly that he is dealing with a stratified society and discovers some systematic way of dealing with politics in these terms." Developing his thoughts based on his research on urban poverty, he argued that the urban political machine

seemed to be a response to the increasingly limited nature of economic opportunity open to ethnic minorities and immigrants.[41]

It was in the responses to Whyte's assertions that a critique of the interest adjustment perspective began to emerge. The debate included Gabriel Almond and John Hallowell. Ignoring Whyte's concern with urban poverty, Hallowell claimed that Whyte's goal was the amoral description of institutions, a goal which relied on conceptions of facts just as speculative as the works Whyte was critiquing.[42] Almond, sounding like Herring, claimed that objectivity in political science meant identifying rational means for achieving ends set by society. Thus Almond claimed that benign views of the political machine ignored the benefits made possible in "an efficiently administered system of social legislation and an effectively functioning economy." *Real* irrationality could be seen amongst "farmers, laborers and industrialists [whose actions are] directed toward breaking the existing price ceilings." Almond went so far as to suggest that the resulting "economic catastrophe breeds movements of political dissatisfaction and desperation...men who have sought their own short-run interests in what appeared to be 'innocent' matters... bear a share in the responsibility for a renewal of the bloodshed and the costs of war."[43] Thus, like Herring, Almond claimed that the "political scientist, by virtue of his training, is qualified to make a contribution toward rendering policy formation more rational - that is, genuinely meet the needs and aspirations of the public."[44]

The discussants appeared to be talking past one another.[45] Driving the disagreement were differing degrees of faith in the role interest adjustment could play within a pressure group framework. Hallowell had critiqued Herring's ideas on "compromise" because there were no attempts to distinguish between good and bad interests. Hallowell asked "how can we mediate differences unless we have some standard of goodness, justice or the public interest?"[46] Herring saw the presence of dialogue and moderation as providing the "tradition" upon which American politics had reliably returned. Almond's view that

interest moderation provided both the public good and disciplinary core indicated his clear agreement with Herring.

A second post-war debate surrounded the role of atomic energy. The debate, which involved Herring and the Social Science Research Council, is equally enlightening. In 1946 the centrality of the atomic energy as a domestic political issue was highlighted by University of Chicago lecturer on administration, John Gaus. His APSA Presidential Address on "A Job Analysis of Political Science" contended that political scientists needed to discount the catastrophic fears of nuclear energy and instead focus on "sober reconsiderations" and even "the revealing light of the atomic bomb."[47] Gaus claimed that he had once been disturbed by suggestions that, to make atomic bombing less effective on population and industrial centers, urban planning should widen the distribution of populations and facilities. No longer. Pointing out that political scientists needed to participate in "vulnerability control," Gaus wrote:

> "My point is that there is a further need for the political scientist, confronted as we are by this new source of change in our environment, as interpreter and appraiser and inventor, and that in all these rôles he will be most useful if he builds cumulatively on the research he has been doing on already known institutions. I found myself, for example, turning again to the materials on regional centers, on the future rôle of state governments.... we must push the application of science further into the analysis of human behavior and institutions as the next step in the physical research which has brought the literally explosive new knowledge into its first application."[48]

Quoting Frederick Jackson Turner and Henry Adams, Gaus concluded that nuclear energy was simply another manifestation of the radical change that followed wars: technological and social transformation required creative work to incorporate change into existing traditions. From this assumption came Gaus's decision to see defense planning as another aspect of federalism and urban planning. *New* knowledge must be embraced, through increasingly coordinated research activities. He lauded, for example, the work of the Social Science Research Council and its support of social science funding in a new National Science Foundation.[49] He went on to note that "There is much to learn from the

example of coöperation which marked the work of the physical scientists engaged in the atomic bomb project."[50]

When Herring and the Social Science Research Council became involved in questions about the effects and implications of atomic energy, the approach was also viewed in administrative and economic terms. Herring contended that the council's role was to conduct research on labor relations in atomic installations, the effect of waste disposal on community relations, occupational hazards, and the effects of this new technology on specific industries and on universities.[51] He was not specific as to what purpose these studies were to serve, but fellow SSRC member Talcott Parsons was more clear on the Council's role when he sought support from physical scientists in *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*.

Parsons claimed that the accumulation of technology had created an advanced society, and that the social sciences lagged behind the natural sciences in their ability to guide the way to social cohesion. Most critical for Parsons was that advances in the natural sciences (centrally, the atomic bomb) had exposed the frail nature of group co-existence. Funding of the social sciences provided, then, the means for the natural and social sciences to move forward in tandem. The tenor of the times required that funding and research begin immediately. "[T]he urgency of the practical needs for rational control of social processes is so great and so obvious as scarcely to need discussion." Not surprisingly, Parsons stated that this rational control was to be produced by scientific elites.

> "We are all familiar with the fact that we live in a technological age. It would be absolutely impossible to operate the complicated technology of modern industry... without the services of scientifically trained personnel... Over against this, it is a common idea that the common man is his own social scientist; that any ordinary intelligent person is qualified to understand the operation of social processes. Even so far as the current situation is concerned, this is very far from the truth... technically trained personnel are playing a larger and larger part... in the administrative process, in the adjustment of industrial relations... in the control of the functions of the economy... we live in the kind of society which, it becomes

> increasingly evident, can only be effectively operated by more efficient applied social science... [not] by letting the present situation stagnate."[52]

Of course, it was not entirely clear what "applied science" meant, or how other council members thought behavioral research in political science would inform that perspective. What was clear, however, was that while a number of physical scientists were fearing the loss of their research autonomy, a number of political scientists with close ties to the SSRC were claiming that these research hierarchies in the natural sciences had been central to winning the cold war. Whether or not their ideas translated into their views of political research is unclear, but it is difficult to see how it did not. One debate concerning this is suggestive.

Responding to calls for the elimination of military research funding, economist Seymour Harris stated that an unorganized scientific community could not challenge the Soviet threat. Being careful to point out that "the writer would not classify himself as a red-baiter" he continued that "[the] fight will not come off so long as it is clear to all that the U.S.S.R. is likely to lose. Until war is outlawed, then, we must spend generously on science... the dollar spent on science becomes much more valuable than the dollar spent on ammunition or soldiers."[53]

William Y. Elliot supported far deeper changes within the polity. It was clear for him that a planned science produced more than an unplanned one and he therefore called for military funding and planning of science. In the absence of control over fissionable material, he was certain a race would exist between the United States and the Soviet Union. Describing a modern tragedy, he commented that the race "must exist-and it must exist until a common formula of control has been accepted and, beyond question, put into workable operation." Every aspect of life would feel the consequences, but that was necessary:

> "not only the scientist, but the whole industrial structure of the United States and probably of other world powers, will be increasingly geared into a military system

> capable of acting on a moment's notice. It is not 'pure' science alone that is endangered [by planning]. The whole range of industrial and technical know-how in the world becomes a military factor... the growth of military controls and an increasingly totalitarian temper would seem to the political scientist inevitable."[54]

These were the components of what Elliot described as "the facts" in his article entitled "Facts and Values." Moving to values, he noted that while he would *like* a more democratic system within the scientific community, but it meant almost certain death.

> "[I]f the facts are as stated, we have as one alternative, the maintenance of an 'open system,' based upon... independent researchers in science... [and] [i]f academic and scientific 'freedom[s]' are the highest values; perhaps this is the right line... On the other hand, so to act is to take certain grave risks about the survival of our whole system... The other alternative is to say that our system is worth putting as far as possible beyond the reach of intimidation... we *may* lose our freedoms in a struggle to maintain this kind of a world... [but w]e shall have to assume the responsibilities of maturity in a most unpleasant world until we are able to change it and establish conditions of moral order...."[55]

In 1949, Cornell political scientist Robert Cushman challenged this stance. Cushman noted that the restrictions on inter-scientist communications were going to hamper not only research progress, but also the most rudimentary forms of due process for federal employees. Under the "President's Loyalty Program" of 1947, industrial employees were being found guilty by association with subversive elements, and the Loyalty Review Board had established a bizarre point system ranking exposure to various newspapers, sympathizer associations, and answers to questionnaires. Unlike the review procedures of the Atomic Energy Commission, the boards did not give defendants copies of their review, and in fact they destroyed notes after completion of the review process.[56] Yet when University of Chicago administration theorist Leonard White submitted a review of federal employment law relative to the "loyalty program," he noted that "no one has the right to work for the government." Thus, none were entitled to procedural due process. He had departed a great deal from the discussions of progressive employment practices in the TVA.[57]

While the discussions of the role of research and hierarchy by Gaus, Herring, Harris, White and Cushman are merely suggestive, they nonetheless outline one aspect of doing "pure research" among those in and close to the SSRC. Creation of research hierarchies embodied a commitment to an administrative and economic perspective on social problems which also led them to ignore the rights of scientists lower in that hierarchy. It was also a view of research that was being contested both among physical scientists.

C. Theory: Resisting Research Hierarchy and Interest Adjustment

While no unified set of ideas arose in response to calls for an administrative orientation, it is clear that the idea (and its companion call for a research hierarchy) was controversial. Easily twelve of the twenty-four articles published between 1943 and 1950 in the "Instruction and Research" section of *The American Political Science Review* discussed the new role of research. Four of them, however, questioned the idea that there should be a subsuming administrative orientation to the profession or to research, and they were joined by others from organized sections of the APSA writing in the *Review*. Some were supportive of increased research emphases, but specified the need for a deep blend of civic education and historical political theory to accompany research. Another author stressed the need for critical reflection upon the profession's middle class orientation, to be followed by commitment to fair treatment of the poor through enhanced development of social security and income maintenance administration.

One notable series of research recommendations came in the reassembly of the APSA Committee on Political Theory in 1944. Panel Chairman Francis Wilson contended that the primary impetus for the Committee's reassembly was increasing competition between theological, classical and analytic approaches to political theory. The rift suggested the need for an "integrated" view of the polity, with an intermediate step being the definition of terms for debate. Here Wilson made a recommendation which, in comparison to Herring, was remarkable: he suggested that third parties contributed significantly to the evolution of American thought, and their study required immediate and focused attention:

> "Smaller or less significant movements in political thinking need, in the opinion of the panel, to be studied carefully. Many movements need monographic studies; the ideas of church groups, of labor organizations, the evolution of the ideas of long established journals, and those who favor the agrarian or cooperative movements should be studied for their interpretation of political values and principles. In other words, there should be a frontal attack by political theorists and their graduate students on tracing the emergence of interpretations and values in American political society."[58]

A similar assertion was made by Harvard's Benjamin Wright at the same meeting. Discussing the appropriate research areas in American thought, Wright identified the need to study the "lesser reform movements," stating that "it must be evident by now that the effect of these humanitarian crusades was materially to alter the conception of democracy in the United States." He went on to note that:

> "There have been studies of the political ideas and agitations of labor groups in recent periods; there has been much less attention to the political thought of the labor organizations before the Civil War; and there are numerous other groups not so easily classified which have at least attempted to affect the course of political action and political thought in the United States... We do need to know something about the players in the game. But such descriptive listing is at best scarcely more than a beginning. If the study of American political thought is to have the importance either for students or scholars, or for the entire course of political thinking... we certainly cannot stop with description or with the cozy task of compilation."[59]

Other writers sought the integration of instruction into research. One APSR article came from a professor working in the Federal Communications Commission, Robert Leigh. Like Herring, Leigh envisioned tremendous development within the profession as a result of the war. With respect to the role of the profession, Leigh reiterated Herring's suggestions, maintaining that research be "more and more a *common* concern of social scientists-presenting a united front in building the essential social science research structure in our universities, [and] securing the necessary funds... for research purposes." Similarly, Leigh focused on the need for training civil servants and administrators.[60] Unlike Herring, however, Leigh made continual references to teaching and the need for constant rotation between government administration, research, and civic education.

Indeed, Leigh suggested the rotation in part to examine the darker underside of governance. Having been subjected to a Congressional investigation, he suggested the need for all to be exposed to experiences to maintain their critical perspectives. He described the investigation as:

> "the real down-to-earth kind with intimidation, blackmail, wholesale removal of carloads of records, star-chamber questioning of hosts of employees for fishing purposes and, I think, wire-tapping. I had read and taught about all these processes of government. And the textbooks gave a pretty accurate picture on the whole. Still, I feel that in the first-hand experience such as most of us have had in Washington there... is more complete access to sources, ... or let us say confidence that we have covered the sources of knowledge and [have] realistic insight about the institutions with which we are vitally concerned as students."[61]

Thus he suggested that "the normal professional career should include all three [foci] at different times" and that "we must be willing to train and to reward teachers who devote themselves zealously and wholeheartedly to the educational task I have described. Only a few teachers probably are content to do this strenuous task for a lifetime. But with a flexibly-organized profession, a large proportion might be willing to do it for a decade or longer-to everyone's profit."[62] In his conclusion he was careful to mention both promise and distance from governance as the focus of the profession.

> "To some, the proposal for a social science profession which will earn its proper place as a specialized group... may seem grandiloquent, even impossible. But I would stress that I am also proposing strict limitations on the profession. I am suggesting that we refuse to be dazzled by any temporary experience in direct administration and determination of policy or with the direct wielding of power... We have a different rôle to play-less spectacular, more patient, more permanent."[63]

Leigh had hopes for the profession, and he was certainly supportive of calls for increased data collection and more focus on governmental processes. Conspicuous in comparison to others, however, was his centering of the profession on civic education while embracing the trends towards research and administration.

W. Hardy Wickwar wrote in the *Review* that while a government oriented towards empathic social services had expanded markedly, political science remained virtually unaware of either its presence or its ethos. "We have helped habituate a new generation to such expressions as 'the service state," [and] 'positive government,"... Yet taking it all in, it is surprising how little we have changed..." The problem was "a division of labor that has arisen... [between] public administration [and] public welfare administration: the former have tended to think in terms of pattern and the latter in terms of content."[64] Wickwar repeated the call for greater information collection and interdisciplinary cooperation, but the call was for the purpose of enhancing community service and providing incentives for "doctors, teachers, lawyers and social workers... to work together as a team."[65]

Wickwar's argument was not simply a call for greater development of a subfield; it implied a fundamental redirection of what he took to be the discipline's current tack. "No reading of laws, or of court decisions, no quantitative measurement of activities, and no exploration of one's own ego, will throw light on a field such as this. Instead, the researcher needs a certain maturity, a feel for social realities, a flair for sensing the 'tie in' of institutions and groups." Approaching his critique of group adjustment, he stated that "[t]his is not perhaps very different from what is asked in the study of parties, pressure-groups, propaganda and similar aspects of contemporary politics...but," he added:

> "in tone and temper and in social structure [this focus] is the very antithesis of that middle-class republic of pressure groups that has been the object of so remarkable a cult on the part of certain eminent American political scientists of recent years... political scientists have accorded to [social welfare administration] only a tithe of the study to which its importance entitles it. To the realist who knows the force of ideals, the devices by which social reforms are put across are no less important than the political skill with which individuals jockey themselves into positions of power and influence."[66]

The reference to "certain eminent American political scientists" was almost certainly directed at the SSRC theorists. Wickwar's recommendations for research were remarkably

similar to those William Foote Whyte had proposed in a 1943 *Review* article. Whyte claimed that research was to examine informal urban institutions (such as political machines) as responses to an absence of economic opportunity. Wickwar, similarly, stated that political scientists might try looking at "neighborhoods as service areas rather than as wards of electoral districts. Here is a different frame of reference and in some ways a socially more mature and politically less abstract than the thought pattern [of] sovereignty."[67]

Other, more subtle, articles recommended limited roles for science. These came from figures as notable as Carl Friedrich, William Anderson, and Leonard Doob.[68] In his Presidential Address before the APSA in 1943, William Anderson of the University of Minnesota directly addressed the "Rôle of Political Science" in the American polity. Anderson, who preceeded Herring as chair of the SSRC Public Administration Committee knew whereof he spoke. His approach was to praise the previous president, Frederic Ogg, noting that the last address was not only the voice of Ogg, but the voice of wisdom being echoed down through a long line of political philosophers. The address was obviously designed to flatter Ogg and the profession in general, but Anderson was making a deeper point. The profession had thrived in the United States, and it was attendant upon its practitioners to behave responsibly in a community that had given birth to the profession. Thus he stated what he believed were the four defining features of the profession: a commitment to the training of citizens, to the training of public servants, to the constant search for innovative practices in governance, and the practice of ethical conduct - the latter to include critique of the polity and constant self evaluation of the profession. Anderson's address was a call for balance. He identified the need for public service training and for increased description of a changing world, but claimed that they were to come from introspection and reflection in classical texts in *combination* with detached observation.[69]

Friedrich's 1947 reflection on the war adopted the same critical stance. His discussion of "Political Science in the United States in Wartime" was the antithesis of Gaus's call to use the "revealing light of the atomic bomb." Friederich's article plodded through the increasing prominence of the profession, the rise of various journals, books, committees, and perspectives. Most importantly, he addressed the rise of "political behavior" and "increasing interest in 'political and 'governmental' topics.'" He commented that:

> "These broadening tendencies are sound and healthy, provided they are held together by some common core of basic understanding of what Aristotle called 'the master science.'...This common core can, we believe be most readily preserved by a firm and constant emphasis in teaching and research upon the history of political theories, whether set forth in the manner of George H. Sabine and Charles H. McIlwain as a history of doctrines, a great 'verbal discussion' on the rational plane, or within the framework of a cultural and institutional manifold expression of the non-, meta-, and irrational aspects of the great political ideologies of the past and present."[70]

The point may have been defense of an older tradition, but it was also an attempt to maintain a professional core separate from "governmental topics." It may not have been any more democratic a recommendation than Herring's producer-consumer vision, but Friederich was calling for more balance than Herring.

It was Paul Appleby, however, who made the most prolonged and pointed rebuttal in the 1950 *Review*. While Herring had written of "Political Science in the Next Decade," Appleby entitled his piece "Political Science, The Next Twenty-Five Years." His article was a critique of economist J.J. Spengler's recommendation for the use of parsimonious economic theories in political science, and an opportunity to comment on the sloppy, vital, robust, and fundamentally illusive nature of the polity and the profession. Research may have been an unorganized affair, but that was the nature of the material and not a fault of political science. "If a plea of guilty is to be entered... it should not be 'guilty as charged.'" Appleby addressed "those who would organize the profession" claiming their need to adopt "scholarly statesmanship of a high order" and he critiqued the notion that social scientists were objective. "Values do not appear full-blown without a begetting,

they are themselves means, and means are value determining. Those who sanctify the other belief would unconsciously impose inadequate and inferior judgements." The point was that without confronting the complexity of the relation between values and inquiry, inquiry itself was becoming "too holy, too quickly dignifying a vast deal of thoroughly pedestrian and unimaginative business."[71] He, too, recommended balance. Political science should:

> "seek wholeness. Political science can not fail to be truly political in orientation, and therefore concerned with values of diverse kinds. It must realistically relate politics to the whole society in which politics develops and which politics serves. It must be associated with worldly wisdom, for the reality with which it is concerned is very human and worldly. It can not be confined to the duty of developing that special knowledge which, as John Dewey has remarked, in public matters 'is not knowledge at all.'"[72]

Appleby's call, then, was for protection of the profession as a diverse and cooperative enterprise. It restated the calls of workers within the physical sciences, and was hardly unlike the concerns of collectivists concerns at the beginning of the decade.

D. Practice: Party Reform as Ideological Activism

In 1950, the APSA Committee on Political Parties produced a highly publicized report entitled *Toward a More Responsible Two Party System*. Though the drafting committee consisted of five persons headed by Elmer Schattschneider, various versions of the document had been distributed to over forty prominent members of the profession between 1948 and 1950. The outline of its contents can be seen by three areas of debate concerning the recommendations made in early drafts. The first was an attempt to generate reforms leading to full party *government*. It was proposed by Schattschneider, but was dismissed at a December 1949 meeting of the committee as a whole. A second area of debate involved the degree to which reforms should make the parties *themselves* more democratic. The report's third focus was to identify ways in which democracy could be enhanced *between* the parties; to identify ways that reforms within each party would

produce coherent, complementary alternatives and policy guidelines -- hence the term Two Party *System*.[73]

The report was the product of Schattschneider and a second political scientist working in the Bureau of the Budget, Fritz Morstein Marx.[74] Marx had been working at the Bureau of the Budget through most of the war, and consciously used his position to draw attention to ways in which the discipline could bring its skills to bear on post-war problems. From 1944 to 1949 Marx ran a prominent series of yearly symposia clearly designed to make economic reconversion more efficient than it had been after World War I, and to otherwise realize the goals of the Full Employment Act of 1945. Herring had presented his views on interest adjustment in the first symposium, while Schattschneider presented his nascent beliefs on party reform in the second.[75]

Schattschneider, like Herring, was disturbed at the "rising demands" of interest group activity But Schattschneider's concerns were more specific, and focused on the late-war CIO-PAC voter registration drive. As Schattschneider saw it, local political machines had been disturbed by economic crises. New government responsibilities made it probable that previously apathetic voters would begin to participate, but would have only weak party machines to turn to. When the CIO-PAC attempted to act as a party, then, Schattschneider found the result unholy:

> "... there is impressive evidence that the regular local party machines are no longer what they once were. In the 1944 campaign, for example, the local organizations of the democratic party in many areas were in a condition of dissolution which threatened for a time to become a public scandal. As if this were not enough, these organizations suffered the indignity of having outside organizations do their work for them. Thus the [main] feature of the campaign was unquestionably a registration drive staged in many areas by CIO-PAC which produced sensational results in a number of states and had a perceptible influence on the outcome of the election."[76]

Given the large numbers of apathetic voters from which the CIO could draw upon, the possibilities were frightening for the future of the existing parties.

> "Since the future of American politics, especially the politics of full employment, will very likely be determined by what is done about the thirty million or more people who did not vote in the 1944 election, the efficiency of party organizations in dealing with this problem is crucial... It is for precisely for this reason that the registration drive conducted by PAC in 1944 has disturbed the regular party workers so greatly. Indeed, PAC organizers speak enthusiastically about a registration drive to bring out seventy five-million voters in the near future, a campaign which - if successful - would produce popular participation in politics on a scale that will swamp all party alignments... there is needed a study of the requirements for a party organization able to reach this huge reserve of potential voters."[77]

Again, labor action was setting a significant part of the agenda. Yet political scientists were responding to labor differently. Herring was far more cautious about strong parties and popular input than Schattschneider. Schattschneider wrote with optimism that "[t]he hiatus between what is and what ought to be is not as serious as it might seem.. because the party is simply what people make it. If the parties have been used indifferently in the past, it is doubtless because the uses of the parties have not been well understood..."[78]

Herring was evidently shocked by the Committee's efforts. Leriserson was most certainly horrified, and wrote of the need to proceed with the plans of expanding the training of students in the behavioral perspective.[79] Ironically, Schattschneider looked at Herring's plans to organize data collection with great hope. Frustrated with the "local" basis for existing knowledge of parties, Schattschneider supported gathering information into a format that would aid in national party organization.[80] Nonetheless, objections mounted quickly and endured. In a personal note to Marx, one reviewer refused to endorse party reform because of its reformist concern for what might be, rather than its empirical identification of the "interests" involved. "It seems to me that the Report in its present form forgets that such parties as we have arisen out of the social, economic and political conditions of the country, and that each of the major parties reflects, however poorly, the class and sectional interests, that national state and local interests, the moral and other interests, of the people who have been drawn in to support the party... we cannot expect the parties to rise far above their sources of strength."[81] Austin Ranney later rejected

Schattschneider's idealistic orientation - citing Herring's *Politics of Democracy* as central to his reconsiderations.[82] APSA Executive Director Evron Kirkpatrick also renounced his participation in the project as overly concerned with utopian speculation. Indeed, Kirkpatrick identified Lasswell's conception of the scientist (the benevolent clarifier) as the model that should guide the profession. Frustrated with the increasingly revisionist interpretations of the *Parties* Committee history, report co-author Paul David tried in vein to point out that the context of the late 1940s made bold and "idealistic" action seem necessary and appropriate.[83]

E. Conclusion: The Outlines of Behavioral Research

The works examined here - primarily those of Herring and the proto-behavioralists — can only be seen as an outline of the origins of "behavioral" research. Yet the centrality of these writers in defining the appropriate conceptions of professional activity can hardly be refuted. Their work provides a view of the continuity between the reform ideas of the late New Deal and the reaction to those ideas *as* political science.

Of central significance was the inextricable link between their conception of objectivity and their rejection of calls for popular political reform. This connection was most evident in Herring's *Politics of Democracy* -- in his rejection of the labor movement as merely "urban," his rejection of the "barbaric" practices of direct protest, and his rejection of the "woodpile politics" of third parties. Having documented the abortion of "superior" outcomes in the past, he contended pragmatic party elites must shape policy. Political groups must limit their concerns to their *natural* limits of self interest, and natural was defined as interests not warped by "hortatory" and "propagandistic" academics or political visionaries. Once in Washington Herring returned to an administrative perspective, focusing on the institutional mechanisms within which interests could be pacified and observed. Herring's 1948 focus on method merely restated and extended his fears of popular involvement, though it also served two related purposes. On the one hand, the focus on method was an attempt to institutionalize the idea of objectivity. On the other

hand, it was an unmistakable attempt to accord that idea a special status relative to other approaches within the profession: Herring clearly used the resources at his disposal to publicize his perspective.

Despite their differences, Lerner and Schattschneider were both responding to the promise of the changing role of government in the form of labor and employment policy. Lerner's concerns were not with the maintenance of two stable parties, but with democratizing the workplace and enfranchising economic policy formation. Schattschneider's concerns were not with creating an objective science to control groups, but with creating mechanisms for group support for full employment programs. The substantive difference between the proto-behavioralists and the reformers boiled down to two key points. The protobehavioralists insisted upon viewing groups in terms of scientific objectivity (rooted in a theory of self interest) while reformers were comfortable embracing "non-objective" and "visionary" party reforms. In the proposals for the structure of science, Herring, Gaus and Lasswell repeatedly emphasized the idea of moderated, limited, controlled competition between groups in a free market. Schattschneider, who had witnessed the failure of the NIRA, emphasized the possibility for regulatory reform in the presence of group unification. The third category - those who took exception to the "cult" of group theorists - wanted the discipline to maintain its commitment to civic education, community leadership and critical introspection far broader than Herring conceived of it. The concerns of Anderson, Appleby, Friederich, and Leigh were just as prevalent in the APSR as those of the SSRC "cult." It was their focus on the profession as a diverse, local phenomenon which in many ways mirrored the period's emphasis on a democratic workplace.

1. Soule, George 1937. "Recovery: Why and How Long March" *The New Republic* Jan. 10, p. 143.

2. ibid., p. 143.

3. Lynd, Robert 1939. Untitled. *Survey Graphic* Vol. 28., p. 498.

4. ibid., Pp. 498-9.

5. ibid., p. 499.

6. ibid., Pp. 498-9. As discussed in Chapter 2. The final point, of course, is that Herring reflected the pressure group system as much as he was reflecting *upon* it.

7. Herring, *The Politics of Democracy* op. cit., p. 277.

8. ibid., p. 273.

9. ibid., p. 281.

10. ibid., p. 275.

11. ibid., p. 277. The entire quote is "All the scientists can do is focus attention upon the selected phases of reality and show the interrelations that operate within the framework of reference set by his initial assumptions... Basic to such an attitude of objectivity is a subjective social ideal. It is the belief that questioning and testing are a good thing, and hence that the political beliefs justifying such freedom for inquiry are worthy of continuance."

12. The calls for the rejection of historical methodology and philosophical inquiry are often attributed to David Easton's *The Political System.* In fact, the critiques begin much earlier, and extend throughout the end of the decade.

13. Herring, Pendleton 1942. "A Focus for Facts and Figures" *Saturday Review* Vol. 25 No. 11., p. 11.

14. For discussion, see Almond, Gabriel 1978. "An unrehearsed interview with Gabriel Almond" Pi Sigma Alpha Oral History Project of the American Political Science Association. King Library Archives. University of Kentucky. Lexington, Kentucky. Tape 1 Side 2. In it Almond stated that "Archibald MacLeish [came]down to Washington--a poet, mind you--as Director of the Office of Facts and Figures. That is to say, America wasn't going to be engaged in propaganda, we were going to put out facts and figures in response to Nazi propaganda. And Harold Lasswell, I think, was known to Archibald MacLeish. At any rate, he was a close friend of a New York lawyer, Keith Kane. This man was the kind of operating director, as distinguished from the idea man; MacLeish thought of himself as the man who would have the ideas in relation to the dissemination

of information, in relation to the American war effort, whereas Keith Kane--he was a good friend of Harold's, and Harold became his principal advisor and consultant. That was the organizational predecessor of OWI. So there was Archibald MacLeish, the poet; there was Eleanor Roosevelt in the White House; and there was Harold Lasswell. And Lasswell was a bit out of his depth, I really think, as it turned out. But he was, in effect, asked to set up the organization of this Office of Facts and Figures, and his thought was to have a really major research effort, both here and abroad that would guide American information and activity. I was hired. I took leave from Brooklyn College and went to Washington with my family and spent the first several weeks working with Harold Lasswell in the effort to get this bureau of intelligence organized. In particular, Harold was interested in the following: he wanted to have a monitoring, a regular monitoring of the media in this country and abroad; and he wanted to have a regular surveying of opinion and attitudes relating to the war--here the focus is domestic--and he was sophisticated enough about the survey research approach that he wanted to have both the intensive interview approach which stressed the open-ended or sophisticated type of survey and the more Gallup type extensive, structured, questionnaire type thing, where Elmo Roper, I think, was viewed as more sophisticated than Gallup."

15. The work is discussed in [Pendleton Herring]* "The Recording of World War Two" *American Political Science Review* Vol. 38 No. 1, Pp. 331-342.;. See also, Herring, Pendlton "An unrehearsed interview with Pendleton Herring" Pi Sigma Alpha Oral History Project of the American Political Science Association. King Library Archives. University of Kentucky. Lexington, Kentucky. Herring notes, for example, that "[t]his Advisory Committee on Records of War Administration was an invention. It was an effort to insure the scholarly efforts that we hoped would ensue in the record-keeping and in the story of mobilization. The Committee, therefore, was composed of individuals drawn from positions of leadership in private life and in the government. William Anderson, professor of political science at the University of Minnesota, was a member for the American Political Science Association, with Brownlow for the American Society of Public Administration. Donald Young of the Social Science Research Council and Waldo Leland serving as chairman was the head of the American Council of Learned Societies. On the governmental side we had, appropriately, Solon J. Buck of the National Archives, Archibald MacLeish of the Library of Congress and Arthur Schlesinger, Sr. and Guy Stanton Ford, from the American Historical Association, obviously I should have mentioned those two from the private sector." *Herring admits to the authorship of this document during this interview. Tape 1 Side1.

16. Herring, Pendleton 1944. "Executive-Legislative Responsibilities" *American Political Science Review* Vol. 38. No. 4, Pp. 1153-65.

17. Herring, Pendleton 1945. "Political Science in the Next Decade" *American Political Science Review* Vol. 39, No. 3, Pp. 758-760.

18. See chapter 3, Introduction. The initial reference to the "game" was made in his advice to labor groups' approach to the political parties.

19. Herring, "Political Science in the Next Decade" op. cit., Pp. 758-760.

20. ibid., Pp. 763-4.

21. Herring, "An unrehearsed interview" op. cit. "Well, I think, Fred, I gave you a copy of that piece that I wrote entitled "Political Science in the Next Decade." And you may recall there that I emphasized the importance of studying political behavior, and I emphasized the desirability of interdisciplinary cooperation. That piece in general was a reaction to the wartime years in Washington and my contacts and talks with fellow political scientists there, the meetings we held and the kind of attitudes, opinions expressed concerning the development of the discipline... I mention this because I think, that in that little piece one finds stated some of the interests that I had formulated in my own mind in 1944 and hence brought to the Council a few years later. I think it was about 1946 that I agreed to serve as chairman of a Committee on Political Behavior set up in the SSRC while Donald Young was the Executive Director." Tape 1 Side 1.

22. Herring, "The Recording of World War II" op. cit.

23. ibid., Pp. 341-2.

24. ibid., p. 332.

25. ibid., p. 340.

26. See chapter 3 and it's discussion of Herring's ties to Seymour Harris.

27. ibid., p. 342.

28. Herring, "Political Science in the Next Decade" op. cit., Pp. 758-760.

29. ibid., p. 765.

30. Hallowell, John H. 1943-4. "Compromise as a Political Ideal" *Ethics* Vol. 49 No. 3. p. 157 and Pp. 157-173.

31. Hayek contended that the "facts" had no true "spatial-temporal coordinates," and they must be elements of the analysts' imagination. Thus, he noted that "[w]hat makes a number of individual things facts of a kind are the attributes we select" and that these are chosen "not according to what we, the observers, know about the objects but according to what we think the observed person knows about it." Emphasizing the intrapersonal character of the identification process, he noted that "[t]he important question which arises is whether it is legitimate to employ in scientific analysis such concepts... which refer to a state of affairs which we all recognize 'intuitively.'" Morgenthau went on to

note, then, that "[t]he misunderstanding is that the social sciences aim at *explaining* individual behavior... [but t]he social sciences do in fact nothing of the sort. If conscious action can be 'explained,' this is a task for psychology but not for economics or linguistics, jurisprudence or any other social science. What we do is merely to classify types of individual behavior... to provide an orderly arrangement of the material which we have to use in our further task." Thus, social science seemed to be best at providing definitions, but little else. In the sense that Morgenthau rejected utopian visions, there appears to have been agreement. "I believe that this view which regards social collectivities such as 'society' or the "state,' ... as in any sense more objective than the intelligible actions of the individuals is sheer illusion. I shall argue that what we call social facts... are rather precisely the same kind of mental models constructed by us from elements which we find in our own minds..." See note 32, below.

32. Morgenthau, Hans J. 1943-4. "The Limitations of Science and the Problem of Social Planning" *Ethics* Vol. 49 Pp. 174-185.

33. Herring is critiqued in Hallowell, John H. 1944 "Compromise as a Political Ideal" *Ethics* Vol. 54 No. 3 p. 157.; Morgenthau's critique of science is in Morgenthau, Hans J. 1946 *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press.; Morgenthau, "The Limitations..." op. cit. Pp. 176-7.; Morgenthau is mentioned by 8 senior figures interviewed for the American Political Science Association oral history project as both active in the University of Chicago's department, and a strong influence in their theoretical development. His first book published after the war, *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics* was favorably reviewed by John Hallowell, who was a more prominent figure in the post-war APSA committee on Political Theory, discussed below. See, also, Gunnell, *The Descent of Political Theory*, op. cit., p. 209.

34. Herring, Pendleton 1947. "The Social Sciences in Modern Society" *Items* (New York: Social Science Research Council) Vol. 1 No. 1., p. 4.

35. ibid., p. 4.

36. ibid., p. 5.

37. ibid., p. 3.

38. Necessary archives also remain closed. As of this writing, the Social Science Research Council Archives are closed, and have been closed for over three years. Those records, as well as the private papers of V.O. Key, Pendleton Herring, David Truman, Avery Leiserson, Alexander Heard, Alex DeGrazia, Herbert Simon and a host of other figures will be the only source of information for a closer mapping of this period. Use of these documents is obviously beyond the scope of this work.

39. Whyte, William F. 1943 "A Challenge to Political Scientists" *American Political Science Review* Vol. 37 No. 3, Pp. 692-697.

40. ibid., p. 693.

41. ibid., p. 695.

42. Hallowell, "Politics and Ethics" op. cit., p. 653 and Pp. 639-655, generally.

43. Almond, Gabriel A. 1946 "Politics, Science, and Ethics" *The American Political Science Review* Vol. 40. No. 2, Pp. 285, 287, and 283-293 generally.

44. ibid., p. 293.

45. Gunnell, *The Descent of Political Theory* op. cit.

46. Hallowell, "Politics Science and Ethics" op. cit., p. 163.

47. Gaus, John M. 1946. "A Job Analysis of Political Science" *The American Political Science Review* Vol. 40 No. 2, p. 230.

48. ibid., p. 225. Gaus, like Slim Pickins in the Stanley Kubrick film *Dr. Strangelove*, seemed to ride the bomb with hope in his suggestion that the explosion in scientific theory was somehow synonymous with atomic power.

49 ibid., p 229

50. ibid., Pp. 221-2.

51. Herring, Pendleton 1948. "Technological Change and Atomic Energy" *Items* (New York: Social Science Research Council) Pp. 5-6.

52. Parsons, Talcott 1947 "National Science Legislation: The Case for the Social Sciences" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* Vol. 3 No. 8, p. 3. The article he was responding to was by Ridenour, Louis N. 1947. "Military Support of American Science, A Danger?" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* Vol. 3 No. 8, Pp. 221-2.

53. Harris, Seymour E. 1947. "An Economist Views the Problem" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* Vol. 3 No. 8, p. 226.

54. Huxley, Aldous "A Positive Program of Research for Peace" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* Vol. 3 No. 8., p. 225.; Elliot, William Y. 1947. "Facts and Value" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* Vol. 3 No. 8, p. 227.

55. ibid., p. 227.

56. Cushman, Robert E. 1949. "Freedom Versus Security" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* Vol. 5 No. 3., pp. 70-72.

57. See chapter 2.

58. Wilson, Francis G. 1944. "The Work of the Political Theory Panel" *The American Political Science Review* Vol. 38 No. 4, p. 731 and Pp. 726-733 generally.

59. ibid., p. 737 and pp. 733-740 generally.

60. Leigh, Robert 1944. "The Educational Function of the Social Scientist" *The American Political Science Review* Vol. 38 No. 3, p. 533.

61. ibid., p. 538.

62. ibid., Pp. 532 and 535.

63. ibid., p. 539.

64. Wickwar, W. Hardy 1946. "Social Welfare and Political Science" *The American Political Science Review* Vol. 40. No. 3, p. 563 and Pp. 563-571 generally.

65. ibid., p. 567.

66. ibid., p. 569.

67. ibid., pp. 567-8. Whyte, "A Challenge to Political Scientists" op. cit., Pp. 692-697.

68. The physical meeting evidently did not take place.

69. Anderson, William 1943. "The Rôle of Political Science" *The American Political Science Review* Vol. 37 No. 1, Pp. 1-17.

70. Friedrich, Carl J. 1947. "Political Science in the United States In Wartime" *The American Political Science Review* Vol. 41 No. 5, p. 980 and Pp. 978-989 generally.

71. Appleby, Paul 1950. "Political Science, The Next Twenty-Five Years" *The American Political Science Review* Vol. 44 No. 3, p. 925.

72. ibid., p. 931.

73. See David, Paul 1992. "The APSA Committee on Political Parties: Some Reconsiderations of Its Work and Significance" *Perspectives on Political Science* Vol. 21 No. 2, p. 71. Ranney "An Unrehearsed Interview" op. cit.

74. Paul David notes that he was deeply involved in the entire project. I have not discussed his role given the absence of public documents produced by him during this time.

75. Marx, Fritz Morstein 1944. "The American Road from War to Peace: A Symposium" *American Political Science Review* Vol. 38 No. 6, Pp. 1114-1191.; ibid., 1945. "Maintaining High-Level Production and Employment: A Symposium" Vol. 39 No. 6., Pp. 1119-1179.

76. Schattschneider, E.E. 1945. "Party Government and Employment Policy" *American Political Science Review* Vol. 39 No. 6, Pp. 1152-3.

77. ibid., p. 1155.

78. ibid., p. 1151.

79. As noted Herring "An Unrehearsed Interview" op. cit. I am taking Herring's agreement with Evron Kirkpatrick's history of the *Parties* committee to mean that he believed it to be a faulty idea at the time, though he did not date the time he disapproved of the Committee's work.; Note also the comments of Avery Leiserson to Pendleton Herring. "I am taking the libery of sending you a memorandum (critical again!) analyzing the Schattschneider repfort of the A.P.S.A. Committee on Political Parties. I have set a copy to Co.O. Key and wonder if ou would be good enought to forward this one to Arthur Macmahon if it makes enought sense not to throw it in the wastebasket. [par] Your intmiation of a summer conference on political behavior interests me very much, and I shall look forward to hearing from you further with considerable anticipation. I am staying in Chicago to finish my manuscript on "The Politics of Labor" this summer -- in the patter of "The Politics of Democracy." With kindest personal Regards, Sincerely yours, Avery Leiserson." Memorandum to Pendleton Herring From Avery Leiserson, May 14, 1949. RAC-SSRC Collection, Accession 2, Series I, Subseries 76 Box 470 Folder 5831.

80. Schattschneider, E.E. 1948. *The Struggle for Party Government* (College Park: University of Maryland Program in American Civilization). Referring to the second chapter (entitled "Areas of Ignorance") of this pamphlet Schattschneider stated that "The title... I have borrowed from Pendleton Herring, a distinguished scholar who understands the limitations of our knowledge of politics. The truth is that despite the great place of politics in American life we know only a little more about our own politics than we know about the politics of the English or the French... *There now exists no usable or comprehensive source of information concerning American politics."* [p. 13.]

81. Memorandum: William Anderson to Fritz Morstein Marx dated May 31, 1950., Georgetown University Archives, Box 2-4-10 file 11.6. See also Smith, George H. E. 1952 "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System. Evaluation of the 1950 Report" unpublished document., Georgetown University Archives, op. cit..

82. Ranney, Austin "An Unrehearsed Interview" op. cit.

83. Ranney, Austin 1992. "An unrehearsed interview with Austin Ranney" Pi Sigma Alpha Oral History Project of the American Political Science Association. King Library Archives. University of Kentucky. Lexington, Kentucky.; David, Paul T. 1991. "An unrehearsed interview with Paul David" Pi Sigma Alpha Oral History Project of the American Political Science Association. King Library Archives. University of Kentucky. Lexington, Kentucky.; See also David, "The APSA Committee on Political Parties" op. cit. Baffled by the rejection of his article when submitted for publication in 1979, David wrote that it was "declined publication mainly on grounds that it made no new contribution to either research or theory. No comment was made on any possible contribution that it might offer on the history of the discipline or to the ongoing discussion of a controversy that may have become tiresome, but was and is still going on."; Kirkpatrick, Evron 1971 op. cit. "Lasswell, without doubt, is the political scientists who has longest and most consistently called on his colleagues to recognize their responsibility to make political science an effective partner in the policy sciences." [p. 982.] It is difficult not to see Kirkpatrick's comments in light of his own troubles and political connections in 1970. His wife, Jeanne Kirkpatrick was a student of Lasswell's, and her notoriously conservative stances are too well known to mention here. More importantly, Kirkpatrick felt that his reputation had been severely damaged by late 1960s accusations that the APSA had received funds from the CIA. The fact that he was not defended by a disillusioned behaviorist David Easton and the "old lefty" Robert Dahl seems to have set the stage for his attack on what he saw as the origins of idealism in the discipline: late 1940s idealism. For a full account of this incident, see Eulau, Heinz "An unrehearsed interview with Heinz Eulau" Pi Sigma Alpha Oral History Project of the American Political Science Association. King Library Archives. University of Kentucky. Lexington, Kentucky. For a review of Schattschneider's work I have used Adamany, David "The Political Science of E.E. Schattschneider: A Review Essay" 1972. *American Political Science Review* Vol. 66. No. 4, Pp. 1321-1335.

Chapter 6

Consensus Historiography and the Behavioral Reaction in Political Science

> The stability of the body politic in the United States does not rest on such a thin foundation as that suggested by the theories of class conflict or the dominance of occupational interests. The foundation is stronger, and perhaps unfortunately for the observer, the political process itself is more complex, than such simple propositions would suggest.
>
> *David Truman*
> 1951

Previous chapters established the presence of conflicting stances towards New Deal political dilemmas. In chapters one and four I discussed collectivists who supported the co-determination of economic policy and workplace management. In chapters two and three I discussed democratic capitalist "realists" who favored the "professional" administration of interests over collectivist proposals. Throughout, I have contended that the "utopian" collectivist framework was in tension with that of the political realists: collectivists provided a set of ideas that democratic capitalists rejected. In the following paragraphs I contend that it was the extension of the realist perspective that generated the contemporary conception of a "behavioral" political science. Realists sought theoretical perspectives and concrete information useful for generating consensus between labor and other groups *as they existed.* By contrast, activists sought an *expansion* and redefinition of labor group power. The idea of a "behavioral" focus referred ~~to~~ an administrative political stance couched in participatory and scientific terms. In this chapter I examine a major political science text from the late 1940s to suggest the final outline of this contention.

I focus on David Truman's 1951 classic work, *The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion.* The text merits scrutiny not only because of its stated focus on the issues at hand, but because Truman was clearly one of the figures pivotal to the transition from a wartime to a post-war "behavioral" political science. Before Pendleton Herring formed the SSRC Committee on Political Behavior, for example, David Truman and a number of other professors had formed the post-war "New England Committee on Political Behavior Research." This group included political scientists whose names were synonymous with the "behavioral persuasion" -- including SSRC members Oliver Garceau and Earl Latham. Truman's work in that group, as well as his wartime contact with Pendleton Herring and V.O. Key, led to Herring's appointment of both Truman and Key to the SSRC's Committee on Political Behavior in the late 1940s. At that time Key was also engaged in the detailed "behavioral" fieldwork for his classic *Southern Politics in State and Nation*, as well as in encouraging Truman to complete what he thought would be a "minor classic."[1] *The Governmental Process* was, in short, written while Truman was in close touch with a number of scholars actively outlining the shape of the discipline.[2]

Three aspects of Truman's work are central to the idea of "behavioral" research: a unity of interest between democracy and capitalism, his refutation of specific collectivist texts, and his ideas about the roots of scientific objectivity in the idea of equilibrium. In each instance Truman substituted collectivists' views of the polity with democratic capitalist surrogates. Truman claimed the polity was most accurately described as the product of self interested groups seeking narrow goals. The critical point, however, was the *level* of analysis he chose: in using both the group and the *existing* group as the analytical focus he legitimated the idea that a narrow social world defined the world of all political actors.[3] Herring maintained, as noted above, that broader philosophical abstractions were brought to politics by activists and academicians: groups were narrowly interested — and happily so — since elites could then "adjust" their desires.[4] Truman said nothing about academic activism, but did expand on the idea that groups' narrow interest was the proper

point of departure for empirical inquiry. Collectivists certainly thought that groups were narrowly interested, but saw that narrowness as the by product of historical circumstance.

A. Scientific Objectivity and the Unity of Interest Thesis

1) Democracy, Capitalism and Science in Truman's History of Labor

As noted in previous chapters, collectivists were loosely united in their belief that the 19th century conceptions of democracy were in tension with 20th century organizational realities. The reformist application of this perspective varied with differing circumstances relative to the pre-war, wartime and post-war years, but the perspective continually reappeared: Lynd critiqued the idea of a "consumer democracy," and both Lippincot and Lynd called for an activist and anti-bourgeois social science. Similarly, Soule and Lerner called for critical studies in economics and history while *New Republic* activists called for the reform of war agencies, democratic planning, and direct political action in response to the defunding of the OPA and increasingly harsh labor legislation.[5] Just after the war, of course. Lynd lamented the absence of intellectual leadership in those pursuits [6] In the last part of the decade social science journals and religious tracts reacted to what they saw as an assault on their own professions -- in both cases identifying an inappropriate deference to postwar concerns for unthinking obedience to an organizational hierarchy. On a foreboding note, Peter Bachrach claimed that without formal representation, labor groups would be increasingly based on narrow self interest in an antiseptically conceived economic system.[7]

Within this political context it is significant that Truman's work began with an extensive discussion of the need for "objective distance" from the "emotional appeals" of groups. *The Governmental Process* engaged in an encyclopedic documentation of rising and falling groups. Within a smoothly functioning system. There was conflict in the group world, but it was conflict between groups whose goals insured benevolent outcomes: business and labor groups were exposed to mere "disturbances." Truman used the term "disturbances" in three different ways. First, the term suggested the presence of intrinsically manageable problems. Second, these problems were manageable because

disturbances centered on economic interest. Third, he claimed manageability because they were handled within democratic institutions. In support of this claim he stated that groups should be viewed in anti-emotional "formal" terms, and he used labor and business group history as evidence.

The structure of the argument began with an analytic and historical critique of popular views, but relied heavily on a history of the labor movement closely linked to Edwin Nourse, Thurman Arnold, Sumner Slichter, and Avery Leiserson.[8] Truman's opening comments began with the point that contemporary outrage over "group pressure" was a product of popular "muckraking exposes"and that "[groups] perform a political function... that is likely to continue indefinitely." Truman contended that the term "pressure" was designed to inflame, as were most popular portrayals of interest groups. "Cartoonists picture the legislature as completely under the control of sinister, portly, cigar smoking individuals... while a diminutive John Q. Public is pushed aside to sulk in futile anger and pathetic frustration."[9] To displace this "popular" view, Truman referred to Madison's Federalist Paper No. 10, suggesting that contemporaries should accept interest groups as deeply as Madison had: Madison had, after all, written it before interest groups were tempered by political parties. "[H]e saw the struggles of such groups as the essence of the political process."[10] On the other hand, Truman claimed that fear of groups was simply a politically ineffectual stance.

> "A common reaction to the revelations concerning the more lurid activities of political groups is one of righteous indignation. Such indignation is entirely natural. It is likely, however, to be more comforting than constructive. What we seek are correctives, protection, or controls... in what we call democracy, and that will weaken or eliminate those that really threaten that system..."[11]

Correctives were an issue for Truman, but the book's primary focus was on assessing how groups were defined and how they defined the political process. "What do we mean by the term *group?"* and "[w]hat are the social functions of groups?... We may then consider certain general features of the relations between political groups and government in the

United States... Why and under what circumstances do organized groups become involved in the operations of government?"[12] When answering these questions, Truman's response mirrored the democratic capitalists' perspectives on labor and political science.

Truman claimed that the "circumstances" under which groups became involved were intrinsically linked to the protection of their narrow economic goals. Stating that "the social psychologists and cultural anthropologists have done much to explain the manner and extent of group behavior",[13] he went on to note that "...trade associations have emerged in response to changes or disturbances in the habitual relationships (interactions) of groups of individuals and that these associations have had increasing resort to the institutions of government in order to stabilize relationships within and between groups."[14] The source of the impetus to stabilize came from, as the democratic capitalists had noted, the material goals of the labor movement:

> "Evidence of the reasons for the establishment of trade associations is to be found in the major functions that they have usually performed. Although many of the early groups primarily engaged in "innocuous and inconsequential social festivities" that indicate merely an increased rate of interaction, virtually all of them eventually assumed the function of protecting the trade against the rigors of competition and the market, either directly through devices for controlling prices or indirectly through the application of various trading rules.... It provided freer rein to these groups for carrying on the basic functions of relieving the frictions of competition and promoting stability of the market."[15]

Extending his argument, he identified the "natural" tendency for groups to lobby, and used Herring's work to clarify the precise stance of interest groups towards government. He first stated that "[r]ecourse to the institutions of government results both from the need of these groups for help in furthering their aims and from their closely related need of protection from the activities of economic and political rivals..." He then pointed out that "Herring, in fact, states that the major reason for the concern of these trade associations with government action has been, not the promotion of their own interests *per se*, but the defense of their interests, both by fostering legislation or regulation to

control the activities of their rivals and by fighting legislation or regulation that operates to the disadvantage of their members."[16]

The "true" portrayal of employer/employee relations, then, followed a continually defensive strategy. This "disturbance" theory of group formation was that employers formed industries and weak trade associations, employees then formed unions and trade associations, and employers responded in kind:

> "Although it is no doubt incorrect to say that union organization has always preceded association on the other side of the employment relation-employers' groups have tended to form as a result of various circumstances making united action on labor policy desirable - it is nevertheless true that increased strength of workers groups has been one of the circumstances producing such employers associations. Their reasons will be apparent if one refers to the basic functions performed by associations in stabilizing relations between tangent groups."[17]

Through this version of labor history Truman defined both the "natural" character of self interest, and the democratic character of the "modern" system of lobbying to protect that self interest. If the student of politics firmly accepted that perspective, objective analyses could proceed. Groups, he contended, should be viewed as "formal" and anti-emotional entities, and their existence studied as such:

> " In the first place, formal organization is usually a consequence, and therefore an index, of a fairly high frequency of interaction within a group... Secondly, the existence of formal organization in a group suggests a measure of permanence or at least an expectation that the arrangement will be a continuing one... degree[s] of cohesion, expectations of permanence, internal division of labor, and formalized values - intimately affect the survival and influence of the group. If they can be stated even partially through an examination of formal organization, that scrutiny is essential."[18]

Truman blended discussion of specific group processes with the assertion that these processes were both democratic and natural. In a chapter distinguishing between the "Myth and Reality" of groups, for example, he first dispensed with the popular belief that groups were unitary entities, and suggested formal typologies for viewing their internal

complexities. The second section of the chapter was then devoted to showing how the more efficient forms of conflict resolution could be revealed through analysis.

In "Myth and Reality," Truman first stated that groups could be classified according to types of cohesion. In addition to cohesion achieved by geographic location and economic function, he claimed that "the most useful distinction... is that between federated and unitary forms"[19] This claim was critical because of the inefficient conflict resolution he saw among confederated groups. The AFL exemplified an inefficient group process, and the CIO exemplified a step towards improvement. "When the established patterns of interaction.... of the A.F. of L. failed to accommodate these new demands, division and the establishment of a rival organization could not be long postponed."[20] The AFL was essentially confederal because it carried trade autonomy "to such lengths as to nullify the capacity of the Federation to perform most of the functions for which it exists"[21] The point was identical to one that had been made by V.O. Key in his 1945 *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups*: the AFL exhibited the worst features of "traditionalism" resistant to progressive New Deal reforms. Their resistance to progressive change was thus said to be a product of "social lag."[22] Truman carried this idea further, noting that:

> "In the first place, the problem of cohesion almost invariably arises where the constituent units antedate the federal body, as is usually true... Recognition of these hard facts of localism and decentralization by the founders of the A.F. of L., it is generally agreed, was crucial in facilitating the association of highly independent unions in a single national organization... [and yet] weakened the A.F. of L. as a national group. By way of contrast it is significant that the C.I.O., ... has achieved a far more compact and powerful national leadership than its older rival... The character of the compromise [between them] is dependent in no small measure upon the relative age of the national movement and its constituent units."[23]

Truman claimed that functional groups were the most resistant to conflict resolution — a point which made the CIO compare more favorably to the AFl. He stated that:

> "Though potential cleavages of major importance within a group may exist along geographic lines... organization according to function especially tends to

> encourage interaction growing out of specialized subinterests... Adjustment under such conditions is made more difficult because those assuming responsibility for it are removed from regular contact from the rank and file. On the other hand, the nonfunctional, or geographical, basis of organization tends to settle the task of adjusting conflicting subinterests upon the entire leadership at all levels by emphasizing interaction based on more inclusive shared attitudes.[24]

The problem he was identifying was less theoretical than his language suggested. Discussing the characteristics of functionally and geographically based groups was merely a was if scientifically restating the jurisdictional disputes within the AFL and between the AFL and the CIO. The decreasingly reformist CIO was favored as a stability enhancing organization because its federal structure reduced conflict and created stable interest groups:

> "Although the youth of the C.I.O. makes generalization hazardous, it seems apparent... that industrial unionism... will limit the number of points at which jurisdictional conflicts may occur... Just as the age of the superpowers may substitute bigger but less frequent conflicts for the continual minor disturbances of a Balkanized world, so the rivalries of the electrical workers and the automobile workers may surpass those among the building trades in extent, though probably not frequency... its continued cohesion will be partly owing to... such factors as the stronger political drives of an organization deliberately based upon unskilled workers in mass-production industries."[25]

Following this discussion, Truman shifted towards a defense of both federated groups and their "active minority" as predominantly democratic. Whether or not they could be more so, *all* the organizations under examination were to some degree, democratic. This assertion was not only directed at the AFL and the CIO, but at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the NAM. In the first place he claimed that all of these groups' deliberations were democratic simply because they disseminated power to their constituent elements. In addition, their elites were not intrinsically anti-democratic. Discussing the AFL and the CIO he noted that "we find the clearest instances of 'democratic' structural formalities... Such formal arrangements as these are clearly the product of the values and practices of representative democracy, whatever may be the actual operation."[26] In similar discussion of the COC and the NAM he stated that:

> "The Chamber of Commerce... illustrates sharply the symptoms of "centralized control" characteristic of modern large-scale business organizations, though many features of its formal organization show the impress of the democratic mold.... the National Association of Manufacturers, we find, not unexpectedly, the clearest case of concentrated control, both formal and actual. Even here, however, the influence of "democratic" demands is apparent. Like the associations previously described, the N.A.M. holds its annual convention... [with] policy-making functions... open to members and nonmembers alike."[27]

Truman concluded that overall, the organizations were democratic because they were embedded in a democratic society. "In summary, the significance of the 'democratic mold,' which affects all associations and to some degree almost all organizations in our culture is of fundamental importance in the process of group politics. It has a profound relationship to the problem of unity-not only the cohesion of the particular association, but as well the unity of the society of which it is a part. Associations in our culture are expected to be 'democratic.'"[28] If the associations were democratic, then it stood to reason that their leaders could not be described as autocrats. Addressing this possibility, Truman listed the reasons elites were a natural by-product of interest group organization. Not only was leadership simply too time consuming for rank and file workers, but skill acquisition depended upon personality traits and inter-group competition rewarded swift decision making. In all, elites represented a natural stage in the group process.[29]

What needed to be studied was the formal participation in the "group process" and not the sensuous activity of work. Hierarchies were naturally occurring entities, which left open questions as to precisely how they worked: who would lead, how they would do so, and a host of questions for future professional research:

> We are dealing here with the complicated problems of participation. Far too little of a precise nature is known about this realm of human behavior. It is clear, however, that every individual, for both physiological and psychological reasons, develops a pattern of participation or interaction that is standardized within broad limits both in respect to frequency and type. This standard exists for his behavior as a whole, but in the groups in which he interacts it is subject to wide variation, both from group to group at a particular time and from time to time in any one group.[30]

In his discussion of labor and business groups, then, Truman's perspective transformed "misguided" outrage into the even-handed analysis of "participation." Truman's framework required careful scrutiny of the factors which would achieve stabilizing consensus. Studying "the realm of human behavior" was the antithesis of activism: Truman's argument relied on his belief that all groups held the "impress" of a capitalist culture, and the participatory concerns of the democratic culture. By stressing the presence of these two orientations he could claim they existed in formal structures and long term trends. In so doing he discounted the idea of a "true" group interest, and thus attacked a fundamental component of reformist thought.

2.Refuting the Collectivists

The refutation of collectivism was further undertaken through Truman's examination of a small set of texts by C. Wright Mills and Robert Lynd. In Lynd's forward to *Business as a System of Power* (1943), for example, Lynd had claimed that "a world of scientists... have left the problem of the power organization and politics of big business... largely unexplored... [with] concepts of a system conceived not in terms of such things as "power" but of blander processes such as the automatic balancing of the market." He went on to note, characteristically, that "[o]ne stout weapon remains in the hands of the little people at the grass roots of democracy: no one dares to challenge in frontal attack the basic democratic thesis."[31] Similarly, Mills' *New Men of Work* was a clear attempt to combine social science methodology with a more leftist agenda. In that work Mills identified the demographic and psychological characteristics of approximately 500 labor leaders in a way that would help intellectuals mobilize response to an anticipated post-war depression.[32]

Truman's defense did not, as one might have suspected, rest on his claim that the "group process" was intrinsically democratic.[33] It began with a discussion of the interpretative indeterminacy of the "unstructured situations" in everyday life — the recurring assumption of the pressure group thesis. By claiming that all groups existed as freely

formed, indeterminate entities, he could claim that these groups could take on vast arrays of characteristics — indeed, reflected the capitalist "impress" of their "surrounding" society. For better or worse, for example, the "impress" of capitalist society guided the popularity of some groups over others within the realm of public opinion.

According to Truman, the condition of indeterminacy was seized by groups who attempted to manipulate perception to their advantage.[34] Truman's stance was that the academician should be the simple observer of the "propagandist," and try and understand the role the group leaders faced. Truman wrote that "[a] sharp and extensive increase in unemployment occurs. Who is "responsible:" What shall be done? There is a rapid rise in the cost of living. Why? What will control it?...Such questions as these illustrate the recurring situations in which ambiguity affords an opportunity for the group propagandist."[35] It is suggestive that Truman chose these issues. As *New Republic* writers noted, the issue would determine whether unions or corporations were more credible defenders of the public interest. C. Wright Mills was consciously trying to *affect* public opinion, while Truman was advocating a more scholastic study of it.

Truman contended that the open nature of interpretation was offset by "variations in propaganda advantage" favoring business groups. There may have been a democratic ethos defining group participation, but the capitalist ethos arrayed groups into different levels of status. Truman thus continued use of his "prevailing values" thesis to explain the strength of business groups, and the weak nature of the labor movement:

> "The position of a group in the social structure can be roughly equated with the extent to which its objectives and methods are congruent with the prevailing values of society, and the degree of influence that it can exercise through propaganda depends, as we have seen, upon its ability to utilize and to associate itself with these prevailing attitudes. Groups that enjoy high status in the society can best succeed in thus invoking for their purposes the values and attitudes that are held by most of the population. They carry the prestige that goes with such status... This has been a business civilization - not a military, ecclesiastical, or scholarly one... Even within the early labor movements, as was indicated [earlier],

attachment to the dominant attitudes weakened cohesion and limited revisionist efforts.[36]

Unlike Mills or Lynd, Truman claimed that domination had to be revealed through factual evaluation: there simply was no clear evidence identifying business groups' ability to dominate the polity in the way that collectivists had argued. Truman claimed that:

> "The social relationship we call property includes, in part, the power of owners to control the behavior of other people. This power increases as property is concentrated, so that if one is an owner "one can coerce, bend others to one's will, withhold, restrain, settle the fate and alter the fortunes of growing numbers of non-owners without, and increasingly against, their consent."... In the United States there is a considerable measure of evidence to support this contention... [but h]asty generalization is not in order; we cannot responsibly conclude from evidence of the existence of influence that the influence is dominant or controlling, unless there is adequate evidence to support this conclusion. Not only are data of the latter sort not available, but also there is a good deal of information that would lead to a more moderate conclusion."[37]

The defense was based on an assertion about where the burden of proof lay, and why it should remain there. The same issue existed with Herring's contention that realistic reform should "start a steep climb in a low gear."[38] Truman, however, contended that the "moderate conclusion" was needed because business groups had not necessarily dominated policymaking:

> "It may be... that over the past 40 or 50 years the forces unifying business - the labor movement and the expansion of governmental services and costs - have introduced into business generally a discipline that represses political expression of its inner conflicts... The conflicts exist, however, and they may be repressed without being eliminated."[39]

Just as Herring and Lerner had talked past one another in their exchange in 1940, Truman seemed to talk past Lynd.

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3)The Behavioral Mind: The Definition of an Interest

The overall structure of Truman's work proceeded in three stages: the first 4 chapters included a theoretical and historical defense of the "group view," a middle section

discussed the structure and dynamics of groups in general, and a final section outlined group "processes" in arenas such as political parties and formal governmental institutions. Throughout the work, disciplinary lacunae were identified and suggestions made for future research areas.[40] The deeper structure of the text, however, was its contention that society consisted of a broad, infinitely complex, and often amorphous set of interests which varied in their types and levels of political significance, consciousness, organization, and inter-group conflict. Most importantly, this infinite complexity housed a perfection for Truman: he clearly stated that new interests arose to challenge outmoded ones, and those freely operating responses were arranged into an attractive "mosaic."[41] The world of groups made up a community which cherished fair play within "the rules of the game."[42]

Truman's realism was based on three assertions: that group divisions were intrinsically natural, that these natural divisions were in equilibrium, and that the groups being considered should be those *already* in existence. Focusing on the natural divisions of labor, he stated that "[i]n a simple society in which all activities-economic, religious, political-are carried on within the family, the division of labor is rudimentary... [but] becomes more complex as the routine activities of existence alter in conformity with altered techniques for dealing with the environment... variation of group life among human cultures apparently grow out of the daily activities of their participants..."[43] He then identified the most important phenomenon between these divisions as a strong tendency towards equilibrium both within and between groups.[44] Within groups he stated that "this tendency to maintain or revert to equilibrium is what is meant by the stability of an institution... The basic propositions... have been sufficiently tested to give them strong presumptive validity."[45] Between groups he noted that "...serious disequilibrium [results in]... the formation of new groups that may function to restore the balance."[46] In the face of these broad trends, Truman thought that reformist proposals to regulate groups were highly limited -- calling them "nostrums and palliatives."[47] Proclamations concerning the

"collective good" were "propaganda activities" used by established groups seeking to maintain their power.[48]

His assertion about group diversity and equilibria rested, however, on his definition of the term "interest." According to Truman, the term needed to be synonymous with "attitudes," since organized groups were based on shared attitudes that had resulted in patterned behavior. Truman knew this contention ran counter to recommendations of writers like sociologist Robert MacIver, who contended that productive analysis required separation of subjective states from more objective phenomena like wealth.[49] Truman, however, sidestepped the issue by making the claim that no objective entity existed without an attitude towards it: Attitudes and social structure were, somehow, synonymous. Again suggesting a rejection of collectivism, his first example began by rejecting examination of workplace structure:

> "there were no oil attitudes prior to the time when the productive behaviors of men led them to do something with petroleum... an array of attitudes with respect to that use has developed -- that it should not be wasted, that it should be marketed in a particular way... and so on. Some of these attitudes are represented by interest groups asserting that the behaviors implied by the attitudes should be encouraged, discouraged, or altered. The physical features of oil production have no significance for the student of society apart from the attitudes, or interests, and the behaviors they suggest."[50]

Truman maintained, again, the need to focus only on "observable demands" and "implied behaviors." Inquiry was to focus on the "shared attitudes towards what is needed or wanted in a given situation, observable as demands or claims upon other groups in the society."[51]

A deeper justification for this stance came from the younger Avery Leiserson's 1942 definition of "interest." "Interest," according to Leiserson, had to be conceived of in observable terms because administrative practice required it. Consciously building on Pendleton Herring's 1936 work on *Public Administration*, Leiserson claimed that

effective administration required bold attempts to coordinate existing interests into a self governing bodies. Also rejecting the "utopian" agenda he stated that:

> "[T]o restrict the meaning of social integration to an idealized, rational conception of social harmony, particularly one which happens to be held by a particular student, administrator, or board, is to fail to take into account the realistic view of politics as a continuous process of introducing an uncertain stability into a constantly changing complex of nonrational social forces. The purposes and results of public administration are a part of politics... and it is one of the functions of public administration to aid in this stabilizing process..."[52]

Leiserson's definition still left open the possibility that administrators might have to deal with the more amorphous desires of groups. This possibility, however, was eliminated by further definition. "[I]ndividuals' interests of enduring value are those which succeed in being embodied in some kind of institutional practices or ways of thinking and behaving..."[53] Leiserson's "realistic view" was that one could only administer behaviors manifested in formed groups.

Though Truman was a recognized practitioner and writer in the field of public administration, his writings on *The Governmental Process* did not mention the topic.[54] Yet the entire thrust of his work remained within that perspective: what tools and theories were needed to conceive of politics in terms of an integrated, equilibrating process? Thus, when Truman discussed labor and business, he did so in ways which discounted the conflictual. In one instance Truman claimed that "[t]he justification for emphasizing groups as basic social units... is the uniformities of behavior produced through them."[55] In his first discussion of labor, he recalled the case of Western Electric plant workers who resisted management attempts to increase efficiency. Exploitation was not at issue, but an academic point was: workers resisted factory modification by "subverting norms." Workers restricted output in the new piece-work system by calling each other "rate busters," "chiselers" and "squealers." Truman treated this as an example of the "group experience" which groups used to maintain their structure. In discussing the character of the employer/employee relationship, he also used an anti-conflictual frame:

> "the functional differentiation of employer and employee permitted the development of attitudes (interests) peculiar to each. Subsequent and varying disturbances inevitably increased interaction among workers, and the emergence of associations to stabilize these relationships followed."[56]

Truman's point was that workers were to be seen as entities with attitudes different from employers. The same held true for their associations:

> "With variations.... such 'pressure groups' as the C.I.O., the National Association of Manufacturers, and the American Farm Federation Bureau develop as well as reflect uniformities in the attitudes and behavior of their members. These patterns are, or are rapidly becoming, the primary data of the social scientist. To identify and interpret these uniformities - their dynamics, their inter-connection, and their relative strength - is the most effective approach to understanding a society, 'primitive' or complex, or a segment of it such as its political institutions."[57]

Though it was identified as the application of social-psychological knowledge to the arena of politics, Truman defined groups in the way that Appleby, Hayek, Herring, and Nourse had claimed necessary for political stability and economic growth. Just as those writers emphasized the need to avoid "idealism" and focus on the local and regional experiences of groups, Truman claimed the presence of primary and secondary associations identified the appropriate arena for analysis, and one in which there was manageable conflict. It was a point inextricably linked to the assertions made by other democratic capitalists. As Arnold, Harris, Hayek, Herring, Holcombe and Nourse had argued, Truman was claiming that mediated interaction between organized groups resulted in economic equilibrium and general progress for the polity.[58]

B. Summary: The Unity of Interest Thesis and Group Analysis

The "governmental process" Truman described was a maddeningly detailed, Escher-like universe. By taking Truman's political context and "democratic capitalist" leanings as the fundamental point of departure, however, a critical aspect of his text is clear: the capitalist concerns of interest groups embodied their democratic surroundings, and those democratic groups embodied their capitalist surroundings. The two "attitudes" worked in tandem, for each reinforced and proved the validity of other. Labor groups had low status

because they existed in a capitalist society, but labor groups were democratic because they existed in a democratic society. Business groups had high status because they existed in a capitalist society, but business groups... and so on. It was a "process" because, as interests "naturally" emerged and changed, they were defined by and worked between these two "attitudes."

For present purposes, it is only necessary to highlight his conception of their intrinsic unity within his "scientific" claims. Truman's "equilibrium" was not a reference to balance between discrete groups, but balance between groups struggling with, being defined by, and using the tools of, democratic and capitalist "attitudes." This was abundantly clear in Truman's history of the AFL, the CIO, the NAM and the COC -- groups which were comfortably both capitalist *and* democratic. Truman's science, similarly, insured that outcome. By claiming that workplace practices were relevant only when generating "attitudes," he sidestepped collectivist calls to include workplace concerns in political debate. This dispensation led to a unique conception of "observable" phenomena -- the restriction to observation of *organized* interests. By conflating social practices with subjective states, Truman reified "democratic attitudes" and "capitalist attitudes." These "prevailing values" were then reintroduced as social forces operating on emerging and organized interests.

The concluding chapter of the text reinforces this assertion. In that chapter Truman addressed the more abstract aspects of "interests" while discussing future threats to American political equilibrium. Expanding on earlier claims, Truman emphasized the importance of the infinite number of "attitudes-interests" in *potential* groups. Potential groups were more amorphous entities, but Truman claimed that a "majority potential interest" existed and stated their democratic attitudes were critical to equilibrium:

> "Such 'majority' interests are significant not only because they may become the basis for organized interest groups but also because the 'membership' of such potential groups overlaps extensively the memberships of the various organized interest groups... These widely held but unorganized interests are what we have

> previously called the 'rules of the game.'...interests the serious disturbance of which will result in organized interaction and the assertion of fairly explicit claims for conformity. In the American system the 'rules' would include the value generally attached to the dignity of the individual human being, loosely expressed in terms of 'fair dealing' or more explicitly verbalized in formulations such as the Bill of Rights..."[59]

Equilibrium was enhanced by the multiple memberships individuals had between organized groups, but more so by their intrinsic "membership" associated with illusive "majority values." Reformers who emphasized class interests threatened isolation of organized groups from these fundamental values. Class based reform proposals were, in short, a threat to American stability:

> "The expectations implied by the [existence of] widespread unorganized interests characteristic of the United States would seem to require the existence of a great many patterns of interaction that cut across, or are independent of, class lines. If this be true, then any tendency for organized interest groups of the association type to operate within class lines or to be much more numerous in some classes of the population than in others may be a source of political instability..."[60]

Like Herring, Truman felt that multiple publics should characterize the American landscape. Unlike Herring, Truman claimed that multiple publics could safely contain tensions generated by differences in wealth only if their narrow values were broadened by exposure to the democratic majority's "interest-attitudes."

> "Overlapping memberships among organized interest groups and among these and potential groups is, as we have seen, the principal balancing force in the politics of the United States. We have further observed that these unifying widespread interests are not always mutually consistent and unambiguous. Variations in group experiences and, consequently, in frames of reference invite differences in the importance attached to these partially inconsistent interests, and their ambiguity permits divergent rationalizations in terms of these diversified frames of reference. Thus if the society has developed great differences in personal wealth, egalitarian demands may be rated above the claims of peaceful change by those in less privileged positions; and orderly adjustment may be regarded as more important than freedom of speech or assembly by those whose economic status is high. Each segment, moreover, can rationalize its preferences in terms of its own view of "fairness" and "individual dignity."[61]

Without blending, trouble was sure to follow. It may not have been possible to blend organized interests, but it was critical to expose all groups to the "majority values" by enhancing public knowledge about the presence and values of specific groups. "The effective activation of widespread unorganized interests depends upon the character of the society's means of communication, broadly conceived..."[62]

The tenuous character of these "majority values" generated the zeal which has come to characterize the "revolutionary" passion of the behavioralists. It certainly did, at least, for Truman. Discussion in *Governmental Process* extended to the need for research on those critical "majority values":

> "Adequate research has never been done on the incidence of widespread unorganized interests and on the extent to which they are central in the attitude hierarchies of various segments of the population. Such research needs to be carried on not only in terms of demographic aggregates, but also on the basis of classifications that reflect the relative power of individuals in organized groups..."

What they would study was emphasized by the very entities which Truman thought would generate "morbific politics": rising beliefs in a class based or racially repressive society, or those who would ignore the presence of legitimate "rising interests." With respect to organized interests he stated that "[c]aste and class interpretations of widespread unorganized interests may be at least as ready a source of instability as conflict between more restricted organized groups." The deeper threat to organized interests, however, came from organized groups failing to incorporate rising interests into the polity:

> "[Equilibrium is] not threatened by the existence of a multiplicity of organized groups so long as the 'rules of the game' remain meaningful guides to action, meaningful in the sense that acceptance of them is associated with some minimal recognition of group claims. In the loss of such meanings lie the seeds of the whirlwind."[63]

Because it was a "class" system, corporatist reform represented one of Truman's "seeds." Beyond incorporation of blacks into the polity, however, it is not clear just what "emerging" interests he viewed as legitimate. If his history of business and labor is any

indication, they would be judged to the degree they conformed to his highly specific conception of "the rules of the game."

It was out of Truman's need to monitor "majority values" and "group equilibrium" that statistical assessment of the population moved to the center of the discipline. There was no mention of this in *Governmental Process*, but it is clear in other arenas. In Truman's SSRC report on the work of the late 1940s Committee on Political Behavior, he stated that "[b]ecause the political behavior orientation implies a major emphasis on systematic research and upon empirical method, it necessarily aims at being quantitative whenever possible."[64] More importantly, Truman and other SSRC members were not going to be at all tolerant of non-behavioral foci. In the same SSRC report he stated that:

> "Properly speaking, political behavior is not a "field" of social science; it is not even a "field" of political science. In fact, it would be unfortunate if research on this subject were to be considered the exclusive province of a small group of specialists... To treat it as a "field" coordinate with... public law, state and local government, international relations, and so on... would be to defeat its major aim. That aim includes an eventual reworking and extension of most of the conventional "fields" of political science, inasmuch as the point of view is relevant to any study of a specialized segment of government... in which the investigator is concerned with processes... This can be supplied only by systematic observations of actual behavior, not by pure speculation or by the exegesis of texts."[65]

Truman, as with others, had begun firing the first shots of the "behavioral revolution." It had begun with a rejection of the "utopian speculation" of New Deal radicals, but was later directed at anyone involved in mere "textual exegesis." This not only included a rejection of philosophy as a defensible practice within the profession, but followed Herring's call for a scientific elite to seize the discipline.[66]

In its extension of a pre-existing paradigm of "scientism," Truman's post-war embrace of social psychology and statistical methodology may be described as part of a mere "reformation."[67] In its unflinching rejection of "traditional" political theorists and legal-institutional analysts, his post war work may be described as "revolutionary." If Truman's

reference to the period's concerns with labor radicalism and class conflict are any indication whatsoever, these descriptions of the SSRC's work are deeply misleading. Behavioralism was too central to the rejection of New Deal reform ideas, too deeply rooted in an elite administrative perspective, and too unwilling to engage in the exchange of ideas to avoid a more severe label. The "remarkable cult" from Harvard, the University of Chicago, and the SSRC generated, in form and content, the "behavioral reaction." For all its profound devotion to "The Individual" as the focus of inquiry, or its supposedly benign roots in statistical methodology and social psychology,[68] the "behavioral revolution" had a darker history. It was the colonization of political science by the "scientific elites" in public administration who were frightened and suspicious of the reformist dreams of the late New Deal.

1. The term "minor classic" was, according to Truman, used by Key while Key was encouraging Truman to write *Governmental Process*. The text being referred to is Truman, David 1971 [1951]. *The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion* (New York: Knopf). For a detailed recount see Truman, David 1979. "An unrehearsed interview with David B. Truman" Pi Sigma Alpha Oral History Project of the American Political Science Association. King Library Archives. University of Kentucky. Lexington, Kentucky. See also, Heard, Alexander 1989."An unrehearsed interview with Alexander Heard" Pi Sigma Alpha Oral History Project of the American Political Science Association. King Library Archives. University of Kentucky. Lexington, Kentucky. For further discussion of Key, see Harvard, William C. "V.O. Key Jr.: A Brief Profile" in Key, V.O. 1993 [1949]. *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press) Pp. xxvii-xxxvi., and Heard, Alexander 1993. "Introduction to the New Edition" in ibid., Pp. xxi-xxv.

2. Indeed, the work has endured. The work has been the point of departure for more contemporary political scientists who reformulated his "disturbance" theory of interest group formation, and is still cited with astonishing frequency. Truman is a central concern of Mancur Olson's, *The Logic of Collective Action*. op. cit. Similarly, Terry Moe revises Olson's theory, but traces his work back to Truman in *The Organization of Interests* op. cit. In the Social Science Citation Index, the average number of citations for *The Governmental Process* between 1990 and 1996 was approximately 30 citations per year.

3. Using the group level he was also, however, able to claim a critical stance towards classic liberal views of a polity controlled by solitary economic men.

4. See Herring, *The Politics of Democracy* op. cit., Chapter 4.

5. As discussed in chapters One and Three, above.

6. As noted in chapters One, Three, and Four.

7. This was, as noted in previous chapters, as economists Seymour Harris, Edwin Nourse, Thurman Arnold and others had predicted.

8. As indicated by his footnotes, the bulk of Truman's analyses in chapters 4 and 6 rely on the work of Millis, Harry A. and Montgomery, Royal E., 1945. *Organized Labor* (New York: McGraw Hill) and Ross, Arthur M., 1948. *Trade Union Wage Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press). As I indicate below, particularly with Harry Millis, Truman is using a labor history universally accepted by the political economists discussed in chapter three of this dissertation. As noted by Tomlins 1985 op. cit., Pp. 197-230, Avery Leiserson and Harry Millis were part of the "technocratic" generation of John R. Commons' scholars who sought to derail the utopian goals of the pre-1940 NLRB. As Tomlins notes, the early work of the board not only focused on an excessively legal paradigm for assessing bargaining units and adherence to collective bargaining agreements, they did so out of a "utopian" commitment to individual worker's rights. The

concern of Leiserson, Millis, and even commons was clearly to establish a more informal "dispute" settlement mechanism that would decrease dispute resolution time and enhance productivity. Whether or not there was a direct connection between the NLRB and Thurman Arnold or Edwin Nourse is unclear. There is no reference to contact between Arnold and Nourse in Brinkley's *The End of Reform* op. cit., or in Irons, *The New Deal Lawyers*. op. cit. It *is* clear, however, that Arnold, Millis, Leiserson and Nourse all sought the structure of unions and collective bargaining arrangements which emphasized high productivity over individual rights.

9. Truman, *Governmental Process* op. cit., p. 3.

10. ibid., p. 5.

11. ibid., p. 12.

12. ibid., pp. 10-13, entitled "The Problem," outline the contents of the book, and centered around outlining the scope and goals of the analysis, rather than developing solutions to identified problems.

13. ibid., p. 17.

14. ibid., p. 74-5.

15. ibid., Pp. 77-8.

16. ibid., Pp. 79-80.

17. ibid., p. 82.

18. ibid., Pp. 112-113.

19. ibid., p. 115.

20. ibid., Pp. 73-4.

21. ibid., p. 118-9.

22. Schattschneider, *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups* op. cit.

23. Truman, *Governmental Process* ibid., p. 121.

24. ibid., p. 123.

25. ibid. pp. 125-6. There are references to Commons throughout the Chapter, and the conclusion is essentially identical to Common's summary of the AFL in *The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* cited in ibid., Truman.

26. ibid., p. 130.

27. ibid., Pp. 136-7

28. ibid., p. 138.

29. ibid., Pp. 149-153.

30. ibid., p. 155.

31. Lynd, Robert S. in Brady, Robert A., 1943. *Business as a System of Power* (New York: Columbia University Press) Pp. xvi and xvii.

32. Mills, C. Wright 1948. *The New Men of Power: America's Labor Leaders* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company). Pp. 3-46 and 287-291 discuss the general nature of his belief in the need for an interactive view of labor intellectuals, labor leaders, and activist union members to counter the traditions of conservative unionism.

33. It was, however, preceded by these claims, and was inseparable from them.

34. Truman, *Governmental Process* op. cit., p. 247.

35. ibid.

36. ibid., Pp. 288-9.

37. ibid., Pp. 245-6.

38. ibid., p. 166.

39. ibid., Pp. 256-7.

40. ibid., Pp. vii-xii.

41. ibid., p. 43.

42. As evidenced in the indexing, the term "rules of the game" is used at least 24 times in the text, and introduced in the chapter wherein the source of group and social cohesion is maintained. See ibid., p. 159.

43. ibid., Pp. 25-6 Truman's classification schema rests upon the same assumption, as discussed on pages 33-43, and pages 56-65.

44. The same point made by Nourse, chapter 3.

45. Truman., ibid., p. 27.

46. ibid., p. 31.

47. ibid., Pp. 524-535.

48. ibid., Pp. 213-261.

49. MacIver, Robert "Interests" in *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* cited in *Governmental Process* p. 34.

50. ibid.

51. ibid., p. 33-4.

52. Leiserson, *Administrative* Regulation op. cit., p. 4.

53. ibid., p. 6.

54. As noted in chapter 2.

55. Truman was rejecting the individual as the unit of analysis, at the same time he was defining groups in apolitical terms. He does, on p. 17 of *Governmental Process* op. cit., for example, claim the uselessness of state-of-nature style arguments, suggesting that he is rejecting philosophical perspectives on political analysis As noted below, however, the bulk of the text appears to be a rejection of those who become overly involved in the appeals of discrete groups.

56. ibid., p. 67.

57. ibid., p. 21.

58. More accurately for Nourse and Herring, as indicated in Chapter 2 and 3, would be the "light" or "professional" or "scientific" administration of interests.

59. ibid., p. 512.

60. ibid., Pp. 523-4.

61. ibid., Pp. 520-1.

62. ibid., p. 516.

63. ibid., p. 524.

64. Truman, David 1951. "The Implications of Behavior Research" *Items* (New York: Social Science Research Council) Vol. 5 No. 4, p. 39.

65. ibid., Pp. 37-8.

66. Like Truman, a SSRC Committee on Political Behavior member Samuel Eldersveld noted in 1951 that it was high time the discipline rejected the "wisdom" approach to the study of politics, and focus on quantification. Eldersveld's comments followed both familiar and unfamiliar lines. Like Herring, he claimed that research "agendas" be established centering around scientific training and generalizable hypothesis. Unlike Herring, he went so far as to imply that political philosophers of the past were antidemocratic. See Eldersveld, Samuel J. 1951 "Theory and Method in Voting Behavior Research" *Journal of Politics* Vol. 13., Pp. 70-87.

67. This is the interpretation of John Gunnell, *The Descent of Political Theory* op. cit.

68. Heinz Eulau 1992. "A Tribute to David Easton" Comments delivered at the 1992 Conference of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.; David Easton 1953. *The Political System: An Inquiry Into the State of Political Science* (New York: Knopf) Pp. 233-265 and 1951. "The Decline of Modern Political Theory" *Journal of Politics* Vol. 13 Number 1, Pp. 36-58. Heinz Eulau 1981. "On Revolutions That Never Were" *The Handbook of Political Behavior* (New York: Plenum Press) Pp. viii-ix.; David Truman 1955. "The Impact on Political Science of the Revolution in the Behavioral Sciences" *Research Frontiers in politics and Government* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution) Pp. 203-217, although it should be noted that in his earlier work on *The Governmental Process* that developments in the social sciences had made it possible to write that book. Note also the comments of John Walhlke on this point. "How it began in protest against formalistic, historicist and juristic conceptions of political science's subject matter... needs no retelling here." John Wahlke 1973. "Pre-Behavioralism in Political Science" *American Political Science Review* Vol. 73 No. 1, p. 9; Eulau, ibid., p. xi., and "Political Science in Bert F. Hoselitz ed. *A Reader's Guide to the Social Sciences* (New York: The Free Press, 1970) Pp. 172-3.; Herbert Simon "The State of American Political Science: Professor Lowi's View of Our Discipline" *PS* Vol. 26 No. 1, (March, 1993) p. 49. The assertion that wartime employment fueled the behavioral "revolution" is not only made by Simon, but also made in Waldo, Dwight 1975. "Political Science: Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise" in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *The Handbook of Political Science* (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co.) Pp. 50-62 and to a lesser extent reiterated in David Robertson, "The Return to History and the New Institutionalism in Political Science" *Social Science History* (Summer, 1993).

Epilogue

The so-called "lessons" of history are for the most part the rationalizations of the victors. History is written by the survivors.

Max Lerner
1938

Six years after the initial 1945 SSRC declaration of the need for an administrative theory of political behavior, its Committee on Political Behavior published its first report, entitled "Research on the Political Process." The committee had not only proceeded in fits and starts, the report's contents were controversial. Specifically, there was concern about the validity of the idea that political participation existed on a "continuum," and that persons placed along that continuum had access to "multiple decision points" to affect public policy formation. Nonetheless, Pendleton Herring declared that the idea would be kept, and the published report reflected committee unity. Along the continuum, research could reveal psychological, economic and sociological behaviors generating the democratic input into the "governmental process."[1]

There is supposedly something benign about the idea that participation exists along a mere continuum, and something supposedly benign about the idea that research will reveal the sights and levels of citizens' input into decisionmaking along that continuum. It is only in historical perspective, I have contended, that one can identify the political character of this perspective and the norms that have guided its expansion as a research tradition. Among protobehavioralists, the idea of an overarching commonwealth began with the assertion that groups must moderate their demands for direct political

participation (lest they generate class conflict), and defer to the benign direction of administrators. It was Charles Merriam who claimed that American democracy had freed people to focus on the non-workplace aspects of their lives, and that it was up to administrators to establish the conditions of fair play, such as the improved use of natural resources and credit mechanisms. It was Herring who had contended that labor groups and utopian ideologues needed to "play the game of politics" in a way that allowed administrators to oversee the conditions for fair play, (such as countercyclical spending) and the moderation of intergroup conflicts through a fragmented party system. In comparison to those who sought to enhance direct participation, the CPB's concept of the "continuum" could have only one meaning: an identification of the reasons why direct participation and reformist impulses were not necessary.

The history of administrative theory was far more complex than that summary suggests, however. The SSRC theorists under examination here generated, I think, layers of ideas in their procession from the initial concerns with class conflict to the empirical investigation of the "continuum" of participation. They began by discussing the need for the moderation of groups' demands, and moved onto the creation of an idea of a "middle" which workers could promote themselves into by an act of will (as with Holcombe) or as an act of pseudo self-examination (as with Harold Lasswell). Moreover, if administrators were going to leave their roots as the narrow interpreters of legislative mandate, it required a new definition of their own role. This, of course, included the ideas of scientifically trained agents in mediation (as suggested by Edwin Nourse) or simple "clarifiers" about the directions public trends would and should take (again, Harold Lasswell's idea). As indicated, it proceeded under the presupposition that there was a basic unity of interest between labor and business. This idea was immeasurably deepened by Truman, however, who wrote a history of American politics which continually repeated one point: groups battled for material gain, but had no real differences beyond that. Economic conflicts were mere "disturbances." Considered more generally, the only real questions surrounding the presence or absence of democracy occurred at the

aggregate level. And it was hardly Truman's work; he had borrowed heavily from the histories of labor written by the conservatives of the National Labor Relations Board.

The idea of a benign "continuum" masks another aspect of this history: the idea of a research agenda. A research agenda might conceivably identify a set of common concerns in which scholars voluntarily participate. It is manifestly clear, however, that Herring's definition of it included the creation of a caste system of producers and consumers within the profession. I will not speculate at length on whether or not the Committee on Political Behavior kept that as a goal, or achieved it for that matter. But the idea that behavioralism was, in general, a benevolent affair flies in the face of Herring's belief in the need for rigid research hierarchies, and to exhibit unflinching intolerance towards reform oriented scholarship. David Truman similarly declared that behavioralism was not going to be a mere subdiscipline within the profession, just as Avery Leiserson wrote anxiously in 1950 of his desire to join Herring in his "missionary" work.[2] The idea that no "revolution" took place was in part generated by Heinz Eulau in 1970 when he claimed that the fervor associated with the "behavioral revolution," including the phrase "Young Turk," was produced by its 1960s critics — the "rear guard of the ancestral order." Eulau stated that "[i]n seeking to slay the behavioral dragon, these antagonists of the new political science harmed themselves more than their imagined enemies." An ancestral order may have originally generated the term, but Truman was willingly using the term by 1950, as was Almond in 1989.[3] Eulau continues to claim that there was no revolution and that it was a benevolent "renaissance."[4] The claim utterly misdescribes Herring's work as well as the work of the CPB members more generally.

The idea that behavioralism was somehow a "method of the center" between capitalism and socialism sidesteps the fact that its origin was among administrators, and that its very practices in the profession attempted to produce a hierarchical order from the very beginning. Compared to their counterparts in the period under examination, contemporary small college professors or unaffiliated researchers no doubt appear as more of an oddity

than as equals within a diverse profession: datasets, I would argue, have become a significant part of the profession's currency. There are, supposedly, mint issues, good and bad counterfeits, and limited admissions to the profession for those who do not own and use them. Whatever level of hierarchy exists, however, one point is quite clear: the concept of behavioralism was *not* a rejection of legal institutionalism, as the old story goes. It was, I think, a language *within* institutionalism, or *for* it, perhaps. There was, true enough, no discussion of constitutional law or contemplation of the offices and powers outlined by each year's legislative achievments. But behavioralism was hardly separate from institutional study. Assertions to the contrary, I contend, are examining only the most superficial aspects of the SSRC's history.

A far more detailed examination of the history of the behavioral movement is clearly in order. In outline form I have nonetheless attempted to show that members of the Social Science Research Council played a critical role in joining a contested concept of administration with the concept of political science more generally. The histories of the two "fields," however, appear to be seen as utterly separate in both descriptions of the past and in present practice. In what way this has defined our conception of the profession is unclear. One sees assertions of a "technocratic" or administrative orientation to empirical inquiry, as though the profession inherited the perspective through some mystical means. Similarly, if a perspective stressing order and stability has dominated the profession, parity would suggest the full acceptability of alternative categories — such as experiential orientations to political phenomena. On a related issue is the degree to which SSRC theorists' concept of administration have muffled other administrative traditions or approaches to the analysis of public policy. The supposed failure of the work of the APSA Committee on Responsible Parties seems to have in subsequent years burried the idea of institutional reform as the Parties' group saw it. As noted above, however, some of its original members still see that attempt, and the progressive tradition which informed it, as important. A more coherent discussion of the varying concepts of administration, and their fate, seems worthy of further inquiry.

The theorists who criticized the early behavioral transformation might well be remembered for their alternative perscriptions for the profession. Following their leads, emphases on generalism, advocacy, historical methodology, case studies, civic education, race, class and gender analyses or textual exegesis need waste little time attempting to portray their work as "scientific" in the formal, hierarchical and disengaged sense that the CPB embraced. As noted above, Appleby described the attempt to sidestep discussions of value in political science as an "unimaginative business." Little wonder, then, that recent calls for the profession have been for "passionate" analyses.[5] There may be good reasons to critique the findings of those who do not embrace "mainstream" techniques or topics, but their rejection of a paradigm rooted in a conservative version of late New Deal administrative practice should hardly be one of them.

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